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# AFTER HUMANISM—WHAT?

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THE TITLE of this paper suggests that humanism stands for something sufficiently well-defined for purposes of study, that it is now ceasing to flourish as an influential factor in human affairs, and that the situation thus created confronts the human race with a problem upon the solution of which our whole destiny depends. The dictionary definition of humanism—"devotion to human interests, a system concerned with human (not divine) interests"—hardly helps us to understand the true import of the term. The above definition implies that humanism, if not necessarily hostile to religion, is at least not passionately concerned about the supernatural, if the latter word is taken in any sense to indicate otherworldliness. The humanist has his feet firmly planted on the earth. It is man as a denizen of this planet rather than as an immortal soul which claims his attention. Admittedly, the term *humanism* is vague and somewhat elusive and the only way to give it greater precision is by an historical study of the modern period. Completeness, of course, would demand a survey of the whole human scene from China to Peru. It would be important, for example, to consider the humanism of the classical Chinese sages. Since some limitation is inevitable, we shall confine our attention to that period of European history which derives from the Renaissance and the Reformation and which, passing via the English, French, and Russian Revolutions, has produced the world in which we now live.

Most students of modern history are usually presented with a certain picture of the course and meaning of events which runs as follows. During the Middle Ages, the intellect and the emotions of men in Europe were imprisoned by a rigid theology which allowed no truly independent thought, whilst their daily life was utterly subject to the oppressive discipline of an all-dominant ecclesiastical institution from which there was no escape. If it was suggested that Thomas Aquinas was a first-class mind, comparable to an Aristotle or a Kant, it was hinted that if his intellect was of outstanding quality, nevertheless the fact that his conclusions were dictated in advance by the tyrannical queen of the sciences prevented him from becoming a truly great philosopher. That this is a travesty of the truth has been shown conclusively to the open-minded by the works of such men as Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. This is not to infer

that no legitimate criticisms can be made either of Thomism or of the Middle Ages in general. Still less does it commit us to all that Roman Catholicism claims for that period. It only modifies profoundly the superficial judgment of many eighteenth-century thinkers that the mediæval period was one of gross ignorance and barbarity when compared to their enlightened selves.

Nevertheless, it would be generally agreed that it was the revived interest in Greek and Roman literature at the beginning of the modern period which prepared the way for the more significant developments which have taken place since then. The Renaissance was a complex event, not easy to summarize. It would betoken a lack of perspective to suggest that there was no interest in human life in this world in the so-called "ages of faith." The hard-drinking, hard-fighting barons, the stories of Chaucer, the student songs all testify to a powerful strain of sensuousness, not to say sensuality, beneath the apparently ascetic atmosphere of mediæval life. The study of the ancient literature can also be traced even earlier to the founding of the great European universities in the twelfth century and afterwards. The impression is sometimes given by certain modern and self-styled humanists that the Renaissance was simply a reversion to the classical standards and attitudes, that it was essentially hostile to the Christian tradition, and that it liberated men from their theological repressions and freed their pent-up spontaneity. This, however, is a prejudiced reading of a complex intellectual movement. If Giordano Bruno and Benevenuto Cellini are taken as typical figures, then such a picture might be true, though even they have a certain self-consciousness which proves them to be children of the Christian tradition even in their repudiations. In the early days at least, the popes were not averse to the new learning and gave it much encouragement. Nor would it be fair to dismiss Erasmus, Sir Thomas More, and Colet. Here were men who shared to the full the Renaissance enthusiasm for the revival of classical studies, whilst remaining loyal to the Christian tradition. In them was embodied a particularly attractive form of Christian humanism. Nor does the modern tendency to depict Calvin as a gloomy and sombre embodiment of all that is alien to true humanity find much greater support in the facts. He was well acquainted with the classical authors of Greece and Rome, and fully aware of the remarkable developments taking place in his day in astronomy, mathematics, and medicine. He speaks of Plato as one of the soberest and most reasonable of the ancient philosophers, and the one nearest to true religion. "When we read Demosthenes and Cicero, Plato and Aristotle, or several other of their company, I readily confess that they will wonderfully attract, that they will please and move us, even unto the ravishing of our spirits."[1] He speaks of "man, by the

[1] Calvin, *Institution de la Religion Chretienne Oeuvres Completes,* Vol. 1 (Edited Jacques Panvrier), p. 69.

beauty of his person and his many noble endowments, the most glorious specimen of the works of God."[2] Here is no narrow scorn for pagan antiquity, nor for man, though Calvin was assuredly no humanist in either the Greek or the modern sense. Why should these men be considered as any less typical than the pagans previously mentioned? It is very doubtful whether the humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was primarily a revival of classical paganism, for the simple reason that the more pagan Renaissance humanists were quite conscious of their reaction against the Christian tradition. There is a certain artificiality and self-consciousness about their humanism which contrasts sharply with the attitude to be found in classical antiquity. The reason for this is that Christianity had entered the world and had been at work in Western society for nigh fourteen hundred years or more. No intellectually alert man, however pagan he might be, could be either unaware or ignorant of that fact.

The real watershed in European history is, however, not the Renaissance and the Reformation, but the Enlightenment. It is the latter which has created the intellectual climate in which we now live. Known as the Illumination in France and the Aufklärung in Germany, this movement consciously repudiated the theological basis of historic Christendom. All things were now to be subjected to reason, but no longer the broad reason of the scholastics but the very narrow and restricted reason of logic and analysis. This was the period of boundless optimism and confidence in the power of the human reason to master every problem in philosophy and science, and even every problem of social life and organization, whether political or economic. There now begins to emerge in Europe a self-confident humanism, a robust confidence in human ability and capacity, which no longer feels itself dependent in any way upon the main affirmations of the Christian tradition, whether Roman Catholic or Reformed. This was not at first accompanied by any dogmatic denial of the existence of God. It is a little strange to the modern mind to find such a skeptic as Voltaire remaining to the end of his days a convinced deist, and indeed Alfred Noyes has gone so far as to claim that Voltaire was in fact more intensely and deeply religious than he appeared to be either to his contemporaries or to subsequent generations. However that may be, the reason for Voltaire's adherence to belief in God was no doubt due to the fact that, in common with other intellectuals of his day, he was profoundly influenced by the Newtonian conception of the universe. Newton himself believed that such an harmonious and orderly machine as he had discovered demanded an intelligent Creator, since no machine had ever been known to manufacture itself. Voltaire, therefore, shared with the intellectual élite of his day the conviction as to the existence of an intelligent Creator of

[2] T. F. Torrance, *Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, p. 25.

the universe. Thus, although Voltaire and many others, accepted with their minds the idea of an intelligent Creator, they separated themselves in practice from the living tradition and worship of the church, and the result of their influence was to encourage a humanism which saw no reason for paying any particular respects to the absentee God of the deists. In fact, the left wing of the Enlightenment was not slow to turn the batteries of reason against the deism of Voltaire and his like, so that the *enfant terrible* of French and European society in the middle eighteenth century soon came to appear as a timid conservative himself. D'Holbach, who may be taken as one of the typical, if somewhat extreme, representatives of the *Encyclopédie,* demonstrates to his satisfaction the fallacies of the arguments stated by Voltaire for the existence of God and contends that everything has its origin in matter. Thus there gained strength in Europe that philosophical materialism which later emerges in full strength as Marxism.

Despite the suffering caused by the Napoleonic war, the hardships consequent upon the developing industrial revolution, and the disillusionment which many experienced when the ideals of the French revolutionaries gave way to the tyranny of a Napoleon, Europe began the nineteeth century with a tremendous confidence in man. The famous interview between Napoleon and the French astronomer, Laplace, is well known. The emperor, having studied the latter's *Mécanique Céleste,* asked why God was not mentioned. "Sire," replied Laplace, "I have no need of that hypothesis." This, however, was no cause for undue alarm. Man was master of his fate and could carve out a new world for himself without supernatural aid. Throughout the nineteenth century, the intellectual confusion of Europe continued to develop apace. The purely secular humanism, which sprang from the Enlightenment, found itself powerless to sustain man's self-confidence in himself, particularly in the face of new perplexities occasioned by the rapid growth of the various natural sciences and their practical consequences. Darwin's *Origin of Species* added to the mental confusion by appearing to show that man was the result of small, chance variations in biological organisms, variations which occurred without rime or reason. Though Darwin himself retained a timid belief in some kind of theism, the result of his work was to encourage further the development of an intellectual nihilism the results of which were likely to prove devastating. The early Renaissance confidence in man, and the arrogant assurances of the Enlightenment began to look a little faded in the light of man's new and humble position in the cosmos. Though some thinkers were quick to deduce, quite illogically, from Darwin's evolutionism a theory of inevitable progress, arguing that if man had a crude beginning, there was no knowing what he might become in the end, it soon became apparent to the keener minds that such naïve optimism was not

well founded. Meanwhile, Marx was disseminating among the new industrial proletariat a new and potent materialism, which was not content to remain philosophic, but believed it had a mission to change the world. The negative religious implications of Marxism had been foreshadowed by Feuerbach, who anticipated Freud by showing that all religion is subjective, being merely the projection of human desires and imaginations upon an essentially material universe. Meanwhile, Nietzsche was completing the job by attacking the inherited Christian ethical standards. The Christian doctrine of love is a symbol of weakness and cowardice. "I call Christianity the one great curse," he cries in *Beyond Good and Evil,* "the one great intrinsic depravity, the great instinct of revenge, for which no means are too venomous, too underhand, too subterranean and too mean—I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind." As if to mark his demonic glee at this final break with Europe's spiritual tradition, he hurled the following at an astonished world: "The only positive function of the rank and file of mankind is thus to be instruments of the great; for the rest, let them go to the devil and statistics."[3] The ideal is no longer the Christian saint but the amoral *Übermensch* or superman.

Whilst few ventured to imitate Nietzsche's passionate repudiation of Christian morality and the Christian ideal of love, he was only saying openly and without disguise what many were thinking. He so terrified and scandalized his own generation because he exposed so ruthlessly their complete spiritual disintegration. If the vehement repudiation of every kind of humanism by some modern Europeans appears to be a willful turning against the light, it is well to remember that it is against this background that their protest must be set. The debate is still continuing in what has come to be called the "existentialist" movement. The modern French writer, Jean-Paul Sartre, has made the word fashionable outside the narrow bounds of philosophical and theological groups. Sartre has been claimed as the exponent of a new philosophy, peculiarly adapted to the needs of a war-ravaged world. In reality, he is offering the old atheism in a new dress. The only difference is that he is trying to avoid the nihilism of a Nietzsche and build a new humanism upon the basis of a complete skepticism. If our brief sketch of European humanism suggests anything at all, it is the utter impossibility of doing this. Sartre represents one of the last despairing gestures of secular humansim. It is true he repudiates the charge of despair, but without giving us any cogent reason why we should not despair. "Existentialism is nothing else than an attempt to draw all the consequences of a coherent atheistic position. It isn't trying to plunge man into despair at all."[4] It is, however, encouraging us to whistle in the dark to keep up our courage, which is rather different

[3] Nietzsche, "Essay on the Use and Abuse of History" in *Thoughts out of Season* (IX).

[4] J.-P. Sartre, *Existentialisme est un Humanisme,* trans. by B. Frechtman, p. 59.

from the confident, indeed arrogant, rationalism of the Enlightenment. Sartre may be more humble than d'Holbach and Diderot, but he is no more convincing.

If the American scene is now considered for a moment, some very interesting and significant developments can be discerned. It has already been noted that the fathers of the Republic were deeply influenced by the deism and the social enthusiasms of the French revolutionaries. More recently, two men in particular have faced this problem of regaining a true humanism. The literary humanism of Dr. Paul Elmer More of Princeton and Professor Irving Babbitt of Harvard has more than accidental links with the Christian humanism of the Rennaissance period. The former was a professing Christian, whilst the latter confessed himself an agnostic on the ultimate religious issues. They are united by a common dislike of Rousseau, who for them symbolizes emotional eccentricity and anarchy. They wish to restore form and order to modern cultural life. Man is neither God nor animal; he is human, and human life demands restraint, discipline, form, the "inner check" (*frein vital*) which subdues emotion to some stable pattern of values. To this group may be added Mr. Walter Lippmann, who, in a *Preface to Morals* and *The Good Society,* calls upon us to repudiate romanticism, its lack of discipline, its self-indulgence, its subordination of objective value to the vagaries of feeling, and take a real humanism seriously. Whilst Professor Babbitt and Mr. Walter Lippmann are not confessed Christians, nevertheless the former has declared himself "unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists." These men are deeply concerned to secure the revival of a true humanism, which will ensure once again in our society recognized standards in cultural matters, and therefore give to our civilization patterns and forms which bear the stamp of the higher characteristics of the human personality. Now Professor Babbitt often speaks as if humanism and religion are natural allies, and the purpose of this essay is to suggest that in a very deep sense this is true. In fact, a true humanism is the fruit of a genuine and vital Christianity. The tragedy of the post-Renaissance world is the fateful attempt of modern man to create a world in which the truly human values shall be preserved, without recognizing that the human, divorced from its roots in God, must inevitably be distorted and finally undermined by biological and material pressures. Man can be truly human only if he can stand above the flux of events and say "No" to the urge of immediate appetite and impulse out of loyalty to some ideal of truth, beauty, and goodness. This power is dependent in turn upon man's recognition that he is not merely a creature of time, but anchored in eternity because made in the image of God and redeemed by a transcendent love. T. S. Eliot, in a pungent essay, condemns the humanism of even a Babbitt as parasitical upon religious truth and unable to exist as an

independent force. Paul Elmer More has recognized the truth of this criticism by ultimately taking the Christian position, and even Babbitt himself, as we have seen, confessed himself to be on the side of the angels.

The twentieth century has now come to the parting of the ways. The horrors of the recent war threw into hideous relief the tenuous condition of what humanism remains to us. The revival of torture, even before the war, the breaking down of restraints which even previous wars had not completely shattered, the sudden realization that we can no longer depend upon man to be "human" in the sense of humane, all this has stirred thinking people in a way unparalleled for many centuries. Millions of men and women of good will feel the urgency of reëstablishing respect for the truly human values, if our society is to be really civilized, or even tolerable at all. The issue, however, goes much deeper than many have probably yet suspected. The challenge is nothing less than the recovery of our spiritual heritage. We must go back and retrace our steps beyond the false turning which Western man took in the eighteenth century. The renewing of our Christian heritage is the only way to the establishment of a true humanism. T. S. Eliot is surely right in maintaining that "Man is man because he can recognize supernatural realities, not because he can invent them. If you remove from the word *human* all that the belief in the supernatural has given to man, you can view him finally as no more than an extremely clever, adaptable and mischievous little animal."[5] It may be asked whether it is not possible for all men of good will to come together in the cause of true humanism, irrespective of their religious position or allegiance. While this is possible, and all who are loyal to the great triad of values should be allies, it nevertheless remains very doubtful whether such values can finally retain their authoritative character for men when divorced from a conscious recognition of their divine source. The Christian church, from one point of view, is a sorry spectacle of division, weakness, and lack of love, but it is still the guardian and custodian of the best hopes of men. Secular humanism in all its manifold forms is dead in Europe and dying elsewhere. There are still men who profess allegiance to such a type of humanism in Europe, but it is no longer a robust and optimistic faith, and the masses are no longer attracted by it. Rather are they being won to the new fanaticism of Marxian communism which, if victorious, will create a world in which anything that we think of as humanism will long ago have perished. The scientist's patient pursuit of truth as well as the saint's devotion to God will be crushed by the weight of a new dogma imposed without pity. The world must now either plunge into further degradation of the "human" or recognize that the basis of a true humanism is to be found only in that religious heritage which has been the source of all true greatness and nobility in the culture and society of Western man.

[5] T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays*, 1917-1932, p. 433.

# AFTER HUMANISM—HUMANISM

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## I

THE QUESTION asked by R. F. Aldwinckle, "After Humanism—What?" is not the kind sometimes called academic. It is a question concerning the future of mankind. The title of his article suggests, so he remarks at the beginning of it, "that humanism stands for something sufficiently well-defined for purposes of study," that "it is now ceasing to flourish as an influential factor in human affairs," and that in consequence the human race is confronted with "a problem upon the solution of which our whole destiny depends." And he endeavors to decide at the outset what the term humanism signifies.

This decision to begin by clarifying the meaning of humanism seems to me wise. And Mr. Aldwinckle is to be commended, I think, for refusing to stop with the dictionary definition which, as he says, "hardly helps us to understand the true import of the term." He seeks a more precise one by looking into "that period of European history which derives from the Renaissance and the Reformation and which, passing *via* the English, French, and Russian Revolutions, has produced the world in which we now live." Humanism is primarily an attitude toward life. Its meaning has to be sought in the living context where it originated and developed. Nor can it be determined without adequate knowledge of the more important humanistic causes and movements which are active in the contemporary world.

No reasonable person will expect the meaning which is decided upon to cover perfectly the entire range of humanistic theory and practice. "Completeness," as Mr. Aldwinckle puts it, "would demand a survey of the whole human scene from China to Peru." And of course only the most essential matters can be considered within the limits of a short article. When one has to be brief, one has to select or emphasize some facts at the expense of others and leave numerous items, although relevant, quite unconsidered.

But such selection or emphasis entails responsibility. The quality of the outcome depends upon the workmanship, upon the care and expertness with which the selecting is done. An appraisal of humanism in its "true import" must be based upon at least the chief representative types. In the case we are examining I fear it is not. Likewise the statement that humanism "is now ceasing to flourish as an influential factor in human affairs" is hardly to be taken seriously if it is made, as in the present

case, without so much as a glance at humanisms which to all appearances are militantly alive in various parts of the globe. And how much logical force can be ascribed to the conclusion that "a true humanism is the fruit of a genuine and vital Christianity," when it is arrived at by deliberately setting aside the entire non-Christian orient, and disregarding such going concerns in the occident as nontheistic Unitarianism, the American Humanist Association, and Societies for Ethical Culture?

A similar criticism applies to Mr. Aldwinckle's disposal of *secular* humanism. "Secular humanism," he declares, "in all its manifold forms is dead in Europe and dying elsewhere." He describes Sartre's *Existentialism* as one of secular humanism's "last despairing gestures." Well, this is not the way things look to some of us. We think we see a world-wide growth in the spirit of secularism, and it will take more than any one's bare assertion to convince us that we are not seeing things straight. Even were it shown that the masses of Europe are no longer attracted by any type of secular humanism known to history, and that in place of this they are "being won to the new fanaticism of Marxian communism which, if victorious, will create a world in which anything that we think of as humanism will long ago have perished"—which Mr. Aldwinckle states as a fact; it would by no means have been shown that humanism *as such* is on the way out. It might only indicate that humanism is undergoing change—a change so radical that adherents of a traditional form of it find the new aims to be utterly antithetical to those which they have been accustomed to value most highly.

We are thus brought back to the question of how humanism should be defined. This is a problem of some difficulty, for there are now such diverse kinds that it has become advisable to couple the noun with a descriptive adjective, so that a particular variety may not be confused with other varieties of the same species or with other species of the same genus. These various humanisms, however, stem from a common root, and this root idea has been well summarized by Jacques Maritain and Curtis Reese, although they end as champions of humanistic philosophies that are far apart. The following formulation is taken from Jacques Maritain's discussion of the term's inherent ambiguity:

> Leaving all these points of discussion open, let us say that humanism (and such a definition can itself be developed along very divergent lines) essentially tends to render man more truly human and to make his original greatness manifest by causing him to participate in all that can enrich him in nature and in history. . . . It at once demands that man make use of all the potentialities he holds within him, his creative powers and the life of reason, and labour to make the powers of the physical world the instruments of his freedom.[1]

[1] *True Humanism* (New York, 1938), p. xii.

Curtis Reese's interpretation may perhaps be summarized in three selections from his fuller statement:

> Humanism is the conviction that human life is of supreme worth; and consequently must be treated as an end, not as a means. This is the basal article of the faith of Humanism.
>
> Humanism is the effort to enrich human experience to the utmost capacity of man and the utmost limits of the environing conditions.
>
> It but remains for religion to place human responsibility at the heart of its gospel. When this is done, science and democracy and religion will have formed an alliance of wisdom, vision, and power.[2]

## II

This is the meaning of humanism, then, stated in general terms: positive faith in man and in making the most of human life through the fullest and wisest investment of human abilities. It is the humanist's objective whether he takes the field as a supernaturalist or naturalist, a theist or an agnostic or atheist, a philosophical idealist, realist, or pragmatist, and in whatever part of the world he is at home.

But this is humanism, as I have said, stated in general terms. When particularized, when elaborated in details of doctrine, it splits up into the various species and varieties already alluded to. The reason for this is that agreement as to faith in man does not carry with it agreement as to man's nature. As different conceptions of human nature get to work, they lead to the development of correspondingly different humanisms. "It is clear," as Jacques Maritain says, "that the idea we form of humanism will have wholly different implications according to whether we hold or do not hold that there is in the nature of man something which breathes an air outside of time and a personality whose profoundest needs surpass the order of the universe."[3] A humanist who believes it to be unquestionable, as Philip S. Richards does, that all men possess an identical human nature, a "unique essence" which constitutes them "a Real Kind," separated "by an impassible gulf" from all other living creatures, will find little to respect in the humanism of a thoroughgoing Darwinian like Julian Huxley.[4]

There is not space in the present discussion to follow this lead very far, but by placing a number of such contemporary humanisms side by side we may gain some idea of their relative merits, and be in a better

[2] *Humanist Sermons* (Chicago, 1927), pp. viii, xiii, xv. In the preface to this collection of sermons by eighteen ministers of liberal religion, Mr. Reese, as editor, outlines the cardinal doctrines of the humanistic movement in certain churches of the United States. See also his books, *Humanism* (Chicago, 1926); *Humanist Religion* (New York, 1931); *The Meaning of Humanism* (Boston, 1945).

[3] *True Humanism*, p. xii.

[4] Compare Philip S. Richards, *Belief in Man* (New York, 1932), especially the introduction and first chapter, with Julian Huxley, *What Dare I Think?* (New York, 1931), especially chap. 5, or his *Touchstone for Ethics* (New York, 1947).

position than Mr. Aldwinckle has left us, to comprehend what we are doing when we choose one of them in preference to any of the others.

## III

A well-known type is classical or literary humanism, which is introduced in Mr. Aldwinckle's article. This is the humanism that finds favor with men of letters, teachers of "the humanities courses" in colleges, and persons who, whatever their occupations, emphasize cultural refinement in contrast with scientific knowledge and vocational training. According to Irving Babbitt who, until his death some years ago, was by many regarded as its foremost exponent, and whose position of leadership, so far as I know, is still vacant, classical humanism involves the activity of three faculties of the human spirit: the reason, the imagination, and the ethical will. Reason applies critical judgment to the cultural standards projected by the imagination, and the ethical will puts the reason-validated standards into operation against the enticement of impulses and desires. Over and over Mr. Babbitt reiterated his convictions that impulses and desires by their very nature tend toward expansiveness and dispersiveness, so that an "inner check" is needed to bring human conduct into line with "the law of measure." Throughout his writings he continued to stress this "will to refrain"; for example: "The goal of the humanist is poised and proportionate living." " 'Nothing too much' is indeed the central maxim of all genuine humanists, ancient and modern." "Decorum is supreme for the humanist even as humility takes precedence over all other virtues in the eyes of the Christian."

It is in this context that Mr. Aldwinckle's quotation from Mr. Babbitt, "For my part, I range myself unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists," has to be understood. He is with the supernaturalists in so far as they are devoted to winning the battle between a higher and a lower human nature, but not otherwise.

> Humanism [he said] differs from religion in putting at the basis of the pattern it sets up, not man's divinity, but the something in his nature that sets him apart simply as man from other animals. . . . It dwells on the danger of any attempt to pass too abruptly to the religious level; it holds, if I may be pardoned for quoting myself, that the world would have been a better place if more persons had made sure they were human before setting out to be superhuman.[6]

This question of the relation of classical humanism and religion, in particular the Christian religion, is one which Mr. Aldwinckle settles too easily in harmony with his own religious beliefs. It deserves more careful study. We cannot, however, enter farther into it at the moment. It must

[6] Irving Babbitt, "Humanism: An Essay at Definition," in the book, *Humanism and America*, edited by Norman Foerster (New York, 1930), pp. 28-29.

be enough to caution the reader against understanding Irving Babbitt's willingness to coöperate with Christianity to have been anything more than an alliance against a common enemy. It should not be allowed to obscure deep-moving differences in attitudes and principles.[6]

The ideal set before men in classical humanism is the cultivated gentleman of impeccable taste, whose likes and dislikes and cultural appraisals are in accord with those of "the keen-sighted few in the present supported by the keen-sighted few of the past embodied in the *caterna aurea* of tradition." He seeks spiritual refreshment and guidance in the great writers of antiquity, such as Plato and Aristotle, and in later writers who derived or now derive their inspiration and insight from those original sources.

## IV

At the opposite extreme from literary humanism is proletarian humanism. It has been described as "the intellectual outlook of a highly class-conscious modern communist." Here the ideal man is the intelligent workingman, conscious of his dignity as a constituent unit of the social class which is believed destined to rule the world. The advocates of this view look to contemporary Russia, rather than to ancient Greece, for the authentic pattern of life; *i.e.,* to the Russian economic and social theory and program as they were put before the world twenty or twenty-five years ago. The inspiring and directing genius is, of course, Karl Marx.

It may be objected that communism and humanism are diametrically opposite approaches to life; that the one is materialistic, rigidly dogmatic, deterministic, and inhuman, while the other is idealistic, liberal, free-willist, and humane. Many others, besides Mr. Aldwinckle, are of the opinion that anything we have thought of as humanism would perish if the world were taken in charge by communism as we know it. I count myself with that number. But I do not see that our opinion in this matter settles the point at issue. Humanism is recognized to be intent upon realizing man's fullest potentialities. A person who sincerely believes that this goal is reachable in no other way than through communist theory and communist practice, and who seriously undertakes to demonstrate this to be true, may be tragically in error, but I fail to comprehend on what ground he can be denied the right to think and speak of himself as a humanist. To conclude that he has no such right, would be to insist that humanism must mean forever what it has meant or now means for this

[6] The quotations from Mr. Babbitt are from "An Essay at Definition" or from "What I Believe" in *Forum,* 1930, pp. 80-87, or *The Masters of Modern French Criticism* (Boston, 1912). Before agreeing with Mr. Aldwinckle that Walter Lippmann belongs in this group the reader is advised to read what Mr. Babbitt said in the Essay (pp. 34-35) just mentioned. He there refers to the former's *A Preface to Morals,* and accuses him of a "flagrant misuse of the word 'humanism,'" and of "Flattering some of the most dangerous illusions of the present time."

or that person or group. Anyone who wants that position for his own may have it, so far as I am concerned.

Unfortunately I must confess to considerable ignorance of the literature in this area of the subject. There may be much or little of it, but misled too long by the conventional notion of the range of humanism, my reading has been more narrowly confined than it should have been. By good luck, however, a book by Leon Samson devoted to this unconventional humanism came into my hands, and I can at least quote a few passages from its provocative presentation of the case.

The foreword indicates the intention to keep doctrines in focus with "objectively observable human relations" and "our fundamental human passions." Probably it is the type of humanism we have briefly outlined which is referred to in this observation:

> Moreover, since our contemporary professoriat—those official assassins of social truth—are concealing their theoretical impotence behind the elusive mask of humanism, it will be our aim to demonstrate the essential inhumanity of their humanism. . . .[7]

As intimated above, nothing more is proposed in what follows under this heading than the quotation of a few passages illustrative of an argument for proletarian humanism. The interested reader will seek to know more of Leon Samson's view. Meanwhile a hint of his humanism can be picked up from these quotations:

> . . . as civilization has, through the mechanism of property, isolated the ego from the crude equality of the primitive commune, so it will be left for the social worlds that are to succeed civilization to transmute the crude egotism of acquisitive self-aggrandizement into the creative individualism of æsthetic self-expressiveness.
>
> Culture does not fall from the sky upon the brow of an unwitting genius. It grows from the social soil of a class dominating a society. Its substance is class substance. Its forms are class forms.
>
> From the midst of the working class the social passions rise to tear down the institutions that dominate, like the gods of old, the mind of modern man. Who knows but that within a century such words as liberty, democracy, religion and family will be philological curiosities in the museum of forgotten ideas? Already we see smoldering underneath the calm surface of our culture, flames that will not only give light, but will destroy. And when the grand conflagration comes mountains of accumulated ignorance will topple over our ears . . . . the gods before whom our halls of learning tremble in silence, will tumble one by one into tiny footnotes of a newborn proletarian world.[8]

In Mr. Samson's survey of events civilization, built about property as the economic, cultural, and moral centre, is but a temporary phase in the history of man. He believes the time is bound to come when man "will have absorbed the essence of civilization" and "will be historically ready

[7] Leon Samson, *The New Humanism* (New York, 1930), pp. v f.
[8] Leon Samson, *op. cit.*, pp. 318, 281, 280 f.

to shed his civilized skin in favor of a more advanced, a freer, a more humane mode of life."

V

The humanism of theistic Christianity does not minimize the desirability of cultural refinement or social reform, but judges these ideals to be inadequate, indeed ineffectual, in themselves alone. When Mr. Aldwinckle expresses grave doubt that the higher interests of life can retain an authoritative character for men unless they are recognized to have a divine source; when he finds the tragedy of the post-Renaissance in "the fateful attempt of modern man to create a world in which the truly human values shall be preserved, without recognizing that the human, divorced from its roots in God, must inevitably be distorted and finally undermined by biological and material pressures"; he is saying what every such Christian humanist is sure to say in one way or another. For it is their intention, as the Dominican friar, Gerald Vann, has worded it, to infuse new life and vigor into humanist ideals "by setting them in the infinitely greater horizon of the supernatural."[9]

Christian humanism takes Protestant and Catholic forms. A Protestant spokesman, Lynn Harold Hough, explains that the contemporary world is in trouble because the age in which we live has lost its past. It has forgotten mankind's moral struggles and victories. The spiritual insights magnificently won during the centuries have been pushed aside by a misapprehension of science and an upsurge of savagery. If human life is again to have high significance, there must be a recovery of that vast, rich body of spiritual experience which our forebears had made their own. This experience becomes vocal, he believes, in the great masterpieces studied by the classical humanists. This study does not, however, go far enough. Classical humanism itself tends more and more to move toward the eternal reality in the world-whole "that answers to the distinctive quality of human life in time." That is to say: "Humanism is not humanism until it meets the answer to all its questions in Jesus Christ. It is only a hint of possible glory until it sees itself in Him."[10]

If it were possible in a few words to do even moderate justice to another Protestant humanist, Francis J. McConnell, it would afford me unusual satisfaction to attempt it. His Christian humanism shows kinship with men and women in the workaday world, rather than with the classicists. And instead of advocating an uncritical return to the insights of the past, he has persistently sought for new insights responsive to an expanding present and a challenging future. Anyone who desires to under-

[9] Gerald Vann, *On Being Human* (London, 1933), p. 18. Personally I have found this little book one of the most stimulating I have read on humanism.

[10] *The Christian Criticism of Life* (New York, 1941), pp. 10-11, 264-265, 273. A special merit of this book is its analysis of classical humanists like Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More.

stand contemporary humanism cannot omit a careful examination of this liberal, forward-looking religious and economic humanism to the advance of which Bishop McConnell has made impressive contributions, both theoretical and practical.

The Catholic Christian humanists go back to Thomas Aquinas for their inspiration and principles. "Thomism," we are told, "holds indeed that the most complete humanism, the humanism which attains its own ideals most perfectly, is the humanism of the Catholic Church." It regards the humanism of Greece, not as mistaken, but as incomplete, and the neopagan humanism of the Renaissance period as atrophied. So all down the line. The "ultimate completion which a humanism on the purely natural level must lack, that completion the thomist outlook supplies. It is not something less than humanism as the non-Christian understands it; it is infinitely more, and more in the humanist's own sense, a fulness which on his own principles and aspirations he must welcome for it is their ultimate realization."[11]

The most thoroughgoing and scholarly work on Catholic Christian humanism which I can claim to have studied is Jacques Maritain's book, *True Humanism.* He has endeavored to "achieve impartiality and justice when dealing with problems that are orchestrated to the multitudinous sensibilities of human anguish and passion," and with "questions whose major complexities belong to our own day," and to do this in loyalty to St. Thomas, drawing upon "the ever-living spring of his doctrine and spirit." His ideal is a radical transformation of society, as radical a transformation as any Marxian communist could dream of, but so as to "bring about—in the degree to which that is possible here on earth and in given historical circumstances—a veritable socio-temporal realisation of the Gospels."[12] His general position is condensed by him in an article, "Christian Humanism," published in *Fortune* for April, 1942. As in all his writings, so here, he is at pains to make clear and to authenticate "Life with Meaning and Direction."

Jacques Maritain believes it to be the supreme problem of the present time to reverse the progressive secularization of life which has been going on since the sixteenth century, continuously spreading the grave error, as he sees it, that man can work out his salvation through his own efforts, thus losing track of his soul and his soul's destiny. This he regards as a false image of man. Ruled by it, he is utterly lost. "He looks in vain for himself; he turns the universe upside down trying to find himself; he finds only masks and, behind the masks, death."[13] From this point

[11] Gerald Vann, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 21.
[12] Jacques Maritain, *True Humanism* (New York, 1938), pp. viii, 86.
[13] *Fortune,* April, 1942, p. 163.

of view there is but one thing for man to do. He must regain the image which is set before him in true or integral humanism. It is this:

> The image of man involved in integral humanism is that of a being made of matter and spirit, whose body may have emerged from the historical evolution of animal forms, but whose immortal soul directly proceeds from divine creation.[14]

But the problem is not merely a personal one. It is also social and political. Jacques Maritain fully appreciates, he says, that "liberal-bourgeois humanism is now no more than barren wheat or than starchless bread. Against this materialized spirituality, the active materialism of atheism and paganism has the game in its hands."[15] He finds in *socialist* humanism a great urge toward truths which cannot be neglected without grave detriment. "However grave its errors and illusions have been, Socialism in the nineteenth century was a protest uttered by the human conscience, and of its most generous instincts, against evils which cry to heaven." In many points we remain in its debt. "Yet the deception it has caused among men is for all that only the more bitter." It cut man off from the world of spiritual reality which is after all the precondition of social redemption.[16] Even *communist* humanism has its virtues or had, for I am referring to writings dated some years ago; the virtue, for instance, of heroic dedication. But it is atheistic, and hence a humanism of destruction. "However generous the feelings of an atheist, atheism turns to stone certain inner fibres of his being: his love for his fellows is a violent demand for their well-being, which rises like a destructive force and which, springing from the rock, hurls itself against the rock, against a universe of human beings who are impenetrable to it."[17] Crucial necessity for radical social and political transformation in line with Christian humanism is made abundantly clear throughout Jacques Maritain's writings. Here is one statement from among many:

> And this transformation demands, not only the inauguration of new social structures and a new scheme of social life succeeding that of capitalism, but also (and consubstantially) a rousing of forces of faith, of intelligence and of love in the inner depths of the soul, and advance in the discovery of the world of spiritual realities. Only on these conditions can man truly enter more profoundly into the deep planes of his nature, without mutilating or disfiguring it.[18]

The differentiating mark of Christian humanism is thus its inclusion of a spiritual, in the sense of a supernatural, component in human nature,

[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

[15] *True Humanism*, p. xvi.

[16] *Op. cit.*, pp. 80, 81, 82.

[17] *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 82. It should be remembered that Jacques Maritain's usage is Thomistic. For him, as for all consistent Roman Catholics, there is but *one* Christian humanism, and this chances to be Thomist humanism.

"an immortal essence" destined to come to its own in a life hereafter. As it is this spiritual capacity which renders men distinctively human, so devotion to its development is of incomparably greater importance than any other possible commitment on earth. In effect the Christian humanist says to those who come to draw water at the literary or the proletarian well, what Jesus said to the woman of Samaria: "Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again: But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life."

## VI

Any collocation of present-day humanisms must include *scientific* humanism. Mr. Aldwinckle appears unaware of its existence, although its bearing on the tenability of his argument is direct and of telling force. Possibly his undisclosed attitude toward scientific humanism would conform to that of other conservative Christian humanists who make a big point of an alleged unbridgeable difference between humanistic and scientific knowledge. Their dualistic epistemology is so widely known that quotation from it can hardly be necessary; still, an example may not be altogether out of place. Says L. T. More (brother of Paul Elmer More), speaking in principle for ever so many like-minded humanists:

> The false pretensions of science must be wholly abandoned, and the problems of our destiny be examined by a wise judgment drawn from human experience, before we can hope for a sane humanistic philosophy.[19]

Exactly how many scientific humanists there may be I have no accurate way of telling, but their numbers are considerable, and I believe are growing. Among their outspoken leaders are such influential thinkers as Boyd H. Bode in education, John Dewey in philosophy, A. Eustice Haydon in comparative religion, Julian Huxley in natural science, Jawaharlal Nehru in public affairs. A list of the men and women whose philosophy of life is colored by scientific humanism more than by any other kind would be notable for its length and the conspicuous ability and social interest of those listed.

The scientific humanist thinks of man naturalistically. He views human beings as belonging in the community of all living creatures. He rejects the doctrine that there is a spiritual element in man's composition which proves him distinct, absolutely, from every other form of natural existence, and maintains that according to the best evidence obtainable, human intelligence, the sense of decency and justice, benevolence, good will, and the rest are stages in an unimaginably long process of evolution.

[19] These are the concluding words of a chapter, "The Pretensions of Science," in *Humanism and America.*

In harmony with this naturalism, the scientific humanist relies upon the scientific temper of mind and scientific workmanship to lead him toward truth in every area of investigation. He refuses to trust pure reason or revelation for understanding himself and his fellow men or learning about physical nature. His refusal is not a temperamental prejudice. Experience and study have taught him to distrust reason and revelation, and to rely upon responsible thinking as this is exemplified by men of science in their respective fields.

This naturalism and this allegiance to scientific procedures insofar as he can employ them, are frequently misinterpreted. The scientific humanist is reputed to identify human nature with pure animal nature, even with lifeless matter. The fact is, however, that his is precisely the humanism which most consistently exalts man by stressing his *humanitas,* those attributes which differentiate human beings from all other forms of life. It is scientific humanism which does not depreciate this or that aspect of human nature, but labors to bring all man's latent potentialities into play that he may become more and more truly human.[20]

## VII

Much of course remains unexplored in the humanisms we have briefly reviewed, to say nothing of the new humanisms which are now taking shape in the Orient, in Africa, in the profoundly changed world-order that takes in all of us. But no further attempt to broaden and deepen acquaintance with humanism's variegated forms can be undertaken in this critique.

Meagre as this survey of humanism must remain—scandalously meagre, I was about to say—it should make clear the serious inadequacy of Mr. Aldwinckle's discussion. His solution of the humanist problem is far too simple even theoretically, and as to its practical application to the crucial exigencies he talks a good deal about, he has little to offer beyond the advice that we go to church. The church we go to—and this is important—must be a church which would have us believe that we must return to a world that no longer exists and will never exist again; a church, moreover, which would have us subscribe to the smart, smug dictum quoted by Mr. Aldwinckle, with high approval, from T. S. Eliot: "If you remove from the word *human* all that the belief in the supernatural has

[20] See the writings of the men named above as scientific humanists; H. S. Fries, "Towards a Naturalistic Religion," *Crozer Quarterly,* XXII, 4 (October, 1945), pp. 301-307; "Humanism and Agnosticism," *Journal of Liberal Religion,* VI (Autumn, 1944), pp. 4-8; Corliss Lamont, *Humanism As a Philosophy* (New York, 1949); Gilbert Murray, *Stoic, Christian, and Humanist* (London, 1940); George Geiger, "Philosophic Humanisms Today," *Antioch Review,* VIII (December, 1948); Alexander Comfort, *The Pattern of the Future* (New York, 1950); George Sarton, *The History of Science and the New Humanism* (New York, 1931); George C. Sellery, *The Renaissance: Its Nature and Origin* (Madison, 1950). Professor Sellery's book throws light on the relation of humanism to the natural desires of men to improve their earthly lives.

given to man, you can view him finally as no more than an extremely clever, adaptable and mischievous little animal." And this is supposed to be humanism, *Christian* humanism! Does this sound harsh? It is not intended to be, nor is it, harsh; it is merely being a little frank where probably more frankness, not less, is called for.

Mr. Aldwinckle is right: our civilization today is sadly, tragically deficient in "patterns and forms which bear the stamp of the higher characteristics of the human personality." But does this require the "recovery of our spiritual heritage," the revival of a past humanism, as he insists? Why not the achievement of a humanism that has never been, something extra, over and above, finer than any humanism we have yet known? He is again right when he says: "Man can be truly human only if he can stand above the flux of events and say 'No' to the urge of immediate appetite and impulse out of loyalty to some ideal of truth, beauty, and goodness." But does this commit us to his deduction that this power to say "No" is dependent "upon man's recognition that he is not merely a creature of time, but anchored in eternity because made in the image of God and redeemed by a transcendent love"? Quite the contrary. Mr. Aldwinckle is writing on behalf of church Christianity when he says this, not on behalf of humanism. Speaking as a humanist, I should say that man can be truly human only if, out of loyalty to an ideal of truth, beauty, and goodness, he can say "No" to a theological appeal that sounds hollow in his ears. The outlook for a true humanism would be darker than it is were everyone the world round obliged to pass Mr. Aldwinckle's theological test or fail to enter upon a humanistic way of life.

"The world," says Mr. Aldwinckle, "must either plunge into further degradation of the 'human,' or recognize that the basis of a true humanism is to be found only in that religious heritage which has been the source of all true greatness and nobility in the culture and society of Western man." You have his word for it. The world of which he asks this recognition will not, I am relieved to think, take his word as final. Possibly, however, men can be brought together as allies in the furtherance of the human cause despite differences as regards religious beliefs; and though we are advised that such coöperation would pretty certainly come to little or nothing, it might actually work if it were tried. It might succeed in humanizing, step by step, the means and ends of practical life. It might even humanize our religions, our moralities, our educational, political, and business practices. This seems to me the only available way of redemption. If it is not feasible, then we are really through.

# MINISTER'S MONDAY MORNING

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JUST what should a minister do with a Monday morning? Or maybe one should make it a Tuesday morning—for a friend once confessed to me that he was not up to the sort of thing I am about to suggest before Tuesday, if then. And maybe as often as once a week has a morbid pulse-feeling connotation to it. But I will positively not settle for anything less than a Tuesday morning at least twice a month. It ought to be done before the data disappears and frequently enough to achieve some sort of discipline.

The text for the Monday (or Tuesday) morning activity will be from Paul: Let a man examine himself. Which being interpreted means, let the preacher carefully evaluate his Sunday's pulpit effort in the cold after-light of the next week.

Now right away one can think of two preachers, or one preacher in either of two states of mind, who might be unwilling to do this, or at least be not overeager thereunto. One is the preacher who is unwilling to dissipate—so tragically soon!—the golden memory of a glorious occasion. It smacks of sacrilege. The other is he who avoids probing the open sore of a still aching memory. That smacks of needless cruelty.

Let us take the most painful case first. It was an unhappy occasion, and the preacher has closed the main channel of his memory and the intake valves of his ego in that particular direction ever since. Yet like one's tongue stealing surreptitiously into the gap left by an extracted tooth, the fringes of his attention have been flickering over the hurt spot ever since. Nor will he be at ease until he faces the issue. Therefore let him now resolutely lay open the situation with a keen blade, cutting away the sensitive but unhealthy proud flesh.

Only so can he heal the wound soundly. Far too many preachers scant the painful process. They put it off till time exerts its false cure by erasing the sharpness of the memory. Or they are too easily consoled by stupidly kindhearted parishioners and adoringly partisan wives into believing that their most obvious failures were just possibly not so bad after all. By Friday the preacher may even remember it as being fairly good. And so penitence is sidetracked, self-discipline evaded, and a like mediocre effort perpetrated yet again.

Now just what has persuaded the preacher that his sermon was a failure? Was it that the congregation was much smaller than he had expected, or at least hoped? Did the sudden sight of empty pews strike

him like a blow in the face, leave him with an empty feeling in the pit of his stomach throughout the service? Or did no one tell him afterward that it was a good sermon, or contrarily tell him so too effusively? Maybe his helpmeet meted out the helpful opinion that at points one, two, and three—there were only four points altogether—it might have been better. Or did she simply preserve a discreet silence about the subject which he was afraid to break?

Maybe his reasons for a sense of failure stem from his feelings at the time, in the very act of preaching. He was oppressed by a sudden sense that somehow it was all wrong—that he was not saying the things he intended to say; words were betraying him, clattering woodenly forth and falling at his feet rather than piercing to each heart like winged light. There was a great gulf fixed between him and his congregation, only less deep than that between Dives and Lazarus, and neither of them could pass over to the other. What then?

Well, there *are* such things as glorious failures even in preaching. The size of the congregation is not the test of the sermon's worth. Sometimes, just sometimes, a preacher's hesitations, his seeking for words express far more eloquently the greatness, the profundity, of the truth he seeks to express than the too well-rounded, the too articulate phrase. (But no deliberate stumble-bumming in the pulpit, please!) Those persons who failed to speak glibly to him about his sermon may have done so because he touched some chords within them too deep for words, or presented a challenge too great in its implications for them readily to assent to. (But do not mistake the glassy-eyed somnolence due to dull words and stuffy air for a glorious Spiritual Impression.) If the preacher has thus failed in the Lord, let him be humbly submissive and dedicate his offering of words with prayer.

And then there are failures. Failures period. And if these have in any way been due to his failure as man or preacher, let him be horribly ashamed and bitterly repent for every dull sorry word he has spoken in the house of God. Could it be that he has perpetuated one more Sunday the lazy habit of years with regard to preparation for preaching—using warmed-over ideas, artificial inspiration, and grudged the costly struggle with words, new ideas, and convictions which must go into any good sermon? Has he mistaken the ease with which a truly good sermon seems to come now and then to mean that one can sermonize out of an empty mind and vacant spirit? Or could it be that he became enamored of an idea, a train of thought, and forgot that he was preaching to people, their hopes, their problems, their souls? In imagination at least he should have set himself down in a pew as he prepared his sermon and tried with all his heart to sense what life and religion look like from down there.

And finally let him face the possibility that his failure was symptomatic of a far deeper ailment—a long-growing sterility of heart or mind. To be sure he ought to be experienced enough spiritually to know that one swallow does not make summer, one crow winter, nor one less-than-perfect sermon a decadent inner life. Yet it does happen in preachers that faith's realities grow stale; that prayerlessness becomes the actual pattern of most days; and that devotional life of the soul which he urges upon his people at sacred seasons is become for him no more than a professional habit of speech. If like the cleric in "The Minister"[1] he wearily, mechanically goes through the sacred motions of leading worship hoping that

> "Perhaps at the end an emotion would come
> And a meaning flare"

then he must somehow find a source of spiritual renewal—or quit preaching.

But has the preacher been somewhat more fortunate? It was a *good,* a blessed Sabbath. Its memory resounds in his ears like the echo of sweet golden bells. The emotions of the day still well over his spirit in healing flood. A luminous mist, redolent with the odor of sanctity and success enwraps the recollection. . . . For the sermon went well, unusually well. It was set in the midst of the service like a precious glowing jewel. It felt good as it left the speaker—words, meaning, emotion, all smoothly and harmoniously joined in happy unity. And apparently it felt good when it landed. At least many of the saints audibly rejoiced in the excellence of the preachéd word and commended the humble messenger thereon. Therefore he went home to a good Sunday dinner, a little afternoon nap, and a rosy-glow feeling ever since.

One dislikes to disturb such moods in himself even more than in others. They do not come often to most people; and even now as one enjoys it he is afraid that it is only a mirage or experience of an opium dream. Surely the servant of the Lord deserves his spiritual hire—a little indulgence of the joy of a good deed well-done; the splendid sense of having been an instrument of Something Higher. Let the mood linger on through Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday in compensation for other weeks of bitter mood, and in relaxation before the effort of the week to come.

But no, brother, cast aside your glorious mantle and look upon yourself and your success with soberly open eyes. Just how shall a preacher know it was a "good" sermon? That splendid glowing feeling, whence comes it? From gratified pride in words cleverly said? from the easy ringing of the changes on sonorous platitudes and honored traditions? in

[1] By George Abbe in *An Anthology of New Hampshire Poetry,* 1938, New Hampshire Federation of Women's Clubs, pp. 181-182.

emotion or laughter effectively produced? Or came it from the warm admiration of people proud of *their* minister, *their* church, *their* religion, *their* kingdom (of course God's too), and words that fitted so precisely into *their* very own thoughts (and prejudices) about the matter discussed on Sunday?

Even at the great danger of tearing his happy mood into shreds the preacher must persist in this sort of questioning till he is certain that his answer is honest. Does he know in his heart of hearts that this success was genuine, because he poured into it a labor of love, because it contained the depth of his own spiritual insight and the height of his faith? Or was it merely a happy fluke because of the clever use of a text, an apt illustration, or tear-jerking words? Was it "good" because he told people what they wanted to hear, or because he challenged them to a new kind of Christian living? Was his happiness as he preached merely that of any performer who senses an enthusiastic response, or because he was deeply convinced that he had a tremendous message which people ought to hear whether they wanted to or not? How has he been persuaded that God approved it—*vox populi vox Dei?* (God be merciful to him [and me] a sinner!)

Should you improbably with all honesty be persuaded that your sermon was a supreme conjuncture of the good, the beautiful, the true, and the godly, then give thanks and begin work on next Sunday's sermon.

Whatever else results from this process of examination, I am sure that it will produce a better man and probably a better preacher. He will surely be a more kindly preacher, who will concern himself more with his hearers' spiritual concerns. He will be a more self-disciplined one who knows that to every sermon he must give the best of mind and heart, no less will do. He will be a more discerning preacher, knowing that the verdict of the moment and the judgment of history on his sermon may well vary, even within the limits of a week. The afterglow of immediate success may fade before the sun sets; and the less sparkling discourse may be bursting into devotion's or action's altar fire days later.

And withal he will be a humbler man. He will come to realize anew the ancient truth that the Spirit of grace bloweth (somewhat) where he listeth. Human effort cannot absolutely guarantee the presence of moving power within the preacher's words—else the preacher would be God and greater than the truth he preaches. After he has made the sacrifice of his best effort he will humbly wait for the power of Divine influence to be sprinkled upon it, give thanks if it visibly appears, and be patient in hope if it remains hidden.

# THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY DEFICIENT

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THE ATTITUDE toward the mentally deficient taken by religion in the past, or rather by religious people, has been extremely varied. One of the earliest notions about the feeble-minded was that he was possessed by a demon. In the bad sense of demon, this would lead to attempts at exorcising the demon, driving the demon out. Such attitudes have been more especially connected with epileptics, but these are often also feeble-minded; and many times exorcism has been tried on the feeble-minded who were not epileptic at all, as well as on all other types of illness.

Sometimes, however, the demon was supposed to be a good demon, kindly, prophetic, and simple-minded; and people possessed by them have come to have great influence in their groups. They were thought to be especially dear to God, and their remarks were treated as oracles. Sometimes one who was mentally deficient was used as an oracle; there is good reason, for example, to suppose that the women who gave the divine utterances at ancient Delphi were simple-minded, if not cataleptics of some sort. In religion after religion the phrase "sancta simplicitas" has great meaning. Indeed Jesus himself is reported to have thanked God that his message was hidden from the wise and prudent, but revealed to "babes," by which was meant adults, not actual children. So the Christian ideal has often been expressed as foolishness. "The natural man cannot receive the things of the Spirit of God," says Paul, "for they are foolishness to him."[1] The ideal has persisted throughout history, and received only its classical expression in Hauptmann's novel, *Der Narr in Christo,*[2] whose hero fulfilled the Christ ideal by becoming quite simple-minded according to normal standards. As adults have accepted the ideal of simple-mindedness for themselves, they have often recognized a "natural" as one who had special insights. "Children and fools speak the truth," we have said for centuries, and by it meant not only that they had no inhibitions, but that they actually had insights peculiarly their own.

All of this is familiar as a part of our tradition, as well as another religious attitude toward mental deficients, that of condemning and rejecting them on the ground that they had inherited a curse from the sins of their fathers, and so were to be despised and avoided. I need hardly bring instances of this.

The milk of human kindness, however, on which religion has at times

[1] I Cor. 2:14. [2] "The fool in Christ."

nourished itself, has likewise expressed itself in the attitude of religious people toward mental deficients. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these" is a phrase preëminently applicable to those who lack normal mentality. Consequently a large number of institutions for their asylum and help (what proportion of the whole they are I do not know) have been founded in the name of religion.

The purpose of this paper, which was originally prepared to be read at the International Congress on Mental Deficiency in Boston in 1948, was to consider the subject from the point of view not of the past but the future, to see if religion could suggest ways of improving the care and treatment of the mental deficient.

The very fact that I was asked to give such a paper indicates a new dimension in psychiatric thinking. More and more physicians of the mind are coming to rediscover the fact that psychiatry in its large sense, which I may call the attempt to quiet the discords of the mind, to help the deficiencies and obscurities of the mind and spirit, is new only in that man is developing new techniques for the old ends. Man the world over has, and so far as we know has always had, a psychiatry and mental therapy in religion. Religion is the psychotherapy of all peoples and ages. Modern scientific doctors concerned with mental problems have suddenly become aware that they are invading the field of religion, are guiding people in moral judgments, are setting up moral standards, creating a world of values for their patients, as well as helping them with their guilt and inferiority, in a way hitherto reserved for the priest or minister, because people who need psychotherapy have broken down so largely on these matters. And psychiatrists are also finding that in handling such people they cannot afford to ignore the experience and wisdom of the ages as recorded in religious history. Psychiatrists now recognize that the breaking down of "resistance" and the beginning of coöperation in a patient are amazingly like what theologians have called the dawn of faith. Thus far correlations have been rather tentative on both sides. Exponents of traditional religion have been reluctant to put their doctrines of faith and grace on all fours with psychiatric processes, and psychiatrists have been just as hesitant to admit that religion is a valid psychiatric technique. But each group is looking over the fence at the other, and at last talking over that fence. Increasingly the theological seminaries are offering courses in psychiatric guidance to their students, and theological students and religious social workers are going out for training into psychiatric wards and clinics. Insofar as the liaison is of value, each will learn from the other, learn the values the other has to offer, and learn each his own limitations.

It is as a part of this most helpful and promising movement that I

dare attempt to suggest to what uses it seems to me religion can be put in treating deficients. I can hope only to open up a subject which must be elaborately studied to be profitable.

First, in the treatment of extreme cases religion has, it seems to me, very little to offer. When mental development has actually been arrested at an infantile level, religion can do no more for the patient than for an actual infant. If an idiot is a Jew, circumcise him; if a Christian, baptize him; but in the case of an idiot, such a ceremony will mean very little to him in this life, whatever it may mean for his parents and in the life to come. Religious people should, indeed, take an interest in providing institutions that such unfortunates may get merciful treatment, but beyond that can do nothing.

It is with the large and varied group which is popularly called the feeble-minded that religion can be of real help, that is, when the patient's development has stopped at what we may call a childish rather than infantile stage. Here religion is entirely at home. For the function of religion the world over is essentially to simplify life and make it both comprehensible and manageable. In one of his most penetrating statements Jung once said that the function of religion was to anticipate the needs of the soul, to provide the soul with symbols, rites, and explanations, so that before the crises of life arose one had already accepted the solutions. In this way the individual did not, alone, have to face the great Alone. The Christian tradition that religion functions best with childlike minds is entirely true of certain types of religious experience. There are many types of religious doctrine, but most of them present in one form or another what they take to be the truth about life. A psychiatrist at Yale recently said that religion ceases to be religion when it thinks it knows the truth. In saying this the doctor told us much about himself, including how little he knows of religion in general. His personal religion clearly is one which believes that man is ignorant, and that his business is to seek the truth. The religion of the quest, one may call it. It is a religious pattern with which I have the deepest sympathy myself, but it can never be the religion of any but a very small proportion of human beings. "We have the truth" is the declaration of traditional Methodists and Catholics alike, and of the devotees of all the non-Christian religions which I know. Religion has almost universally represented itself as the revelation of truth to man, and except for the tiny minority of any generation who could follow the ramifications of theology, religion has taught a very simple and childlike truth, told in simple stories, myths, or religious legends.

A large proportion of modern thoughtful people, like the doctor at Yale, have rejected religion in this sense, and regard it as not only childlike but childish. But those who care for the mentally deficient above all

are sensitive to the hierarchy of mental life, and the fact that the truly adult mind is a very rare thing, to the point that even those who are most developed and mature in one type of thinking may be quite driven by childish compulsions in others. Accordingly one who considers a religion childish which proclaims that it has the truth, must still be deeply aware of the inevitability of that kind of religion in a world which is so largely childish. Still more should such a one recognize that in dealing with the permanently or extremely childish, the mentally deficient, the value of religion cannot be ruled out because it speaks on a childish level. For these it is most completely adapted.

In educating normal or bright children we must always make room for the likelihood that the religion of certainty will give way, and become if not the religion of callous indifference, then the religion of the quest. But for the permanently childish this is no problem at all. They will never turn upon you with reproaches that you told them myths as though they were truths. They will never come into the adolescent revolt of freshmen and sophomores against the formulations acceptable to them in early life. If they are to be oriented to the world at all, it must be in terms of what a nonbeliever may consider myths; formulations which are best provided by traditional religions.

It is extremely hard for people trained in critical thinking to tell these formulations in a way which makes them acceptable to either children or the mental deficient. Nothing is so communicable as faith, except perhaps the lack of it. To tell my own children the stories of religion as truth has always been beyond my power. Yet they needed such stories, and so in their early years I send them to Sunday school, and keep out of sight when they return. Similarly I doubt if many doctors or psychologists who are responsible for the care of the mentally deficient can take what to them are myths and tell them to their charges with such conviction as will do any good. If the patients are to get any such simple and direct formulation of life, they must get it from those who themselves believe the stories, and find direct value in the rites.

I strongly recommend the systematic training of the mentally deficient in religion by people who themselves are sincere believers and practitioners. From the therapeutic point of view it makes little difference whether that training be Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or any other. But those who are deficient should meet and according to their several capacities learn from people who live in a religious world, and who can make traditional religion vivid and real to them.

If the doctor or psychologist provides his charges with such religious teachers, however, he must himself guide these religious teachers, and keep an eye on what they do and teach. If religion is a therapy, it has dangers in misapplication like all other therapies, as had my great-grand-

father's inevitable prescription of calomel. The feeble-minded, if I may call them so, are by no means alike in temper or disposition, just as they have a wide range of capabilities. Similarly religious experience itself is of many types. The successful religious teacher in an institution for deficients must himself understand that what is of great help to one patient will perhaps deeply hurt another. Not only must the intellectual aspects of religion be largely avoided, as beyond the permanently childish, and so harmful to them, but the very types of experience on simpler levels must be carefully distinguished.

In talking of types of religious experience I am aware that I am using a much debated word. I am using it with circumspection, and I hope I will be understood so to use it. Discussion of "types" of psychopathic personality can easily take one away from reality as presented in a given patient. Similarly what I shall suggest about "types" of religious experience might be misunderstood as implying that to me the religious experience of individuals can be put, and the individual with them, into neatly labeled pigeonholes of abstraction. This is absurd: an individual is never the type, just as any color I see would practically never be pure red. Pure red can be produced only by laboratory processes, and then only approximately. I should not be able to distinguish pure red if I saw it. Yet it is unavoidable that for my own thinking, as well as for communication, I use the word red, and think of it as a type or category of color. Every individual thing is described only in words, themselves corresponding to imaginary types, which may be combined to modify each other in such a way that the complex individual is indicated. So, as I speak of types of religious experience, and types of personality, the reader must understand that I am quite aware of the limitations and dangers of the term.

Some deficients, we may say, are essentially sweet-tempered, coöperative, quite unimaginative, practical. To them religion may best be presented as legalism, a type of religious formulation in which it is supposed that a good God has taught men what they should do, and will reward those who do it. One thing is right, another wrong. To tell such deficients that they are in need of redemption through the crucified Christ, that they are sinners who must be converted, would often be highly unstabilizing and destructive, as it has been for many normal children.

On the other hand there are deficients of quite unstable type to begin with, filled with deep streaks of negativism and hostility, which make them alternate between resentment and repentance. Many such patients might well be stabilized if they could be taught to transfer their problem from the superintendent to Christ, conscious that in their rebellious moods they are really rebelling against their loving Saviour, and that if they will pray to the Saviour, who loves them dearly, he will help them and comfort

them. Any other psychiatric approach to the problems of their instability is probably quite beyond the mentally deficient. As a mentally deficient he can no more be taught to understand himself than to understand the universe. Indeed, it looks as though understanding ourselves will take much more intelligence than understanding the universe. People of limited mentality can, however, apprehend a great loving Person in Christ, or Mary, or in Moses or Abraham, who watches what they are doing to help, comfort, and forgive them even more than to condemn. This will make life under the superintendent's rule much more easy—for *some*. To others it would just complicate more deeply the whole problem of living.

There are still other children to whom a scheme of sacraments will be extremely helpful in making adjustment to life. Catholics, Roman, Greek, or Anglican, who are called in to work with the children, will of course be at a great advantage in this approach, since they can offer the children definite sacraments with direct power. Next will come Jews with their beautiful succession of festivals throughout the year which give the believer things to do, such as the eating of *mazzoth,* the waving of the *lulab,* the lighting of the *menorah,* the dedication of the *kiddush,* which, to name only a few, are acts of great and simple dramatic power. Protestant workers will be least effective in this approach, but they can supplement their meagre ritual as Americans have done in general, by using for the children, along with the recognized festivals of Christmas, Easter, and Thanksgiving, also such days as Mother's Day, Father's Day, Children's Day, Valentine's Day, Fourth of July, Halloween, birthdays in the group, and the like. The observance of these things may seem trivial to us adults, but there is almost no civilization which is not a succession of such special days, days which serve effectively to stabilize in life and death those who practise them.

Just as some children are extremely imaginative and others not, so among the feeble-minded there are those to whom fanciful figures appeal. The stories of religion are here of great value. In Christianity of all branches the beautiful figure of Jesus can become a constant companion and friend, or for Catholics his lovely Mother, or some of the other saints. For Jews there is a wealth of such material in the Haggada.

Each of these approaches can be helpful to deficients of one sort or another, but all can be injurious, just as it is a real relief to many children to know that there is no Santa Claus, since they had turned him into a demonic monster of terror in their secret hearts. Many religious workers understand these distinctions, but many by no means do. The danger in using people of personal religious experience to help with deficients is that so many of them have found such real satisfaction in their own type of experience that they tend to hold their own up as the norm for all others. A little wise direction from the doctor or psychologist in charge

may well correct this. For the fact is, let me repeat, that none of these types of religion is purely represented in any individual, and few religious workers would come in who do not understand the value of several of the types, and themselves use them. If a religious worker is himself intelligent enough to be trusted with defectives, he will usually be brought easily to see the need of discretion in what he gives them. If not, the people responsible for their care and adjustment must exclude such a worker from association with them.

For this I would emphasize in closing: In spite of the millennia of experience behind the religious worker, and in spite of the real power of what he has to offer, from a critical point of view religion has as yet been least analyzed of all human activities. The great part of religious training is still training in why we should believe this rather than that. The psychology of religion is nearly a dead subject, which, brilliantly started a half century ago, has almost entirely faded out since those devoted to one or another type of religion found it disquieting, and those devoted to no religion, as they thought, left serious consideration of historical religions behind them with their dolls and kites. The psychological effect of religion upon those who accept it is accordingly something which cannot be trusted to most religious workers to determine. Most religious believers are too ignorant of psychology to have judgment in matters of therapy. Always, accordingly, they should be made to feel that they are assistants to those who have been scientifically trained in mental problems. In matters of general policy they should never be allowed control. In such a problem as the sterilization of defectives, for example, ecclesiastical notions of the meaning of life and sex cannot be allowed to affect scientific judgment. What are the merits of this particular dispute from a scientific point of view I have no opinion: but I do know that traditional attitudes on the subject, Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, are completely irrelevant to the discussion. If churches oppose what seems the best scientific procedure they must be resisted and circumvented. Modern medicine must never forget that it got its start only when it defied legal and ecclesiastical prejudice in England and the Continent by stealing corpses to dissect them when they could be got in no other way.

This is a practical problem for the leaders with scientific training to meet as it arises. What is most encouraging is the growing tendency, especially among Protestants and Jews, to welcome the new scientific approach to mental problems, and coöperate with it, and the growing feeling of psychiatrists of all schools that Freud was a bit hasty in waving religion into oblivion as an "illusion." Just how the two may eventually come together I am by no means ready to predict, but I am quite sure that neither school of approach to the treatment of mental problems can function at its best without carefully studying the other.

# J. S. BACH'S "APPEALS TO CÆSAR"

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WITHIN the last century an accumulated crescendo of praise has been bestowed upon Bach by the musically initiated. The profound spiritual wisdom contained in Bach's vast traversal of the *Passion according to St. Matthew,* the sublimity of his utterance in his musical setting of the *Passion according to St. John,* and the overwhelming inner vitality and power that emanate from such masterpieces as the *Mass in B Minor* and the *Magnificat,* repeatedly have inspired musical critics to superlative and extravagant praise. Recently there has grown up in musical circles a kind of Bacholatry, akin to the worship of Shakespeare during the nineteenth century. Musicians have cried out in their zeal for Bach: "A Daniel come to judgment! yea, a Daniel. O noble judge! how we do honour thee!" Bach is pictured sitting in judgment over this faithless and unrighteous generation of music scribblers: he, the peerless one, the perfect one, established the unapproachable standard; he showed the unassailable right way. In quintessential terms Bach realized all that is profoundest and most everlastingly true in Protestantism: or, so say the musicians.

But if Bach was such a magnificent exponent of the best in Protestantism, why then have churchmen been so much slower than musicians in recognizing these supposedly unique religious values in his music? Surely churchmen, rather than musicians, should be able to recognize whatever is most typical in Protestantism: if Bach so consummately expressed the best in our religious heritage, why then was his church music, even in his own day, accorded a distinctly chilly welcome, and why now does his church music still walk in and out of our larger sanctuaries with the gait and mien of a stranger? Many of our bigger hymn books have remained sullenly obdurate when Bach's hymns have sought some small abiding place; lesser composers have jostled him, and some of our most widely used hymnals have completely ignored him. Catherine Winkworth, Jane Borthwick, and other lesser translators have forever enriched our hymnals with choice translations from the German, but the hymnbook editors do not find it convenient to mate Bach's music with the English words of these translations, even when his music fits, as it often does.

## II

Bach, though reared after the straitest sect of the Pharisees, and though tutored at the feet of Gamaliels, and though caught up at times even to the third heaven, where he beheld visions, nevertheless throughout

all his official life as a church musician adopted an air of independence (and at times a tactless brusqueness) that alienated the very churchmen under whom he was called to serve, and at last brought him obloquy in his lifetime and oblivion after his death—in church circles, And today when musicians on housetops proclaim the "lofty spirituality" of Bach, churchmen often bend their necks to his yoke with inner revulsion against his artistic standards, just as the churchmen of his own day fretted and galled under captivity to his perfectionist ideals. When churchmen of his own time called upon him for compromise in his rigorous ideals of perfection, Bach did not submissively bow before the superior wisdom of consistories and church superintendents; no, not for a moment did he yield, but rather he resisted them to their faces, condemning them openly in Antioch for their Judaizing tendencies, if necessary. When he found that his own rector, the erudite Johann August Ernesti, walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel (as Bach saw the truth), he said to Cephas before them all, "I through the law died unto the law: henceforth let no man trouble me." And when Superintendent Deyling, and Rector Ernesti, and Subdeacon Gottlieb Gaudlitz, and all the congregation of the synagogue did try to call him to account, he aroused their lasting ill will and undying animosity by appealing from their judgments direct to Cæsar.

A little later we shall trace in detail the number of instances in Bach's official career as a church musician when we find him appealing over the heads of all his church superiors directly to the secular authority, in order to win judgment in his disputes with his own immediate church authorities. This annoying habit of his has in symbolical fashion persisted throughout the two centuries that have now elapsed since his death in July, 1750. Even today we find that Bach appeals to the Cæsars, that is to say, the secular musical authorities, in order to force his way, an unwelcome guest, into the sanctuary. He does not present himself, humbly and submissively with hat in hand, offering to act the willing handmaid in the sanctuary; but no! he comes with a signed edict issued by the greatest musical critics, the élite of the secular music sphere, stating in categorical terms: *I am J. S. Bach, with special license to abide two whole centuries in my own hired dwelling, receiving all that come to me, preaching the kingdom of God with all boldness, but in my own way, none questioning my own methods.*

## III

John Sebastian, greatest of the Bach clan, derived from the most famous musical family in history. Back of him stood generations of successful musicians who had served as town's musicians, as organists, and as directors of music in churches. His father was not a church musician, but rather was attached as town musician in Eisenach; John Sebastian was

therefore making his own choice when he went into church music rather than secular music. He chose the life of a church musician, as Schweitzer, Spitta, and other biographers have united in showing, for a single purpose: the glorification of God through music.[1] His leaving Mülhausen, where he had made an auspicious beginning with his cantata, *God Is My King* (the only one of his long procession of over three hundred cantatas printed during his lifetime), occurred because the church authorities there did not accord him the means he deemed necessary for "the achievement of my goal of a well-regulated church music without further vexation." The betterment of church music, he insisted over and over again, was his prime goal.

Unfortunately, in stern pursuit of his consuming ambition, and while pressing on toward the goal unto the prize of the high calling, he often showed himself impetuously and relentlessly vigorous. Before he went to Mülhausen—in fact during the first years of his professional life—Bach set a pattern which he consistently maintained throughout his entire church career. In Arnstadt, where he held his first church appointment, he antagonized his fellow musicians; called one of them a "nanny-goat bassoonist," and according to the minutes of the consistory "had the reputation of not getting along with the students."[2] His musical innovations, even during those earliest years at Arnstadt, caused consternation. The consistory reproved him "for having hitherto made curious *variationes* in the chorale, [for] mingl[ing] many strange tones in it, and for the fact that the Congregation has been confused by it."[3] Threatening Bach with dismissal from his post, the consistory (presided over by Superintendent Olearius of the famous Olearius family of Lutheran divines) drew up a catalogue of complaints against this young upstart:

> The Consistory desires to know where you have been for so long, and who gave you leave of absence. . . . We are surprised that you have given up performing figural music, and conclude that the omission is due to your bad relations with the pupils. . . . We must therefore ask you to tell us explicitly that you are prepared to practise them in figural music as well as in hymns. . . . You must tell us categorically, yes or no, whether you will do what we require. If you will not, we must find an organist who will.[4]

After Bach had shocked all proprieties by fighting with his fellow musicians, and even drawing his dagger against one of them, the consistory had more than a legitimate case, one may feel. Bach had the highest ideals, but unfortunately like many another master, he was merciless in his encounters with inferior musicians whose sloth and indifference prevented their improving themselves. He was ready at all times throughout his

[1] Hans T. David and Arthur Mendel, *The Bach Reader*, New York, 1945, p. 60. See also Philipp Spitta, *Johann Sebastian Bach*, London, 1899, I, pp. 373-374.
[2] David and Mendel, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[4] C. S. Terry, *Bach, A Biography*, London, 1933, pp. 70-71.

church career to instruct, to guide, and to inspire, provided only that his colleagues were ready to accept his instruction, his guidance, his inspiration.

His career, inasmuch as his art was dedicated to religion, and inasmuch as he had to make use of an elaborate corps of assisting artists wherever he undertook church work, strangely parallels Michelangelo's. In the cognate realm of the visual arts, Michelangelo's stormy relations with his assistants, his even more tempestuous relations with such demanding patrons as Pope Julius II, showed parallels which become strangely significant when we think of Bach's continuously stormy relations with *his* assistants, and the continuously tempestuous relations with *his* church superiors. Michelangelo's broken nose occurred in the same kind of brawl ending in physical violence that Bach provoked with his abusive remarks about a fellow artist; other interesting parallels could be adduced tantalizing the student of the two careers: both Michelangelo and Bach devoted themselves to Gargantuan enterprises, and both achieved what now seem superhuman standards of excellence even in their largest and most inordinate attempts.

A few months were allowed by the lenient Arnstadt Consistory to elapse after the first reproof of Bach, but again in November, 1706, the consistory took action. By this time Superintendent Olearius must thoroughly have disapproved of Bach's very presence, for when the superintendent had called Bach's attention to the excessive length of his organ pieces in church, Bach had turned right around and "had at once fallen into the other extreme and had made it too short"[5]—as if to say: if you will not accept my art on the terms I lay down, you shall have nothing from me at all. Superintendents in that day, and in this, are not in the habit of taking instructions from menial musicians, nor even from musical geniuses, such as J. S. Bach.

In any event, Bach was officially reproved again on November 11, 1706, when the consistory caustically set down in its official minutes this comment: "If he considers it no disgrace to be connected with the Church and to accept his salary, he must also not be ashamed to make music with the students assigned to do so."[6] Bach, contumacious as ever, gave no answer in apology, but said he would "declare himself in writing concerning this matter." If his answer "in writing" was ever forthcoming, there is no evidence for it in the consistory archives, just as there is no evidence to show that he replied in writing "within eight days" as he had promised to do after the first complaint made against him by the consistory several months previously (when Bach was told: "If you do not do what we require, we must find an organist who will").

[5] David and Mendel, *op. cit.*, p. 52. (Excerpts from *Proceedings of the Arnstadt Consistory.*)
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

And so, Bach at his first church post in Arnstadt, and at his second church post in Mülhausen, ended his official connections with a resignation. Well and good might it have been for him to depart, symbolically wiping the dust off his feet against Arnstadt and Mülhausen, and at this distance we cannot but agree that the kingdom of heaven, if superlative music is any criterion, had come very close to those impercipient cities; doubtless, however, it will be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the judgment. Bach did possess a sublime sense of mission, and whatever he undertook to do he finished, saying, as he did in his last dedication (*Dedication* of the *Musical Offering* to Frederick the Great of Prussia): "This resolve has now been carried out as well as possible."[7] Musical critics unanimously agree that Bach completed every musical task "as well as possible," that is to say, as well as the task in hand could conceivably be accomplished. But the perfectionist zeal that consumed him like a living fire made no allowance for the limitations of human frailty in other musicians.

He shook off the dust against Arnstadt and Mülhausen, but in his last and greatest period, the quarter century that he spent at Leipzig, 1723-1750, Bach (though he may many time have chafed and looked elsewhere for a more soothing climate in which to produce church music)[8] found there was no place else to move; he had completed his moving days when he at long last secured the appointment as Kuhnau's successor in the coveted Leipzig post. Henceforth, having figuratively arrived at Jerusalem, he could do naught else but stay and be crucified if necessary. He did not crucify gracefully, however, and we find that over and over again in Leipzig he did what the apostle Paul did when apprehended in the company of Trophimus. He first tried throwing the chief priests into confusion by diverting issues and in wily fashion asserting that his disputes with his musicianly colleagues and church superiors arose only because "touching the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question." When he could not extricate himself by such tactics, then he followed an old precedent: he appealed to Cæsar.

## IV

Cæsar, in the case of eighteenth-century Leipzig, was at first Augustus II, king of Poland, elector of Saxony, known as "the Strong"; in order to secure the Polish crown he had abandoned his ancestral faith, and had embraced Catholicism. Though king of Poland, he normally resided in Dresden, some sixty-odd miles southeast of Leipzig. His one legitimate son followed him into the Roman Catholic Church, but the Lutheran popu-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[8] Spitta, *J. S. Bach*, II, p. 253. Important corroborating evidence was discovered by him in the state archives at Moscow where was found Bach's letter to George Erdmann, dated at Leipzig, October 28, 1730. Bach wanted Erdmann to procure him a post in Danzig where the latter was Russian agent.

lation of Saxony remained dominant in the realm. Augustus II, cordially disliked in Saxony because of his Polish affiliations, continued to reign for a decade after Bach's arrival in Leipzig. It was, then, to the ruthless, and as many in Saxony felt, remorseless Augustus the Strong, that Bach addressed his first "memorials" in an effort to subvert the wills of local Leipzig authorities; after the death of Augustus II in 1733, Bach continued his irritating habit of appealing to a Roman Catholic Cæsar in order to reduce into submission his Leipzig Lutheran enemies. It would be unfair to Bach, of course, to omit mentioning this salient fact: he always used his appeals to Cæsar as a last resort, after all local efforts to protect his rights (rights, as he saw them) had failed.

The first appeal to Cæsar occurred two years after his arrival in Leipzig. Bach had been in dispute with the governing authorities at the University of Leipzig from the very moment of his installation as cantor in Leipzig; the controversy centred in his right to conduct and oversee certain special services held at high festival times in the Paulinerkirche, the University church. On the purely local level Bach succeeded in restraining a musical competitor of his, Görner by name, from directing at these traditional special occasions. But though the University Council was forced on the local level to restore Bach the directorship of these services at the Paulinerkirche, he was unsuccessful in his corollary demand for the salary of twelve florins traditionally paid for these annual services. Unable to get his fees, he dispatched the first in a series of complaints to Dresden, dated September 14, 1725. A reply from Dresden speedily arrived, stating that the University authorities presented quite a different story from Bach's. Undaunted, he asked on November 3 for a copy of the University's damaging allegations. Having received his copy, he then set to work drafting a third communication to his "potent and most gracious sovereign," the king-elector, Augustus II. Dispatched December 31, this letter is one of Bach's lengthiest, and displays not only dogged determination to have his rights vindicated, but shows also quite an astounding grasp of the legal technicalities involved in the dispute.[9] (Bach's son, Carl Philipp Emanuel, who took a law degree at the University, could have inherited a natural flair from his father.)

Bach won his contention, but his victory was a Pyrrhic one; his subsequent relations with the University authorities were embittered, and he never enjoyed the wholehearted coöperation from the University students which his predecessor in the Leipzig cantorate, the more tactful Kuhnau, had received. Three carefully composed letters to Cæsar had won him his first victory in Leipzig.

Following up his success with an obsequious cultivation of Cæsar's

[9] Terry, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

favor, Bach in the next year after the favorable decision conducted an elaborate *Dramma per musica* extolling the virtues of the generally detested Augustus II during that monarch's visit in Leipzig; detailed account of the event (May 12, 1727) pictures a presentation of the principal copy of Bach's *Dramma per musica* to his royal majesty "bound in deep scarlet velvet, with gilt tassels and gold fringes, but printed on white satin."[10]

Bach next collided with authority over the choice of hymns for the services conducted not at Leipzig's most famous church, the St. Thomas Church, but at a lesser church, the Nicolaikirche, whose music was also under Bach's supervision. On September 8, 1728, the consistory of Leipzig issued an injunction requiring Bach "when the ministers who are preaching cause it to be announced that particular hymns are to be sung before or after the sermon" to be governed accordingly, "and have the same sung." Bach resented the choice of hymns made by a subdeacon deputed to preach at Nicolaikirche, averring that the subdeacon chose hymns that were "inordinately long,"[11] thus unduly prolonging the service and throwing it into confusion. In this instance Bach must have been influenced by the fact that some of Paul Gerhardt's hymns chosen for singing stretched to thirty stanzas; the singing of thirty stanzas obviously consumed time which Bach needed for performance of his own compositions, rehearsed, ready to perform, but then canceled for lack of time. Bach appealed from the consistory, which had taken the part of the subdeacon, to the civic town council, composed of laymen, not clergy. The outcome is somewhat obscure, but Bach seems to have won his contention against the subdeacon.[12]

The next few years found him in disagreeable odor with his ecclesiastical superiors, but Bach assiduously spent his time casting about for a cushion against their wrath to come. In 1733, Augustus II having died, Bach sent the *Kyrie* and *Gloria* of his immortal *B Minor Mass* to the newly ascended sovereign, Augustus III, who from 1733 until Bach's death remained the ultimate secular authority. In dedicating the *B Minor Mass,* Bach came to the point soon enough after the necessary preliminary fanfare:

> For some years and up to the present moment I have had the *Directorium* of the Music in the two principal churches in Leipzig, but have innocently had to suffer one injury or another, and on occasion also a diminution in fees . . . but these injuries would disappear altogether if Your Royal Highness would grant me the favor of conferring upon me a title. . . .

Bach did not specify the exact title he wanted, but he asked for some honorary musical post in the Dresden court, and furthermore requested that a certifying "document go forth to the proper place."[13]

[10] David and Mendel, *op. cit.,* p. 113.
[11] Terry, *op. cit.,* p. 194.
[12] The cantor's prerogative in choosing the hymns was "of long standing," as Bach pointed out to the council.
[13] David and Mendel, *op. cit.,* p. 128.

Occasionally, very occasionally, a church with three or four thousand dollars to spend on orchestra and soloists will undertake the *B Minor Mass,* but there is an irony—an irony, certainly not because the work is entitled a Mass and performed in a Protestant church. Rather, irony exists in the knowledge that this prodigious work, comparable in its immensity and grandeur only with Michelangelo's famous frescoes on the Sistine Chapel ceiling, was in its inception designed to procure the favor of that inept *poseur,* Augustus III, in Bach's struggle with the local church authorities at Leipzig.

Not until three years after the dedication of portions of the *Mass in B Minor* did Bach gain his coveted title. On December 1, 1736, the great organist Bach, whose feet flew faster than most performers' hands, who never missed a note, who executed the most extravagantly difficult compositions with the ease and nonchalant perfection that ordinary performers can only bestow on children's pieces, the incomparable Bach, "made himself heard from 2 to 4 o'clock on the new organ in the Frauenkirche, in the presence of the Russian Ambassador."[14] Augustus III, not "the Strong" like his father, but weak, was forced to haggle for the Polish throne. Only after securing Russian support did he succeed in capturing the Polish crown; in June of 1736 Augustus III finally made his inglorious entry into Warsaw. Naturally then, he must have been delighted when Bach, by every contemporary account one of the most remarkable organists of all time, stunned and excited the Russian ambassador, a connoisseur of good music. Augustus, by whose order Bach's patent had been readied a few days previously, finally rewarded Bach's three-year old application for a title on December 1, 1736, the precise moment when he was selected to stun and excite the Russian ambassador.

Bach dearly needed the distinction, for earlier in that year had begun the bitterest contest of his entire life. The title, "His Majesty's Composer," was well earned: not only had Bach sent portions of the incomparable *B Minor Mass,* not only had he stunned the ambassador with his organ playing, but apparently at his own expense he had published librettos of several complimentary odes honoring the Royal Family at Dresden during the three-year period of waiting for the title. The bitter contest beginning earlier in the same year that saw the granting of his title raged hotly during 1736, 1737, and only subsided in 1738. Bach in 1736 was fifty-one; as cantor he taught in St. Thomas School whose rector in 1736 was a precocious scholar but unattractive disciplinarian, Johann August Ernesti, twenty-two years Bach's junior. Old enough to be the rector's father, Bach still clung to the ancient idea that St. Thomas School existed primarily as a choir school in which singers for the church service would be

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 151. (From the *Dresdner Nachrichten.*)

trained; music would come first in the curriculum, and liberal arts would occupy a secondary rôle. Ernesti, appointed rector in 1737 when only twenty-seven, himself unmusical but a phenomenal linguist, looked forward to a day when music would be nothing more than an incidental in the curriculum; he therefore did all he could to discourage concentration in music. "When he came upon a student practicing on an instrument he would exclaim: 'What? you want to be a beer-fiddler, too?' "[15]

In order to find more time for his preparation of the numerous classical texts he edited and then published one after another in bewildering profusion, Ernesti used his personal influence with the burgomaster of Leipzig (in whose home he had lived) to secure his own exemption from such routine duties as eating in hall with students, saying grace, and conducting school prayers. It is not our purpose here to narrate the harrowing contest which broke out between Rector Ernesti and Cantor Bach in St. Thomas Choir School. The ostensible occasion of the feud was the appointment of a student to lead the singing in church. Ernesti claimed the right to reinstate a student as leader of the choir whom Bach had dismissed as an incompetent; Bach naturally resented Ernesti's meddling with the conduct of the music in church. Ernesti threatened to whip and expel any student who dared conduct the choir in place of the incompetent whom Bach had dismissed. Bach was thus reduced to conducting himself, and both Ernesti and Bach carried their cases to consistory first, and then to the town council. Ernesti grossly alleged that Bach's itchy palm was held out for a silver bribe on more than one occasion when a student was incapable of filling his post; the rector, just turned thirty, was ready to impute to Bach, over fifty, the most venal motives in organizing his choir.

The whole record of the controversy makes very sad reading indeed. Ernesti, an imperialist in his personal relations with his own family, and with the students, was determined to assert his own supremacy over Bach, even in musical matters, at all costs. Many of the students in St. Thomas School were themselves already seventeen-, eighteen-, and nineteen-year-old boys;[16] Ernesti, their senior by a scant ten years, but the cantor's junior by twenty and more years, seems to have interpreted this struggle as a life-and-death one for ultimate authority in the school. Only with the aid of Burgomaster Stieglitz, his personal friend, had he succeeded in obtaining the appointment to the rectorship at twenty-seven, and at this distance we can clearly see his need for asserting his authority within a school where late adolescent youths were cooped up under semimonastic disciplinary restrictions.

The first document in the Bach-Ernesti dispute was dated August 12, 1736. Bach played in Dresden and was denominated "His Majesty's Composer" on December 1, 1736. After more than a year of wrangling, with

[15] Spitta, *op. cit.*, III, p. 12. [16] Terry, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

consistory and town council striving to effect a reconciliation, Bach finally wrote a letter to Cæsar, that is to say, Augustus III, laying the whole case before the king, October 18, 1737. Certainly he had not acted suddenly in addressing Cæsar this time, just as he had not acted precipitously in appealing to Cæsar during the dispute with the University authorities. The king's personal intervention in Bach's behalf at Easter time, 1738,[17] more than two years after the disgraceful contest had begun, finally stopped the acrimonious flow of letters in the dispute. But Bach and Ernesti were never really reconciled. During the remainder of his life Bach withdrew more and more from active association with the choir school; whenever music was needed he used his old compositions, rather than writing new ones, as he had been inspired to do in happier days. Not that he stopped composing: he simply stopped writing church music. His great series known as the *Goldberg Variations,* his *Musical Offering* to Frederick the Great, and his monumental though unfinished *Art of Fugue,* represent the tasks to which Bach devoted himself after the blight killing his interest in church composition supervened.

## V

A year before his death the Leipzig town council was canvassing a successor to Bach; at the meeting of the town council, only one week after his death, the councillors officially chose his successor. Burgomaster Stieglitz, Ernesti's friend, arose at the council meeting, and without offering one perfunctory tribute to the memory of Bach, one small gesture of gratitude for his services, or even a gracious expression to Bach's bereft widow, offered instead the following belittling reference to Bach's services: "The School needed a Cantor and not a Capellmeister."[18] In other words, the school needed a man who would subordinate musical aspirations to the over-all disciplinary requirements of the school: someone, moreover who would hop, skip, and jump for Ernesti, and who would not hanker after concert standards. The man whom the council chose was a nonentity. Significant, too, was the interval of time which elapsed between Bach's decease and the new appointment—one week. Bach, on the other hand, had to wait ten months after the decease of his predecessor in the Leipzig post before securing election!

Instinctively many churchmen turn from Bach just because they do feel him to be *Capellmeister* (a concert musician) rather than *Cantor* (a church musician). Thus it was that when finally Bach's supreme masterpiece, the *St. Matthew Passion,* did receive a hearing one hundred years after its supposed entombment at Leipzig, it was revived not in church, but in a concert hall. Felix Mendelssohn, conductor at the revival, alluding for once to his Jewish ancestry, said on that occasion: "And to think it

[17] David and Mendel, *op. cit.,* p. 158. [18] *Ibid.,* p. 189.

should be . . . a Jew who give[s] back to the people the greatest of Christian works."[19] Greatest of Christian works it may have been, may still be, but only in those churches today where the czars of secular music opinion control the choice of church music does the *St. Matthew Passion,* or any other titanic Bach masterpiece of sacred choral literature, get a hearing. Even today, then, he still appeals to the Cæsars of secular music, and it is only their written approval that can hush the clamor of dissent that greets his music when unaffected church opinion is consulted.

And yet, if his music really means anything, its essential meaning and message can only be savored to the fullest and appreciated to the utmost by those who share his basic religious outlook. His settings of the sublime words of Jesus on the cross are certainly intended to enhance the meaning of the words, and therefore we assert the musician who simply drinks in the loveliness of the music but lets the words pass out of mind, can scarcely have received all that Bach meant to give. He was himself a fervent believer in the cardinal truths of the Christian religion, and the blood, the toil, the tears, and the sweat that attended Bach's composition of his masterpieces ought not to be trodden like pearls beneath our feet, even if we do not turn and rend him again.

Undoubtedly his very success in appealing to the Cæsars has not won him friends in the synagogue. When he came unto his own, and they received him not, he was not content to be crucified either by church or by school authorities. He appealed then as he does now, to the higher secular tribunal—higher in the sense of more powerful in this world. But though he be befriended by Cæsar now, can he really ever be ultimately safe in his hired house near Cæsar's gardens? At the end, even though he appeals to Cæsar, his message is only germane in a Christian society, and is only valid in a Christian environment.

## VI

The churches have dealt hardly with Bach, and he has at times fled their face. But the guardian angel that has found him growing up beside a fountain of water in the wilderness and flourishing on the water from the well of merely secular approval, must at last ask him: "Whence camest thou? and whither goest thou?" Bach may well answer that he has fled from the face of an ungracious mistress, the Christian churches. But the angel of the Lord can only enjoin upon him: "Return to thy mistress, and if she will let thee, submit thyself under her hands." Perhaps the churches will one day, even if not yet today, have the grace to receive Bach back into a more intimate fellowship, and his name shall be called Ishmael because the Lord has heard his affliction, and he shall dwell with Abraham, and he shall not any more grow up in the wilderness.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 383.

# Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

No READER of the New Testament who uses such an edition as the American Revised Version (ARV) or the Revised Standard Version (RSV) can have failed to see the occasional footnote at the bottom of a page with such information as: "Some ancient authorities read," or "Some ancient authorities omit," or "Many ancient authorities insert." To what extent the average reader pays heed to these not very enlightening words would be an interesting question. They are always warning signs that the text to which they refer, while accepted by the translators, is nonetheless open to legitimate question because of differences of readings in the manuscripts and the quotations by early Fathers. In no case are they to be regarded as due to modern critical "tampering with God's Holy Word." Some modern translators, notably Goodspeed and Moffatt, refrain from such footnotes. But the text which they translate is the result of the careful and critical comparison of all such variations.

All of these variations—or as the textual critic styles them, variants—are important. Some may well seem of more significance than others to the nontechnical reader. One such, which no one can fail to recognize as very important, is found in the story of the crucifixion. The words in question are: "And Jesus said, Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34a). To these words the Revisers, both the English and American, append the note, "Some ancient authorities omit," while the recent RSV has the similar warning: "Some ancient authorities omit the sentence." So far as the textual evidence is concerned, most modern editors are agreed that these words cannot have been an original part of the Gospel of Luke. The textual evidence is such as to warrant the unqualified conclusion of such cautious students of the New Testament text as Westcott and Hort, who print the passage in double brackets—their symbol for "interpolations . . . containing important matter apparently derived from extraneous sources"—and devote a long and detailed note to the reasons for their excision at this point. Similarly Nestle in his widely used *Novum Testamentum Græce* (now in its eighteenth edition) prints it in double brackets. Almost all modern editors and commentators agree. J. M. Creed, *The Gospel According to St. Luke,* has summed the matter up well that the weighty combination of ancient witnesses which omit the words "leaves it improbable that the words were original in the Lucan text . . . . the omission of a prayer so sublime and Christ-like seems less probable than its insertion." The late Burton Scott Easton, of General Theological Seminary, in his admirable commentary on Luke agrees: "The evidence for the omission of this saying . . . seems to be conclusive." Plummer *(ICC),* Adeney *(New Century Bible),* B. Weiss (Meyer series), Klostermann (Lietzmann *Handbuch*) all recognize the improbability of its being an original part of the Gospel of Luke, although the first two regard it as a genuine piece of evangelical tradition and insist that it should be retained in its accustomed place. Even the late A. T. Robertson, hardly to be regarded as a radical critic, in a terse "grammatical note" to the verse in his *A Translation of Luke's Gospel* substantially conceded

its non-Lucan nature: "B D Sahidic omit. Certainly a true saying of Jesus, if not genuine in Luke." Not only is the textual evidence conclusive but the position of the verse, separating as it does very awkwardly the acts of the crucifiers (23:33 and 34b), makes its present position more than suspect.

In a circumstance of this sort what is a conscientious translator to do? Is the colorless footnote, "Some ancient authorities omit," really adequate? Does such a word give a nontechnical reader sufficient information? Is Moffatt justified in printing it in his famous translation with no warning at all, although in his earlier *The Historical New Testament* he double-bracketed the verse and suggested in a footnote to that edition that it was more than suspect? Several modern translations, such as those by Mrs. Montgomery, Weymouth, F. A. Spencer, pass the problem by unnoticed. The *Twentieth Century New Testament* prints the verse in single brackets. Goodspeed, on the other hand, omits the words without comment as not a part of the text.

Admittedly this is not an easy question to answer. The words have long endeared themselves to Christian readers. Their removal would seem to some sheer blasphemous mutilation. To many scholars, although they would agree that the words are not a part of the Lucan gospel, they are a genuine piece of "evangelical tradition" and not to be rejected. If not here in the traditional place, where are they to be printed? On the other hand, there is by no means unanimous agreement that the words actually are those of Jesus, despite their haunting and seemingly so appropriate character. In the judgment of several highly competent scholars a distinctly probable case can be made for their being of early Christian composition, and based on such words as Isa. 53:12; Luke 12:48; Luke 6:28; Acts 3:17; and the familiar stories of the gracious words of Stephen (Acts 7:60) and James, the brother of Jesus, as recorded by Eusebius (*Church History* ii, 23, 16).

In this quandary in which the conscientious translator finds himself charges of wantonly mutilating God's Holy Word are singularly pointless and out of taste. Few, if any, translators would find anything but value in the lofty sentiment of the words. A decision to excise them, as reached by Goodspeed, was utterly remote from questions of value or appreciation. The problem is simply this: If the evidence leads—as it has most of those competent to have an opinion on the matter—to the sure conviction that the words are not a part of the Gospel of Luke, is it honest to translate them as if they were? Will this not of necessity result in a distortion of the writing which the original author produced? Is it not in essence an actual rewriting—if apparently only a minor case—of the book, and almost certain to lead eventually to erroneous judgments Is it not the task of the conscientious translator to present as nearly as is possible the ancient witness, with the confidence that it is solid enough to stand without additional support, ancient or modern?

It is not an easy problem to decide. To some it will seem but another reason for preferring the sort of translation which shields the reader from such headaches. Others, who have less inclination to emulate the ostrich, will agree with Bishop Berkeley: "Since things are what they are, and results will be what they will be, why should we seek to be deceived?"

# From Off the Campus and On

EDITORS, like preachers, have to spend too much time in getting new subscribers. Without them—the new subscribers—any institution will sooner or later become moribund. The joy with which we hail and give the right hand of fellowship is very genuine. But this joy does not obscure the constant satisfaction at the many old-timers who continue year after year to make the journal possible. Unfortunately it does not prove possible to write to many of you with any degree of regularity, to most of you at all—save to send out annual bills for renewed subscription. But every letter which comes in is eagerly read. We appreciate the not infrequent word penned upon the bill which you return with your check. A good deal of time and thought go into the make-up of each issue. It is far more than a casual bundling up of a bunch of copy to be set. Frankly, we do have a very definite policy—and an important part of it is that none of our readers will fail to find at least one item in each issue which will be of distinct service and interest to him. But if there is some particular subject which you would like to see discussed, write us about it. Naturally, it may not be possible to meet your desire at once; but be assured that your suggestion will be considered, will be met if possible, and will be definitely appreciated.

Dr. Aldwinckle is assistant professor of systematic theology at McMaster University. He came to that position in 1947, as the successor to R. J. McCracken. He was born in England and holds degrees from both the University of London (B.A.) and Oxford (M.A.). In addition he received a doctorate in theology from Strasbourg. He is an ordained Baptist minister and held pastorates in Coventry and London before going to Canada.

Professor Otto, who was invited with the consent of Dr. Aldwinckle to examine the latter's thesis and to prepare a reply, is too well known in educational and philosophical circles to require a detailed introduction. For forty years, until his retirement in 1947, he was a member of the department of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin, from which he had graduated with the orthodox triad of degrees (A.B., A.M., Ph.D.). During all his academic life he has been writing on scientific humanism, and his contributions have been many and important. His three-cornered debate with H. N. Wieman and D. C. Macintosh in 1932 under the title *Is There a God?* aroused wide interest and literary activity. In 1940 he published *The Human Enterprise.* In connection with his present essay it would be well to reread his chapter in *Religious Liberals Reply.* It is a pleasure to welcome back to these pages this ripe, provocative, and truly generous scholar.

Professor King will be remembered by our readers for his several essays and reviews. "Tell Me—Is It a Prayer?" which appeared in October, 1949, was an article which every preacher might well place upon his every-six-month list of prescribed reading. And we suggest that this present essay might well appear there too. A graduate of Asbury College, Andover Newton, and Harvard (Ph.D.), he has been since 1949 dean of the chapel and associate professor of philosophy and religion at Grinnell College, having gone there from the pastorate of the First Congregational Church, Waterville, Maine.

Professor Goodenough has been on the faculty of Yale since 1926, with the title professor of history of religion since 1934. In addition to a B.A. (Hamilton) and S.T.B. (Garrett) he holds a D.Phil. from Oxford and honorary degrees from Yale and Garrett. For nine years he was editor of the *Journal of Biblical Literature* and is now president of the parent Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis. His books and articles have revealed his penetrating and fertile scholarship. At present he is publishing the first of a five-volume work to appear under the title, "Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period," in the Bollingen series.

Robert Stevenson, Th.M., M.Mus., Ph.D., is an assistant professor at the University of California with responsibility for courses in music and Bible. He has taught courses in sacred music at the U.S. Army Chaplain School, at Westminster Choir College, and at the University of Texas. He has published many articles on church music and related subjects in such journals as *Harvard Theological Review, Journal of Religion, Étude,* and CROZER QUARTERLY. Our readers will remember his "Reformed Church Music" which appeared in these pages in January, 1949.

Fifty-nine book reviews and notices, forty-four reviewers: this we submit is an all-time high. Publishers appear to welcome our appraisals, scholars continue gracious to the editorial bid for their talent, our readers are very vocal in their appreciation—*ergo!* Dr. Aubrey is professor of religious thought at Pennsylvania. Professor Banning has the chair of theology at Bangor. Professor Beare has the chair of New Testament at Trinity College, Toronto. Dr. Bertocci is professor of philosophy at Boston University. Professor Bining is a member of the faculty of history at Pennsylvania. Dr. Bond is head of the department of religion at Bucknell. Dr. Brush is professor of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Buckler is professor of church history at Oberlin. Professor Cadbury has the Hollis chair of divinity (New Testament) at Harvard. Dr. Clements is minister of the Bryn Mawr Presbyterian Church. Mr. Coe is a member of the faculty of Friends' Select School, Philadelphia. Dr. Cohen is rabbi of Beth Sholom Congregation, Philadelphia. Dr. Cranston is dean of the Graduate School of Religion at Southern California. Dr. Crosby is professor *emeritus* of Greek at Pennsylvania. Mr. Enslin is a writer and student of *belles lettres,* living at West Harwich, Mass. Dr. Fleming is professor *emeritus* of missions at Union Theological Seminary. Professor Flight has the chair of biblical literature at Haverford. Dr. Foote is a retired Unitarian minister and a former member of the Harvard faculty of divinity. Professor Gaines is head of the department of modern languages at Richmond. Mr. Gehr is minister of the Church of the Restoration, Philadelphia. Dr. F. C. Grant is professor of biblical theology (New Testament) at Union Theological Seminary. Professor R. M. Grant is a member of the theological faculty of the University of the South. Dr. Hamilton is professor of the history and philosophy of religion and of missions at Oberlin. Dr. Harkness is professor *emeritus* of church history at Crozer. Professor Hightower is head of the department of sociology at Kalamazoo. Dr. Hough, now retired, was for many years the distinguished dean of Drew Theological Seminary. Dr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church, Richmond, Va. Professor Jeffery is a member of the faculty of Semitic languages at Columbia. Dr. Johnson is a professor of surgery at Pennsylvania. Professor Keighton is head of the department of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Matthews is professor *emeritus* of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Metzger is associate professor of New Testament at Princeton Theological Seminary. Professor Miller is head of the department of classics at Lincoln University. Mr. Morey is supervising principal of the School District of Swarthmore, Pa. Professor Morris is assistant professor of Bible at Goucher College. Dr. Petry is professor of church history at Duke. Dr. Pottle is professor of New Testament of the Divinity School in Philadelphia. Dr. Ross is professor of world religions at the University of Southern California. Dr. Howard Wayne Smith is a retired Baptist minister and executive of the Northern Baptist Convention. Professor K. L. Smith joined the faculty of Crozer a few months ago as assistant professor of applied Christianity. It is a pleasure to welcome a new colleague to these pages. Professor Stinespring has the chair of Old Testament at Duke. Mr. Thomas, a former member of the Crozer faculty, is an executive secretary of the Ministers and Missionaries Benefit Board of the American Baptist Convention. Professor Widgery is a member of the department of philosophy at Duke. Dr. Wright is professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*Ancient Near Eastern Texts: relating to the Old Testament,* edited by James B. Pritchard, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. xxi, 526, $15.

There can be few, if any, teachers responsible for instruction in biblical subjects, whether at the lower or at the higher levels, who do not constantly refer students to the wealth of illustrative material that has been made available by exploration and excavation, and particularly by recent exploration and excavation, in the lands of the Near East, the lands that in the days of our grandparents were familiarly known as "Bible Lands." The Bible tells of Ur and Erech, of Babylon and Nineveh, of Bethel and Mizpah, whose ancient sites exploration has now located, and much of whose ancient life excavation has now revealed. In the Bible we read of temples and shrines, of high places and palaces, and the archæologist today can actually show us the ruins of such buildings, reconstruct them on paper with reasonable accuracy, and describe to us in some detail what they must have been like in biblical times. We read in Scripture of the ancient gods and goddesses, of Dagon and Ashtoreth, of Nebo and Hadad-Rimmon, of Bel and Chemosh, and excavation has unearthed so many figures and figurines from ancient sites that we can actually look on the faces of the images ancient peoples made of these objects of their reverence and even handle the cult objects used in or associatd with their worship. In Bible stories we read of Elamites and Assyrians, of Egyptians and Midianites, of Hittites and Horites, Medes and Persians, Philistines and Sabæans, peoples whose languages and national records were unknown till a generation or two ago; but now their records have come to light, their languages for the most part have been deciphered, and they can tell us their own story, sometimes even telling how events in biblical history appeared when seen through their eyes. The Bible brings before us such famous rulers as Sennacherib and Pharaoh-Necho, Cyrus and Darius, Hiram of Tyre and Mesha of Moab; but now we can read what many of these rulers of the nations have themselves to say about the history of their times in the inscriptions they caused to be carved on the monuments they set up. From Bible story we learn that the peoples in the lands surrounding Israel had prophets and poets, sages and soothsayers, scribes and priestly chroniclers; and in recent years a rich store of the literary productions of such ancient writers has been recovered from the ruins of ancient sites, and has been made available for comparison with what the biblical writers have bequeathed to us.

All this is very wonderful. Nicolaus de Cusa before the middle of the fifteenth century was aware that the true significance of biblical religion could appear only when it was studied in connection with the religious ideas and practices of contemporary peoples in the lands surrounding Palestine. All he could use for comparison, however, was what he found in the classical authors, taken in connection with what the pages of the Bible itself told about those other religions. From the sixteenth century onwards there has been a continuous effort to enrich the material available for such comparison, an effort whose progress we can study in the work of Edward Herbert (1584-1648), Alexander Ross (1590-1654), John Spencer (1630-1693), Cristoph Meiners (1747-1810), and C. F. Creuzer (1771-1858); but it was only in the nineteenth century that excavation opened up the possibility of serious additions to our

knowledge of the ancient world, and only in our present century that the interpretation of material from excavation has been put on a sound basis.

For students in our generation the necessary material is available in great abundance, and the interpretation of much of the material is well advanced, and is reliable interpretation. But though available, it is to the great majority of students largely inaccessible. The results of excavations are published in large and expensive tomes which are rarely accessible save in very large libraries. This material, and new accessions of material, are discussed in detail by competent scholars in a variety of journals, bulletins, reviews, monographs and proceedings of various learned societies, but often these are highly technical publications, some of them little known, and in half a dozen languages. Texts are published and provided with philological and historical commentary, and to a gratifying extent the results of all this work are incorporated into the more recent commentaries and books for biblical study; yet all this does not meet the teacher's need of a body of easily available material that can be used effectively in connection with class instruction on biblical subjects. In Germany an attempt to meet this need was made by Hugo Gressmann in his *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder zum Alten Testament,* published at Tübingen in 1909, the first volume of which presented a selection of texts in translation, and the second a selection of pictures, both selections chosen for their interest as illustration of biblical material. Gressmann's book has been an invaluable tool for generations of teachers all the world over, but even the second, entirely revised edition (Berlin and Leipzig, 1926), has long been unprocurable. In any case, since Gressmann's book was in German, its texts were unusable by many students. R. W. Rogers in 1912 made a useful collection of English translations of cuneiform texts, and an even wider range of texts was made available in the second part of G. A. Barton's *Archæology and the Bible,* which the author labored to keep up to date by revising each edition up to the seventh (1937, the fourth printing of which is dated 1946).

Recent advances in our knowledge of the ancient world have made these books, good and useful as they were, quite out of date, so that in 1950 Kurt Galling edited for the publishers at Tübingen a new volume entitled *Textbuch zur Geschichte Israels,* in which with two collaborators, one to handle the Egyptian and the other the cuneiform material, he published a selection of texts and annotated translations of the more important illustrative material. It is a slim volume of ninety pages for which scholars are very grateful, but it is necessarily limited in its range. What teachers have needed more particularly is a collection of English translations of texts, not merely such as illustrate particular passages of the Bible, but texts of sufficient variety to illustrate adequately the various types of literary production among the peoples in the lands surrounding Palestine, as well as texts more directly illustrating the history and religion of the groups with whom the Bible story brings us in contact. Such a volume is now in our hands in this admirably edited and excellently printed work from the Princeton University Press.

G. A. Barton made his own translation of much of the material he used in his book, and for the rest used translations already published by other scholars. Gressmann had three expert collaborators for his second edition, and Kurt Galling had two. Dr. Pritchard has confined his labors on the present volume to editing, but has secured the collaboration of no less than eleven experts for the task of translation and annotation. The advisability of this was obvious. No one scholar can at the present day hope to be equally competent in handling all the languages of these ancient oriental texts, and in the case of some of the languages it is rapidly becoming impossible for any one scholar to be equally at home in all the various fields covered by the

texts. Dr. Pritchard has had to set up the framework for the collection, in consultation with his experts select the texts, work out the general plan for introductions and annotations, and, when the experts in the various fields had sent in their translations, work over the whole to secure the greatest possible consistency in presentation. This has been well done, so that the book appears as an integrated whole.

The plan of the book is different from that followed in earlier works of this kind. The commonest plan is to follow the arrangement of the Bible, beginning with Genesis and working through, assembling the documents from whatever source or period they may come which can illustrate chapter after chapter as the book progresses. Another possible arrangement is chronological, which means arranging the texts, irrespective of language or provenance, according to their dates. Another arrangement is that of grouping the texts by language or by country. The arrangement followed in this book, however, is that of literary types, then by language under each type, and roughly by chronology under each language. This arrangement will certainly not please everyone, but it has distinct advantages, and at least pays homage to the modern enthusiasm for the comparative study of literary forms. Nine such types are represented: 1. myths, epics, and legends; 2. legal texts; 3. historical texts; 4. cultic texts: rituals, incantations, festival texts; 5. devotional texts: hymns and prayers; 6. wisdom texts; 7. lamentations; 8. secular songs and poems; 9. letters; while a tenth section collects a number of oddments, which apparently it was felt did not classify easily, though to this reviewer it would seem that all of them might easily have been included under the other rubrics. The languages represented are Egyptian, Sumerian, Akkadian, Hittite, Canaanite (including Ugaritic), and Aramaic. No attempt has been made to include any Elamitish, Hurrian, or South Arabian texts. The Egyptian texts have all been translated by John A. Wilson, the Hittite all by Albrecht Goetze, the Sumerian for the most part by S. N. Kramer, and the others divided up among translators according to their speciality.

Most of the old favorites are here—the Creation stories; the Gilgamesh Epic; the Code of Hammurabi; the Hymn to Amon-Re and the Hymn to the Sun; the Descent of Ishtar; the Wisdom of Ptah-hotep; the historical inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser, Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, Asurbanipal, Nebuchadrezzar, and Cyrus; some of the Amarna and Lachish letters; the Moabite stone; the Story of Ahiqar, the Song of the Harper, the Eloquent Peasant and the Dialogue between Master and Slave; two of the papyri from Elephantine; and some of the now popular Ras Shamra texts. Besides these well-known texts, however, a great many others have been included which have never before appeared in any such collection, and some texts which here appear for the first time in an English dress. To the Babylonian creation story have been added the chief Egyptian creation stories and a number of cosmogonic myths from Sumerian, Akkadian, and Hittite texts, which are sometimes even more pertinent as illustrations of the biblical story than the "Chaldæan Genesis" so well known since the first publication of George Smith. To the Babylonian flood story have been added the much earlier Sumerian account of the deluge and the queer Egyptian tale of the deliverance of mankind from destruction. To the Gilgamesh Epic have been added other hero tales from Mesopotamia, from Egypt, from Asia Minor, and from Canaan. To the Code of Hammurabi have been added the Laws of Eshnunna, the Lipit-Ishtar Code, the Middle-Assyrian and Babylonian Laws and the Hittite Code, together with a representative selection of legal documents and texts which illustrate the practice of law in the ancient Near East. To the Wisdom of Ptah-hotep have been added the Instruction of Ani, the Admonitions of Ipu-wer, and many another sample of ancient wisdom. To the historical texts which one

would expect to find have been added the early king-lists and other "historiographic" material, besides some new historical documents. The section on hymns and prayers is particularly rich and rewarding, and it is most gratifying to find that ritual and cult texts from each of the areas have been included so that we can see religion at work in the community.

The wealth of interest in these texts is more than one can indicate in a brief review. Not only do such biblical place names as Ascalon, Jerusalem, Tyre and Sidon, Joppa, Ekron, Timnah, Judah, Moab and Edom, Gaza, Kadesh, Arvad, Eshdod, Punt, etc., appear before us here in nonbiblical contexts; but such figures as Hiram king of Tyre, Rezon king of Damascus, Omri, Johoahaz, Menahem, Pekah and Hoshea kings of Israel, and Manasseh king of Judah are mentioned in the inscriptions of foreign rulers; and from the lips of their own worshipers we hear the names of El and Bel, Nebo, Dagon and Sin, Chemosh and Ashtoreth, Tammuz, Shemesh and Resheph, and even the Queen of Heaven. These texts tell us of other peoples to whom the pig was an abomination, who practised circumcision, smeared dust on themselves in mourning, who made offerings for the dead, knew of spirit possession and the use of exorcism, who feared the oath and used the ordeal in accusations of unchastity, who knew that God could communicate with men, and sometimes sent messages through dreams. It is in the legal texts that the parallels with biblical ordinances are most striking, but it is hardly less striking to find evidence of other peoples knowing of a trinity whose persons were three yet three subsumed in one, that among other peoples it was nothing surprising if a spirit of prophecy should descend on a young man and cast him into a fine frenzy, that there were other peoples whose heroes of the early days lived to length of years besides which Methusaleh's age is a small thing. There are very close parallels among these texts to such familiar stories as those of Noah's ark, of Moses' ark of bulrushes, of the corvée of forced labor, of the seven lean years, of the breathing the breath of life into the nostrils, of Joseph and Potiphar's wife, of the functioning of the Creative Word, and even a sort of parallel to the Cain and Abel story. Perhaps even more impressive are the curious parallels in language to the bone of bone and flesh of flesh, the being clothed in fine linen, the being a father to the fatherless, those who cry "How long?" and such like very familiar phrases. The sacred number seven occurs on page after page. We read constantly of the importance of the scribe, and meet the familiar figures of the unrighteous judge and the men who pervert justice for bribes. Prayers for rain, confession of sin, supplications for the removal of transgressions are probably universal; so that we should not be surprised at finding them in these texts, but it is a little surprising to read how important among some peoples was the possession of the household gods, a detail which gives new meaning to the anxiety of Laban to get back from Jacob those which Rachel had carried off.

Where there is such a range of texts from the middle of the third millennium B.C. to almost the end of the pre-Christian era, and in such a variety of languages, it is perhaps presumption for a reviewer to pass judgment on the quality of the translations. The reader, however, has a right to expect an opinion on this crucial question; so the present reviewer has read a number of these new translations against the original texts in those areas where he had some acquaintance with the original languages, and, so far as he can judge, the quality of the translation work is excellent. To a British ear the idiom of the English used by some of the translators is rather queer, and it is a pity that in translating the Ugaritic texts an attempt was made

at using an archaic diction which reads stilted and artificial where it would have read smoothly and easily in modern diction.

At the end there is a listing of the texts by language for facility of reference, and two indexes, one of suggested biblical references, and one of names. Each reader will probably want to make his own subject index to the volume. A map marking all the places referred to, such as Kurt Galling has included in his recent little volume, would have been very helpful, and it is to be hoped that it will be found possible to follow this volume by one of pictures to parallel the *Bilder* volume of Gressmann's work. We have spoken above of the use of this work by teachers and students, who are doubtless the groups for whom it was primarily intended, but the careful editing and presentation of the material have made it a work that can be effectively used by the preacher and the great body of unacademic folk who have a love for the study of the Bible.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

*Early American Methodism: 1769-1844* (Vol. II), by Wade Crawford Barclay, New York, Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church, 1950, pp. xi, 562, $3.50.

This is an encyclopædic work. In the light of the innumerable sources quoted, references cited, and biographical notices authenticating the broad sweep of the history itself, the reader, contemplating the author, finds himself in the amazed state of mind of Goldsmith's villagers: "And still the wonder grew, that one small head could carry all he knew"—though the physical qualities of the paragon may not be known.

It may be confidently stated that the volume is and will be for long to come a standard source of information on Methodism in the United States, in all its organization, type of ministry, leadership, vision, spirit, and marvelous achievement. But more, it is in reality the story of the achievement of Christianity and of the Christian church, so often neglected by general historians, in molding and guiding the course of America's development in the formative decades of its history. The author at times roams far afield, but ever in serious search, and he always returns laden with rich food to supplement the Methodist diet. Nor is he ever lost in those Presbyterian, Congregational, and Baptist pastures of doctrine, practice, and contribution to the common supply of Christian values and virtues.

The Board of Missions and Church Extension has assumed an ambitious undertaking. Six volumes are planned under the general title, *History of Methodist Missions.* The work is divided into four parts: Part One, *Early American Methodism, 1769-1844,* Vol. I, Missionary Motivation and Expansion (reviewed in CROZER QUARTERLY, April, 1950); Vol. II, To Reform the Nation, Part Two (also in two volumes), *Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1845-1939;* Part Three, *Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1845-1939,* and *Missions of the Methodist Protestant Church;* Part Four, *World Outreach of Methodist Missions.* Mr. Barclay entered upon his task well prepared, having for some eighteen years been executive secretary of the Joint Committee on Religious Education in Foreign Fields and having visited during this period the major mission areas of his church.

In the first chapter, "Methodism and Reform," after emphasizing the fact that early Methodist ministers were consumed with the passion of reform, and discussing such reform movements as poor relief, prisons, temperance, labor, and race, the author deals with the main subject, Methodism and Slavery. This is one of the most valuable sections of the book since it presents disinterestedly, yet fully, the

moral, political, and economic problems of that national issue of a century ago. Good men, among them Methodist bishops as well as the general body of circuit riders, found themselves caught in the painful dilemma of a professed liberty-loving nation enforcing a slave system.

Nor does Mr. Barclay hesitate to imply that bishops, including Asbury himself, were at times opportunists. At the Western Conference, October, 1808, when this father of American Methodism "presented and read a paper, suggesting caution and moderation . . . it is said *'the audience hissed him.'*" Though this may be excused by saying that the bishops were Americans within an American situation, yet one finds himself, especially in this hour of the world's plight, in full accord with the author's assertion, "To refuse to face a moral issue resolutely when it is clearly recognized as such is not the way of peace either for an individual or a religious group. . . ." "Nor in the present-day concern can any Christian church exempt itself from that reproach, or at least from the necessity of anxious and prayerful heart searching.

Chapters Two and Three, "Indian Missions East and West of the Mississippi," present little that is distinctive from missionary activities carried on by other denominations in these great areas. With a driving sense of mission these men, and women too, spread into the vast prairies, to the South and North West and across the Rockies. There may have been differences of opinion as to policies and to the affairs of the national government, between Methodists and others, but no more so than often prevailed between men of the same denomination.

Chapters Four and Five, "The Methodist Way" and "The Methodist Message," are both constructive and informing, written without the offensive glamour of sectarian pride. The "Methodist way" was itinerancy, and itinerancy "in spirit and in method . . . in early American Methodism was a missionary spirit." Wrote Abel Stevens, "Obviously . . . a 'settled' pastorate, a 'regular' clergy, trained through years of preliminary education . . . could not possibly meet the moral exigencies of such an unparalleled condition. . . . A religious system, energetic, migratory, 'itinerant,' extempore, like the population itself, must arise; or demoralization, if not barbarism, must overflow the continent."

So itinerancy was long maintained, Asbury insisting upon it to his dying day (1816), even though as settled communities grew its need therein was outgrown. The itinerant ministry was successfully adapted to the pioneer years; but, as settlements arose, Methodism found that to keep pace with other Christian bodies the stationed ministry was essential. But this projected one of the denomination's most difficult problems. The circuit rider neither asked for nor received the assurance of a fixed remuneration. His allowance might be six pounds per quarter, but that was the limit he could receive, and he had no guarantee of any amount. Verily he lived off the country and, many thought, especially those to whom he so generously ministered of his spiritual blessings, that poverty was next to godliness. How then could a stated salary be assured even when well-to-do laymen in the growing towns demanded a local pastorate? It is the author's opinion, however, that this situation could easily have been remedied had it not been for a heritage of opposition to a paid clergy coming from John Wesley and especially from Bishop Asbury who "had had abundant opportunity to observe the moral havoc wrought by state support of the ministry of the Established Churches and [who] was determined to avoid anything even remotely resembling a similar evil in the Methodist Church."

The Methodist message was one demanding an experience, heart warming, of the saving forgiveness of God through Christ. To be a member of the church one may

not yet have the assurance of "having been born again," though that was the burden of the gospel, but he must certainly be one seeking that experience in good faith. The character of the message was one of man to man, the confidence and joy of one who had the deep and satisfying sense of peace and righteousness in his own life. There was little theological standard required, in accord with Wesley's announcement in the early days of his own evangelical preaching that confession of sin and acceptance of Christ were alone necessary. The evidence of that experience of newness of life was love to God and to fellow man. Thus, writes Mr. Barclay, the instructions were that the preacher must "suit the subject to his audience," and though sermons were to be meticulously prepared they were to be delivered extemporaneously.

Though at first Methodists had no theological or secular schools this was not due to opposition or unconcern. Rather it was because of lack of funds. If poverty of the ministry was an inherited policy from Wesley and Asbury, from these two, through the same Anglican Church, was inherited the conviction of the need for thoroughly trained preachers. Before the opening of the Revolutionary War Asbury was busily engaged in establishing academies in Virginia.

So these men, as a mighty army, in tatters, poverty, and distress at time, but strictly organized and sternly disciplined, loyal to their heavenly and earthly leaders—perchance to the latter especially in certain cases—went out "To reform the Continent and to spread scriptural Holiness over these Lands" (p. 1). Nor, as Mr. Barclay insists, can we forget the women who accompanied them, sustained them and, what may be more heroic, bore with them at times—a contribution to American progress and way of life which, with others of a similar character, has been almost universally neglected by both secular and religious historians.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

*Studies in Old Testament Prophecy* (presented to Professor Theodore H. Robinson by the Society for Old Testament Study on his sixty-fifth birthday, August 9th, 1946), edited by H. H. Rowley, New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. xi, 206, $4.

This well-deserved tribute to an outstanding British Old Testament scholar is filled with rich intellectual fare. Most of the contributors are British, but the list includes also names from the United States, Germany, France, Denmark, and Canada. Altogether there are fifteen contributions, including an introduction by the editor and a bibliography of the writings of Professor Robinson.

The first paper is "The Psalm of Habakkuk," by W. F. Albright. This well-known scholar believes that "the book of Habakkuk is substantially the work of a single author" to be dated "between 605 and 589 B.C." Albright assumes, therefore, that the psalm belongs with the rest of the book. This is a somewhat astonishing bit of conservatism, in view of the musical notations, like those of the Book of Psalms, which are attached to the psalm in Habakkuk, and the absence of the psalm in the recently discovered commentary (with text) on Habakkuk in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Albright's great contribution in this paper consists in Ugaritic parallels, metrical analysis, and revised test, with copious (as usual!) notes.

"The Age of Zerubbabel," by S. A. Cook, mostly raises questions for further study in the early postexilic period. The author is troubled by the discrepancies between Haggai and Zechariah, on the one hand, and Ezra 1, on the other. The old problem of the historicity and/or date of the man Ezra also arises. There is an inclination to accept the hypothesis of Morgenstern of a destruction of Jerusalem in 485 more serious than that of 586 in order to explain the conditions found in the Book of Nehemiah.

"The Yahwistic Tradition in the Eighth-Century Prophets," by G. Henton

Davies: "Belief" or "faith" in Yahweh was not first enunciated as a doctrine by Isaiah or any eighth-century prophet; it is found in J and E, which reflect an old tradition current long before the writing prophets.

"Difficult Words in the Hebrew Prophets," by G. R. Driver, brings forth some new meanings for difficult Hebrew words by reference to Ugaritic, Arabic, Assyrian, Syriac, Aramaic, Sumerian, etc. The paper is, of course, highly technical. Some of it is convincing and some is not.

"Schwerterschlagene bei Hesekiel," by O. Eissfeldt: The phrase "slain by the sword" in Ezekiel (especially chap. 32) is used of enemies of the Jews who go down to Sheol. This phrase, like the term "uncircumcised," found in the same context, has a bad connotation, such as "murdered" or "executed," and does not refer to the glorious death of the battlefield.

"Jonah II. 3-10: A Study in Cultic Phantasy," by A. R. Johnson, suggests that the psalm in Jonah was originally used in connection with thanksgiving offered in the temple. In other words, it was "derived from a cultic source" and was inserted in Jonah either by the author of that book or an editor. Johnson thoroughly analyzes the thought of the poem, which has its parallels in the prophets.

"Une Tablette Inédite de Mari, Intéressante pour l'Histoire Ancienne du Prophétisme Sémitique," by Ad. Lods, with a brief commentary by G. Dossin. The tablet comes probably from the archives of Zimri-Lim, the contemporary of Hammurabi. It concerns two oracles received by the king from two deities through personages called "respondents" or "answerers." These "respondents" apparently received their oracles by direct inspiration rather than by omens or augury, even though they were attached to a temple. Thus they correspond to the "cultic prophets" among the Hebrews.

"The 'Former Things' and the 'New Things' in Deutero-Isaiah," by C. R. North. The "former things" are not always something in the distant past like the call of Abraham or the Exodus. Sometimes they are the early victories in the meteoric rise of Cyrus. The "new things" are the expected liberation and return to Judah.

"The Rôle Played by Inspired Persons among the Israelites and the Arabs," by Johs. Pedersen. Here the famous Danish scholar continues his study of the origin and development of the "cultic prophet."

"The Basis of the Ethical Teaching of the Prophets," by N. W. Porteous: The prophets, who after all *did* emphasize ethics more than the priests did, found bases for ethical teaching both in tradition and in their own personal experience of God.

"The Prophet Jeremiah and the Book of Deuteronomy," by H. H. Rowley: Josiah's lawbook was Deuteronomy. Jeremiah at first supported the reform, but afterwards became disillusioned at its superficiality and condemned its insufficiency.

"The Literary Structure of Isaiah's Oracles," by R. B. Y. Scott: A form-critical study of the oracles regarded by Scott as genuinely Isaianic.

"The Servant of the Lord in Deutero-Isaiah," by Norman H. Snaith: Deutero-Isaiah is nationalistic, not universalistic. The servant is the righteous remnant among the exiles, or the exile as a whole. This is a provocative paper.

It is to be hoped that the reader will not regard perusing these brief notes as a substitute for reading the book. It is a very worth-while book.

W. F. STINESPRING

*The Kingdom without End,* by Robert Elliott Fitch, New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. xiv, 137, $2.50.

Fitch has written "a prophetic interpretation of civilization," or "an essay in Christian faith and in Christian skepticism." This analysis is pertinent since "the

age in which we live is an age of insecurity." All of the values of our civilization are threatened. In the light of the apparent "change and decay and contradiction, it is no wonder that we ask again the old question, which is the perishable kingdom, and which is the everlasting kingdom?" Fitch's analysis shares the vision of the Hebrew prophets that "God's righteousness is vindicated in history." He attempts to illustrate this belief through "an empirical philosophy of history" which is a blend of the methodology and metaphysics of John Dewey and the social and religious insights of Reinhold Niebuhr.

The theme of this volume is based on Jer. 9:23-24. On this basis Fitch concludes that there are two kingdoms, *viz.*, the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of the world. The former is the kingdom without end; the latter are the kingdoms which have an end. Today, we need to recapture the values of the kingdom of God. The kingdoms of the world are those kingdoms whose foundations are power, riches, wisdom (pride of intellect), and virtue (spiritual pride). These kingdoms glory in their own achievements and not God. Hence, they always come to an inglorious end. The kingdom without end is God's kingdom. "It is a Kingdom which is on this earth and within this world, though it is not altogether of this world. The rejoicing of this Kingdom is in justice and in righteousness, in love and beauty and truth and freedom" (p. 1). This theme of the two kingdoms determines the content of the book, *i.e.*, the central theme (that God's righteousness is vindicated in history) comprises chapters I and VI; chapters II-V have to do with the humanistic faith that what rules in history is power, riches, or wisdom, or virtue.

The kingdom without end receives its vitality from God. The essence of the author of this kingdom is creativity. Hence, "God wills therefore that man, too, should be a creator" (p. 2). Fitch's description of God as "continuous creator" is the cornerstone of his book. God's chief revelation of himself is in action, and God rules history through his creative activity. This point of view represents a theology of creativity, which defines God "not in terms of value, but in terms of a process or an activity" (p. 9). God's creative activity comes to its most concrete fruition in the church, *i.e.*, "the Kingdom of Christian faith and fellowship" (p. 109). This kingdom is among us, today, both as a fellowship and a culture. This is to say that God is among us as a reality in which we share. We become a participant in this kingdom through "a humble and a contrite heart." The condition of admittance is repentance. "This is a repentance in which he must put off the pride of power and the pride of possessions and the pride of intellect and the pride of spirit in which he once gloried. . . . Let him (now) put on the wedding garment of justice, and of loving-kindness, and of righteousness. For in these things doth the Lord delight" (p. 119). The choice of the kingdom without end means to choose life over death.

Although there are many insights in this book with which I agree, there are facets of the orientation that disturb me a great deal. Fitch admits that "in no sense . . . is this an adequately comprehensive Christian philosophy of history" (p. xi). The reviewer shares this point of view. It is significant that Fitch calls this volume a prophetic interpretation rather than a Christian philosophy of history. The reviewer will concede that Fitch has written a theistic interpretation of history, but it does not plumb the depths of a Christian interpretation as one finds it, for example, in Augustine's *City of God.* The author seems to have missed a rather significant point of any Christian philosophy of history, *i.e.*, Christ as the centre of history.

Fitch is inconsistent at many points. This seems to be due to the fact that he attempts to ride two horses at the same time, *viz.*, scientism and the Christian faith.

This is true in the sense that he bends over backwards to state his conclusions scientifically and empirically. His definition of miracle will illustrate this point. In one place he writes: "In the language of *contemporary science,* we shall say that a miracle is an event which is not covered by the statistical generalization of the formula (p. 4). This seems to indicate that although we do not understand a particular phenomenon in the present, we shall be able to do so as "the statistical generalizations of the formula" increase. However, we should note that this definition of a miracle is definitely incompatible with his idea that Jesus Christ is a unique event. In another place he writes: "It is the Christian faith that the whole of him [God] was revealed in the person of Jesus Christ. . . . The occurance of that person in history was the miracle above all miracles since it was the *uniquely* divine *event* which could not be duplicated by any other event" (p. 5).

The reviewer is quite sure that it would be impossible to arrive at this conclusion even when the "statistical generalizations of the formula" were extended *ad infinitum.* Such inconsistencies are numerous, and many of them are attributable to the fact that Fitch has attempted to write an "empirical philosophy of history." The author should admit that he began with certain *a priori* presuppositions, for on the basis of Dewey's methodology and metaphysics it would be impossible to draw the conclusions which he has drawn. As a matter of fact, if Fitch had considered only the "empirical facts" of history without certain *a priori* categories of interpretation, he would not have arrived at an intelligible philosophy of history.

This volume will neither find a niche in the Theological Hall of Fame nor win any prizes for scholarship. There is no bibliography, and his only documentation consists of biblical quotations. A great deal of this volume is homiletical, and herein ministers will find many "seeds for sermons."

KENNETH L. SMITH

*The Heritage of The Reformation,* by Wilhelm Pauck, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. 312, $4.

This is a good book. Such a conviction rapidly outgrows the initial fear that this could prove merely a useful collection of disparate studies. The fact is otherwise. Actually, one suspects that the nineteen topics here discussed had to be encountered in their seemingly detached contexts of lecture and article before they could enter, after decades of maturating research and reflection, into the comprising unity of a well-balanced volume.

Each of the three parts, The Reformation, Protestantism, and Liberalism, advances the revaluation of the Reformation heritage, with immediate and sometimes painful reference to the contemporary church. Representative Protestants and Catholics alike are candidly examined for knowledge and ignorance of the genius and spirit of the Reformation. It is heartening to see the positive rescue of much Reformation thought from the obfuscating scintillations of numerous contemporary authorities; just as it is heart-warming to find in text and notes the analysis of source passages, basic issues, and recent interpretations, as they bear upon each other.

The chapters on Luther and his faith show a sixteenth-century man continually amazed at what God chose to do with and beyond poor Doctor Martin: "I have done nothing; the word has done and accomplished everything. . . . I let the word do its work" (p. 23). Luther's ecclesiology as here set forth accents the church "as the communion of believers . . . constituted in and by the word" (p. 28). The discussion of Calvin's *Institutes* is fundamental if not too distinctive; that of Luther and Calvin in relation to Butzer is productive of numerous fresh insights. The rôle of the

Anabaptists and other "Schwärmer" is seen with more than usual understanding, though treated too cursorily to permit of any major refocusing such as newly available documents warrant.

The Protestant critique of Trent and its leading intent is recreated through Calvin's stinging indictment of the Council. This supports Professor Pauck's contention that what modern Catholics constantly advert to as true Catholicism is not so much the emergence of the faith revealed to the saints before Trent as it is the product of Tridentine ecclesiologists. These, as Lancelot Andrewes reminded Bellarmine, were the real *novatores;* the Protestants were *renovatores.*

Part II, Protestantism, is, perhaps, the most vigorous and illuminating portion of the book. These seven chapters analyze the nature of Protestantism, its character in the light of revelation, and its dynamics. Of cumulative power are the critiques of Protestantism and Catholicism, as directed to each by the other, and the bearing of the whole upon the issues of Protestant faith, religious tolerance, and the practice of the democratic ideal on the American scene. Dr. Pauck's lack of confidence in any short cuts to the reappropriation of our Protestant heritage is bluntly exposed. Here is the resourceful invocation of theology and history with unblenching indictment of what happens when men and nations try to obviate theological thinking and religious dedication. Some of the author's sharpest admonitions are directed, not only against the superficial integumentation of modern life, but also toward the reinvestment in our own day of our liberating Reformation heritage.

The disturbing rôle of the historic Jesus and the invincibility of the Incarnate Son of God are set in redemptive focus. The personalizing effect of the gospel upon the Reformation leaders and the socializing powers of the "good news" as it has worked its way through history are positively enunciated. The Roman Catholic reiteration that it was the Reformation which destroyed true Catholic unity is proved false. The Protestant temptation to shout the praises of justifying faith and then rely less upon human renewal through Christian *agape* than upon an inverted reassertion of saving good works is not overlooked.

Perhaps, in his critique of Catholicism, the author fails at times to stress the individual capacity for outrunning institutional limitations; whether in the socially permeating witness of the mystic or in the liturgical reagents found within typical Catholic organization. Perhaps, in his chapters on Protestantism, he does not always show how like the deprecated moralism of the Catholic is the tolerated moralism of the Protestant. Dr. Pauck seems amply justified, however, in finding even the most irenic Catholic quite incapacitated for understanding, or even desiring to understand, the genius of the Reformation. Certainly, Professor Pauck barters away no part of our distinctive Reformation heritage; whether to conciliate amiable Catholics, placate pious statists, cultivate Protestant dilettantes, or foster ingrowing bigots.

The section on liberalism will doubtless strike some readers as less definitive than any other part of the book. Nevertheless, here also, the admirable tendency to review both sides of conviction and inquiry, weakness and strength, spiritual pertinence and religious impertinence, is in evidence. Professor Pauck is in no mood to reject the basic insights of the liberal spirit. Nor will he grant every waiver of Christian heritage that is called for in the name of emancipating modernity. He is unprepared to enshrine the loose insinuations of the pundit—be he orthodox, neoörthodox, liberal, or of whatever category.

Most readers will doubtless agree that "The Prospect for Ecumenical Theology Today" enters no plea for mawkish sentimentality and no naïve appeal for organic unity directed to a fundamentally hierarchical Catholicism. These chapters, like

the entire book, do help raise one audible invocation: May those of the Protestant heritage give a newly vitalized example of what one great Christian tradition can proffer to the whole world through the fellowship of Christ!

RAY C. PETRY

*Theologie und Geschichte des Judenschristentums,* by Hans Joachim Schoeps, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1949, pp. vii, 526, DM 27.

This is one of the most substantial books on early Christianity to come out of Germany since World War II. Apart from the supplementary matter which occupies the last third of it, and the footnotes which occupy a third of the rest, the text proper is not something to be read in a day. Jewish Christianity has long interested and intrigued students. For over a century theories about it have been influential if varied. Here is a book about it more comprehensive than any that has appeared before, and with new considerations which will have to be borne in mind even in the study of the better known orthodox church of the first centuries.

The sources on both sides are based on hearsay and not on direct observation (p. 262), but those for Jewish Christianity are particularly fragmentary. Apart from hints in the New Testament, we must rely mainly on the antiheretical writings of later Church Fathers. Schoeps, like others, employs conjectured sources behind the psuedo-Clementine literature. He attempts inferences from the Jewish-Christian gospels and their Greek Old Testament (Symmachus), but in both cases the remains are extremely fragmentary.

The general reconstruction of the history of the group does not differ much from older representations. But each step is carefully analyzed. At first they are the early Christians. James, the Lord's brother, is their representative, and there is no real breach with gentile Christianity. Soon after his death and after the outbreak of the Jewish War they form a separate group in northeast Palestine. Apparently they are a Greek-speaking group. They are active missionaries. They are in conflict with Jews and Christians, but keep out of trouble with Rome. They are in conflict too with Christian Gnostics. Contrary to loose traditions they are not Gnostic themselves. They do not continue much after the fourth century. In connection with their history many subsidiary questions are dealt with, including their various names, like Ebionites, and their relation to Judaism, Christianity, the Essenes, the Elkesaites, and finally to Islam.

As for their theology it was of course Christian, but their Christology was based on adoptionism, denying the virgin birth. Schoeps believes they laid stress on Jesus as the true or new prophet, a second Moses. For all their Jewishness they seem to have succeeded in getting rid of much of the law. "The Ebionite *Auseinandersetzung* with the Old Testament proved far more interesting and productive than that of Marcion or even that of the church theologians of the second century" (p. 147). The written law is for them more authoritative than the prophets, but even that does not come from Moses; it has interpolations and false sections. These include the commandment of animal sacrifices, the passages describing God anthropomorphically, etc. While opposed to the cultus, to the temple worship, and to the institution of monarchy, the Ebionites had in other matters stricter principles than orthodox Jews. They eschewed the eating of meat and the taking of oaths. They exalted poverty.

No brief review can do justice to the intensive and extensive learning of this book. I should mention an excursus (v) of seventy-five pages on the single problem whether there was an Ebionite Book of Acts of Apostles. Naturally much in the book deals with the canonical literature—Acts and Matthew especially. In a brief excursus (1) the Epistle of James is described as catholic rather than Ebionite,

written however by a Jewish Christian but *against Gnosticism* (following H. Schammberger).

HENRY J. CADBURY

*Aus frühchristlicher Zeit,* by Hans Joachim Schoeps, Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1950, pp. viii, 320. DM 21.

This volume contains thirteen essays by the professor of religious and spiritual history at the University of Erlangen. They are, so to speak, by-products of the author's extensive research which was incorporated in a large work on *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (Tübingen, 1949). Most of the essays in the volume under review were published in European and American periodicals between 1941 and 1949. If one can detect a common theme in these chapters, it is the historical and theological phenomena connected with Ebionitism.

In the first two chapters, which deal with the Pseudo-Clementine literature, Schoeps shows the great degree to which certain ideas (such as demonology and *Urgeschichte*) in this literature are related to Jewish haggada of the same period, especially in the books of Jubilees and Enoch.

The third study connects Symmachus, the second-century translator of the Old Testament into Greek, with the Ebionites. Schoeps also uses evidence from Symmachus' translation to trace influences from mythology and the Midrashim in his thinking.

Next the author attempts to solve the enigma of the epithet "oblias" used in Eusebius with reference to the apostle James. By an ingenious and not altogether convincing equation of Hebrew and Greek words, Schoeps maintains that Hegesippus, whom Eusebius quotes, had originally called James "a righteous apostle" (*shaliach sedeq*).

On firmer ground in the fifth essay, the author studies the background of the charges in the New Testament (such as in Matt. 23:31 and parallels; Acts 7:52; I Thess. 2:15; Hebr. 11:36-38) that the Jews murdered their prophets, and finds that, although these charges are mentioned in later rabbinic literature, they are first found in Old Testament apocryphal sources, and except for two instances (*cf.* Jer. 26:20-24 and II Chron. 24:20 f.) they are unsupported by the Old Testament itself.

The next two chapters deal with rabbinic answers to the use which Christian apologists made, on the one hand, of the destruction of the second temple and, on the other, of the claim that the church was the true Israel.

In the eighth and twelfth essays Schoeps argues that Jesus was not interested in the alteration or reform of Old Testament precepts, but merely their fulfillment in terms of the inner spirit of the Torah and in the environment of the kingdom of God when man would be endowed with a new heart. The Ebionites, on the contrary, held that Jesus had gone back to the original natural law, which, being older, had greater authority than the Mosaic code.

Chapter nine deals with certain aspects of Paul's Christology. By rabbinic exegesis Paul held that with the advent of Jesus the Messiah, which marked the end of one era and the beginning of another, the Mosaic law was no longer valid. Also, by typology Paul probably found in the contemplated sacrifice of Isaac a prototype of the death of Jesus as "the sacrifice of the lamb of God."

In the tenth and eleventh studies Schoeps treats of a variety of Jewish and Christian aberrations, including Simon Magus, Ben Stada, Balaam, and certain ascetic as well as libertine excesses in Gnosticism.

The last chapter traces in a most interesting way the development of the idea

of the *imitatio Dei* from the Old Testament through the early rabbinical literature to its Christian formulation involving belief in the Incarnation.

Four indexes increase the usefulness of these stimulating excursions into some of the lesser-known byways of early Christian doctrine. All of the problems and areas are illuminated by the author's wide knowledge of rabbinical sources.

BRUCE M. METZGER

*War and Civilization,* by Arnold J. Toynbee, New York, Oxford, 1950, pp. xii, 165, $2.50.

In 1934 Arnold J. Toynbee's first three volumes on *A Study of History* were published, and five years later the second three volumes appeared. Three or more volumes are yet to be completed. *A Study of History* treats the genesis and growth of certain civilizations and the causes of their breakdown and disintegration; for Toynbee, like Spengler, Bergson, Pareto, Croce, and some other contemporary philosophers of history, believes in the rise, maturity, and decay of cultures that have no redeeming faith beyond reason. Toynbee's ideas about past civilizations and about the problem and nature of their breakdown merit serious study and consideration. From this significant work, Albert Vann Fowler of the Pendle Hill Press of Philadelphia, in consultation with Toynbee, has selected nine extracts which illustrate the author's thesis that civilizations destroy themselves and that militarism and war have been the "commonest cause" of their destruction. These extracts have been published in a small book under the title of *War and Civilization,* which is the subject of this review.

In appraising *War and Civilization,* it must be kept in mind that the passages have been torn from their original context and that war is not the main theme of the work from which they have been taken, although unfortunately war has been an outstanding institution of societies and cultures. The book presents a discussion of militaristic society and, through a study of past civilizations, examines the idea of the ultimate suicidal outcome of militarism. Sparta collapsed when it reached military supremacy because it lacked the flexibility necessary for adjustment to new conditions. The military conquests of Assyria resulted in an overwhelming coalition of her enemies, which finally brought disaster. The Roman Republic in the second century B.C. furnishes an example for what Toynbee calls "the intoxication of victory"—the demoralization that took place after the terrible ordeal of the Punic Wars. The conquerors Tamburlaine and Charlemagne pushed their conquests to such an extent that the victors became exhausted. Various societies, from the earliest times, have disintegrated because of their belief that superior military techniques made them invincible. Thus the study abounds with illustrations against war and against those who put their trust in militarism.

In the preface to the book, Toynbee rules out the possibilities of pacifism as a solution to the prevention of the scourge of war in the contemporary world. The nations in which pacifism might be strong would be at the mercy of nations whose pacifism was impotent. This would mean that the most unscrupulous governments and the most benighted powers would become rulers of the world. "To face this prospect and submit to its immediate consequences presupposes an active foresight and a passive heroism that have been exhibited by saints but never by ordinary mankind in the mass." By rising to the "Warrior's level" rather than to the status of saints, unaggressive peoples in two world wars exercised the "cardinal virtues" without which war could not be waged; they defeated a militant power whose aim

was to conquer the world. But the opportunity to get rid of militarism after the First World War through a voluntary association of peace-loving peoples was thrown away and, according to the author, a second opportunity lies before us now. However, the reader who seeks in these pages a concrete proposal of escape from the intricate web of world militarism will be disappointed, for no practical suggestions are presented.

This study is scholarly, even though the author ranges far and wide in time and space. Ideas are expressed in beautiful prose studded with rich metaphors and brilliant similes, but the author's erudition and metaphysics give an elusive character to his conclusions. The book contains much material for serious reflection on the present and grave concern for the future, but it expresses little more than a moralistic attitude toward war and a pious hope that Christian virtues will prevail. It does not possess the relative completeness of the one-volume condensation of *A Study of History* (1947), or the interest and timeliness of the essays in Toynbee's *Civilization on Trial* (1948). The study closes on a sombre note: "The spectres of war and revolution that have latterly passed into legend now again stalk abroad, as of old, in the light of day; . . . the "Time of Troubles" has returned; and this shocking calamity has descended upon a generation which has been brought up in the illusory conviction that the bad times of yore have gone for good!" ARTHUR C. BINING

*From Constantine to Julian,* by Hans Lietzmann, New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. 340, $5.50.

It is always worth while for the English reader to have something by Lietzmann translated. Hans Lietzmann was without question the greatest church historian of our times. His wide interests in classical philology, ancient history, the New Testament, and the ancient church kept him from viewing Christianity in any narrowly parochial way; perhaps the principal merit (among many) of his *Geschichte der alten Kirche* is its combination of the life of the church with the life of the world. On this ground the third volume of his history, like the other two, must be unhesitatingly recommended. No student of church history can afford to be without this guide to a period difficult to understand.

Unfortunately the English translation, as previous reviewers have noted (and it is an easy observation to make), does not do justice to Lietzmann's work. A page of *corrigenda et emendanda* has been inserted in the American edition (perhaps this explains the excessively high price!), but there are many more corrections to be made, chiefly in regard to passages which are not quite German but are certainly not English. Some simple samples will suffice. On pp. 71 and 84 the *traditores* are called "traitors" (with quotation marks) and traitors (without); on p. 88 they are called *traditores,* while the index lists all these passages under "traitors" (no quotation marks). On p. 107 we read of Lucian of Antioch, while on p. 108 he has become, or rather remained, Lucianos (Lukianos). On p. 64 "Diocletian had become wrath"; this is not English. The names of modern scholars are sometimes misspelled; thus "Schubert" (p. 52, n. 2) should be "Schubart," and "Partheys" (p. 329) should be "Parthey."

The additional bibliography supplied by H. Chadwick (pp. 331-33) is valuable as a guide for the beginner in these studies.

In spite of the shortcomings we find in the translation, and the excessively high price the reader must pay for the book, we must recommend it for theological students and others who wish to have some understanding of the life of the church in the fourth century. Lietzmann clearly shows that it did not live in a vacuum, while at the

same time he does not stress the environment to the exclusion of everything else. His final chapter on the Christian liturgy is an invaluable summary. The personal characteristics of men like Constantine and Athanasius are brought out in detail, and he shows us that they were men with human ambitions rather than detached thinkers or symbols of ideas. Students of Christianity ought to have all three volumes, as well as a fourth which is to appear.

ROBERT M. GRANT

*The Admonition Controversy,* by Donald Joseph McGinn, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1949, pp. xii, 589, $6.50.

Professor McGinn's task in arranging the documents of the controversy between Cartwright and Whitgift in a form which brings out the relevance of Whitgift's answers is a major service to church history in general and to both English and American church history in particular. His simple restatement of the dialogue implicit in the tracts must have involved patience and judgment far beyond that which is normal in these days. The result is that both men appear in their true light and setting. It is essentially a "Tractarian Movement" in the English Church of the sixteenth century, which compares favorably with the quality of the thought of the nineteenth-century Tractarians, and it reveals the differences between Cambridge and Oxford thought on matters ecclesiastical in a way which no inter-University event from the *Tracts* to the Boat Race could be expected to achieve.

Cartwright and Whitgift were academic rivals before they became ecclesiastical opponents. They represent two moods which still survive in Cambridge, so much so that it is possible to *see* them in action in this arrangement. Whitgift—a generous scholar—was not an extremist. He stood for the Tudor reformation settlement on the basis of national unity or the greatest good for the greatest number; Cartwright stood for an absolute standard of theological precision derived from the Latin mind of John Calvin. Whitgift represents the generosity of the best Cambridge type of scholar and master of a College: he is the forerunner of Lightfoot and Westcott, and is not far removed from his friend Hooker—the exponent of sweet reasonableness in theology, which extends to the evangelical movement and beyond.

The irony which emerges from reading the *Admonitions* in their proper setting—and still more the normally unread replies of Whitgift!—is to reveal Cartwright as the true predecessor of Newman and the Oxford Movement! This revelation is not due to any undue pressure from Professor McGinn, but emerges from the "Tractarian" *mood* of Cartwright himself.

The effect of reading the whole controversy thus properly set out is to reveal the nature of the English Reformation and particularly the policy of Elizabeth in their true light. The accuracy and charm of Whitgift's answers satisfies alike the canons of accurate scholarship and good taste against the inaccurate blind turbulence of Cartwright. Church historians owe a deep debt to the author of this book for delivering the later phase of Tudor reform from the narrowness inflicted by the disciples of Cartwright and the defamers of a thoroughly honest archbishop of Canterbury—Whitgift, who was to the end a scholar and *not* a "Tractarian."

F. W. BUCKLER

*The Popes and Heresy in the Thirteenth Century,* by Albert Clement Shannon, Villanova (Pa.), Augustinian Press, 1949, pp. ix, 148, $2.50.

This is a thorough study, extensively documented, not alone of the attitude of the popes toward heresy, but also toward what was considered heresy and the causes for it. Dr. Shannon is scrupulously impartial in his effort to reach the facts,

carefully exact in disentangling the threads of history to establish the full extent of civil and ecclesiastical authority responsible for the treatment accorded heretics, especially in and through the inquisition. He introduces his findings by stating that they are based on "a thorough investigation of the papal registers, bullaria, and conciliar decrees," a claim well substantiated by the sources cited.

Quite properly we are early acquainted with the papal definition of heresy: "Heresy, in its strictest meaning, was construed as a deliberate and intentional denial of some article or articles of the revealed truth of the Catholic faith, and a public and obstinate persistence in that error." But, "it was required that the crime of heresy be externalized." Originally, the charge could not be made against the *credentes* (believers), who merely "adhered to the doctrines of an heretical sect without submitting themselves to all its laws and practices." However, with the passing of the years and the growth of opposition to the established authority of church and state these were included among those to be punished.

It is this, though not specifically mentioned by Dr. Shannon, that helps us today to understand the fierce provocation of both these powers toward heresy and heretics in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the extreme measures meted out in the effort to suppress them. Society within the Holy Roman Empire was in the process of disintegration with the emergence of states, witnessed first, perhaps, by the Norman Conquest of England, 1066. Treason, in the modern sense of disloyalty to one's native land, had not yet been, nor could have been, defined by law. Necessarily in that church-state system, heresy was the only legal charge possible against all who, refusing to conform, caused disturbance and disruption. Consequently, "the juridical concept that it was the duty of the state to protect true religion and to punish heretics as enemies of society."

It is this that explains the determined and desperate assaults made upon such heretical sects as the Waldensians, Albigensians, and others, as it also explains the bewildering alterations in papal policy, since within their brief reigns the popes had to deal with a constantly changing society. It also points up the dilemma faced by the popes in their relationships with the emperors and kings. They had no desire to strengthen the hands of the rulers; yet the execution of their decrees so often rested upon the recognized divine right and duty of the civil powers to wield the sword. So, though "heresy was essentially an eclessiastical offense," the pontiffs, not always heartfully, perforce "appealed to the monarchs of Europe to supplement Canon Law with appropriate civil legislation."

Wrote Innocent III to the King of France:

> For the protection of his spouse, namely the Universal Church, the Lord instituted the pontifical and the royal dignity: the one which cherishes its children, the other which wards off adversaries. . . . It is expedient, therefore, that both the spiritual authority and the secular power, mindful of the reason for their establishment, should concur together for the defense of the Church, and should aid each other, so that those whom ecclesiastical discipline cannot restrain from evil, the secular arm will curb, and those who, trusting in their own savageness do not fear the material sword, spiritual punishment will pursue.

It is not to be thought, however, that these two authorities were always harmonious. This "disciplinary action against heresies," says Dr. Shannon, was often carried on "against the determined and bitter opposition of the temporal rulers." But if the king was irked by this subordinate position, his Holiness had no liking in being beholden to the secular power. Thus, though it might outwardly appear that the divine appointees were locked in loving and holy endeavor to eradicate evil, they were often locked in inimical endeavors of extreme proportions—a hostility which eventually culminated, for the papacy, in the disastrous conflict of Boniface VIII with Philip the Fair and the Babylonian Captivity.

Dr. Shannon pays special attention to the inquisition as the extreme effort of the popes to destroy the evil of heresy. But he warns that "no specific document can be labeled as that which formally constituted the inquisitorial tribunal in existence. Rather . . . the inquisition was the result of a closely linked sequence of events having important juridical connotations . . . as a separate entity with specifically assigned personnel, a codified system of laws, and a defined procedure [it] had no birthday [but] was born of a change of procedure, of entrusting the investigation of heresy to specially trained and skilled judges working in collaboration with local bishops and deriving their jurisdiction directly from the Holy See, which now chose to exercise primary jurisdiction over heresy and heretics."

Why? Because of too much moral and spiritual laxity, corruption and political ambition, among both civil and ecclesiastical officials. Faced by these patent facts, the popes appointed, as investigators and judges, Dominicans and Franciscans, "well-trained theologians . . . men of spiritual life, disinterested in the wealth and honors of the world" and free from the "ordinary vices of public office—corruption, bribery, peculation, respect of persons." The relationship between these special representatives and the local officers varied, however, with time and communities.

Emerging as an institution in the reign of Gregory IX (1227-1241), the inquisition was welded into an efficient and effective weapon by Innocent IV (1243-1254). As to the procedure of the tribunal, early in its history the accused was informed of the charges made against him, and was allowed the rights of canon and civil law in defense, including the knowledge of the identity of his accusers and the witnesses against him, and also a legal advisor. From the first, however, this latter right was frowned upon, and under Innocent IV all these privileges were withdrawn. This pope likewise authorized secular authorities to torture the accused to gain a confession. Should the defendant confess voluntarily, he was promised a lighter sentence, but if he refused to accept this offer other measures were used to gain the confession of guilt—close confinement, reduction of the food supply to a minimum, torture.

One comment of Dr. Shannon warrants our attention. "In contradistinction to secular law the dispositions of criminals, *i.e.*, of convicted heretics, were allowed, provided the court was convinced of their veracity and disinterestedness." One wonders whether this practice may not be creeping into the observance of some of America's court proceedings today, especially those of certain committees of the Senate.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

*Erasmus and Our Struggle for Peace,* by José Chapiro, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. xv, 196, $2.50.

This readable book, dedicated to the United Nations, "embodiment of the ideas of Erasmus," supplies the first new English translation since 1559 of one of the most significant works of the Dutch humanist and affords the reader fresh hope and a constructive interpretation of history.

José Chapiro, defined by the publishers as "a scholar of international erudition who is at home in a dozen languages," presents his own lively 54-page translation of *Querela Pacis,* or *Peace Protests,* which Erasmus published in 1517, in part as a recapitulation of his earlier writings on peace, such as the salty *War Is Sweet to Those Who Aren't Fighting,* and portions of *The Praise of Folly.* Erasmus here implements his usual exposures and denunciations of war by proposing positive steps to make peace vital. Peace rests on liberty, and is an art developed by education

and moral discipline. It comes when desired with all the force of the human soul, and springs less from treaties than from the elimination of the sources of evil.

Peace, Erasmus asserts, may be obtained through the just motives and actions of princes guided not by self-interest but by common concern. An especial plea is made to several sovereigns then ruling, the elderly Maximillian (about to close a dubious career), the new pope Leo X, and the three young kings, Henry VIII of England, Francis I of France, and Charles I of Spain (soon to become also Charles V of the Empire), whose later lapses unfortunately were destined to belie their early promises. For the edification of the English, Erasmus overstresses the merits and potentialities of their traditional enemies, the French. His appeal to the virtues of kings affords an exact contrast to the cynical admonitions of Machiavelli's *Prince* which by coincidence appeared at just the same time. Erasmus seems never to have become acquainted with that Italian handbook.

Modern critics will object that Erasmus' thesis is outmoded by the subsequent decline of princes and despotic monarchy. In the present age it is the people or dictatorial groups who rule. Erasmus, however, moves on in his argument. "War . . . should not be undertaken except with the consent of the entire nation." If persons go to war to advance the name of their country, "why do not men resolve that the universe should become the country of all?" This presages a world community, religious as well as political. The Moslem Turks (the advancing "menace" of that day), were profiting by divisions among the Christians. If Christians hoped to convert those of other faiths, let them first be themselves Christians. As a climax, Peace calls upon princes, priests, bishops, theologians, magistrates, and the rank and file to join against war.

The tract is powerful, witty, and convincing, as in depicting the folly of a soldier repeating the phrases of the Lord's Prayer as he seeks to purify himself by partaking of Mass before battle. In theory it is unanswerable. One might wish that it could be read and heeded by today's autocratic war makers.

Mr. Chapiro prefaces his translation with a 120-page introduction on the career and significance of Erasmus about whom he is preparing a biography. He knows his sources and appreciates the classical and humanistic traditions. Erasmus and Thomas More are for him symbols as well as writers and men of action. The preface ends with a lengthy contrast between the urbane and tolerant Erasmus and the gross, unbridled, and contentious Luther, "the greatest religious agitator since Mohammed." This disquisition may not be historically or philosophically objective, nor is it Erasmian in tone. Yet Protestants, Catholics, and all others may well turn to this compact and timely volume, for the spirit and teachings of Erasmus were never more needed than today.

EARL CRANSTON

*The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers,* by Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd [Chicago, Blessing's Book Stores], 1948, pp. 150, 12/6.

This book is part of a doctor's thesis presented to the faculty of theology in the University of Basel. Its writing was suggested by Karl Barth, and it was written under the direction of Oscar Cullmann and Karl Ludwig Schmidt.

The fact that three translations of the Apostolic Fathers have appeared within the last five years in America shows that scholars are using Christian writings that date from the same time of the New Testament or immediately after. Whereas interest in the Apostolic Fathers used to be in their doctrine of the ministry, they are now being read because they show the beliefs, life, and practice of those men who first heard and practiced the gospel.

The author has that British custom of taking a thesis and then finding arguments to prove it. His purpose is

> to probe into the early Christian understanding of grace, and to discern how and why there came about in the history of that doctrine so great a divergence from the teaching of the New Testament. It is my firm conviction that the misunderstanding of the Gospel which took place as early as in the second century, with the consequent relapse into non-Christian ideas, has resulted in a doctrine that is largely un-biblical, and that has been only partially corrected by the work of Augustine and the Reformers.

Dr. Torrance has read the Fathers very carefully, and if anyone wants to know exactly what Clement, Ignatius, or Barnabas and the others believed and said about the doctrine of grace, he will find it in this book. The introduction traces the idea of grace in the Hebrew Bible, the Septuagint, Philo, hellenistic writings, and the New Testament. It is a careful linguistic study. The particular doctrine of grace which Dr. Torrance approves of is that of St. Paul. But here, unfortunately, he never gives an accurate definition of St. Paul's doctrine of grace, unless it is synonymous with the person of Jesus Christ: "Any attempt to detach grace in a transferred sense from the actual embodiment of God's grace in Jesus Christ is to misunderstand the meaning of the Pauline 'charis' altogether."

It must be acknowledged that in the Apostolic Fathers the emphasis seems to be on the doctrine of works rather than grace. They seem to have gone back to a Jewish emphasis although they are not Pharisaical. Dr. Torrance is almost angry with them because they do not use the Pauline doctrine or phrases. He seems to forget that some people have always considered that St. Paul corrupted the primitive gospel of Jesus. Of course we do not hear this so much nowadays. In studying the Fathers we must study them for what they say and not what they ought to have said. We want to know what men were really like in Rome and Asia Minor and in Corinth. After all they did not have two thousand years of Christianity behind them. Any convert will bring over previous thought-forms and practices no matter how soundly he is converted. The Bible which the Apostolic Fathers used was the Septuagint. They had not read the New Testament, and we have no right to read in the developed forms of Christian doctrine which we now know. Their sincerity is beyond question. None of them had what we call a theological education, and the surprise is that they could grasp and state the great Christian truths. They received the grace of God and they did not receive it in vain even if they could not state it in technical language.

The footnotes of this book are exceptional in that they supplement the text and show the author has used a good bibliography. The book does not sound like the usual doctor's thesis, and therefore is interesting to read. It is recommended especially for scholars of the patristic period, but the average clergyman reading it should read it primarily for the factual content.

VINCENT FOWLER POTTLE

*Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,* by Walter A. Kaufmann, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950, pp. xi, 409, $6.

Professor Kaufmann, of the department of philosophy in Princeton University, is convinced that Nietzsche has been misunderstood by nearly everybody; so he has given us a new interpretation. He rarely quotes or mentions other writers on Nietzsche except to disagree with them. Nietzsche has been claimed as a champion by militarists, by racists, and now, by the existentialists. To reëvaluate him is desirable. The inaccuracy of our English translations and the mutilation of the German text call for the kind of scholarship with which Professor Kaufmann is equipped.

His competence is quite evident in the first part of the book which gives a biographical and general historical background to the study of Nietzsche. What is particularly gratifying is the broad and thorough manner in which the author relates Nietzsche not only to the philosophers and writers of the first rank (others have done that), but also to lesser men like Jacob Burckhardt, Erwin Rohde, Franz Overbeck, and Freud. The footnotes show an acquaintance with details of German literary history which English and American writers on Nietzsche rarely possess. The author is thoroughly at home in nineteenth-century German thought and literature.

But when we turn to the constructive part of the book we are somewhat disappointed. He rejects the view generally held that Nietzsche's thought can be divided into three different and contradictory periods. He undertakes to show that there is a consistent development in Nietzsche's thought and that there is no gap between the early Nietzsche and the later philosopher of the will to power. He disavows, naturally, any intention of forcing the thought "into a Procrustean system." Another aim is to clear Nietzsche of the charge of racism. Whether he has succeeded in avoiding Procrustes' bed, every reader must judge for himself. To the reviewer his method appears open to criticism.

There is a certain inconclusiveness in the course of the discussion. The argument occasionally fails just at the important point. The "It would seem, etc." formula is employed at least half-a-dozen times. It is rather irritating to be told, when the argument gets to the crux of the matter, that the problem will be taken up later, and when it is taken up later, to find that it is no longer the same problem. The objection that Nietzsche's monism becomes dualistic by the introduction of the principle of *self-overcoming* is one of these *cruces*. The author recognizes the force of the objection but postpones an examination. Much later we discover that the question is one of cosmology and it is again postponed. Finally, the author decides that the objection is unanswerable if the will to power is made a basic principle of the universe; that Nietzsche did this only late in life and that the will to power as a metaphysical principle is an excrescence on Nietzsche's thought and not an integral part of it; and that the objection is answered if the will to power is maintained simply as an empirical concept arrived at by induction. By finding a parallel between the *aufheben* of Hegel and the *self-overcoming* in Nietzsche, the author believes that he has removed the dualism. The case is quite the contrary. The dualism in Hegel can be resolved because of a metaphysical ground in which contrarieties find unity, but since, on Kaufmann's own argument, Nietzsche's leading principle, the will to power, is not metaphysical, and since Nietzsche recognizes nothing beyond nature, the dualism between the will to power and *self-overcoming* cannot be resolved in a higher synthesis, for no higher synthesis exists.

When Professor Kaufmann defends Nietzsche against the charge of racism he engages in special pleading. Every reader of Nietzsche knows that much that is called Nietzschean does not belong to Nietzsche. But the author leans over backward. He notes, as proof of Nietzsche's innocence, that he was proud of his Polish forebears and believed that the Germans entered the line of gifted nations only through a strong mixture with Slavic blood (p. 249), and he quotes a passage in which the Jews are praised as "beyond any doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race which now lives in Europe" (p. 256). Instances of racism in reverse! The author assures us that when Nietzsche says: "Blood (*Geblüt*) counts," he does not mean blood but something else. Statements against the Jews that cannot be explained away "must be understood as *ad hominem* arguments against contemporary racists." Finally, he makes the strong assertion that the notion that Nietzsche

became a racist and came close to Nazism "is entirely unwarranted." Although he insists that the will to power is the core (p. viii) of Nietzsche's thinking, he tries to save him from responsibility for it by explaining that Nietzsche did not really endorse the principle of the will to power but simply stated it as an essentially empirical concept arrived at by induction. Many philosophers would like to claim as much for their principles.

Here is a book not to be ignored by the student of Nietzsche, not because the author has reduced the thought to a system nor because he has cleared Nietzsche of all racism. Its strength and importance lie in the searching analysis of single facets of the philosopher's thought and in such original contributions as the long but cogent discussion of his relation and parallel to Hegel. These contributions assure the book a high rank in Nietzsche literature.

PHILIP S. MILLER

*Pascal's Pensées,* edited by H. F. Stewart, New York, Pantheon, 1950, pp. xxiv, 543, $5.

Of the making of new editions of Pascal there seems to be no end. He is one of those few writers who must be studied afresh by men of every generation and, as Sainte-Beuve expressed it, "chaque époque ainsi va refaisant une édition à son usage." It is not Pascal who changes, but we who, getting farther from him, must be continually bringing him back into focus.

During the latter years of his life Pascal was known to be gathering material for an Apology of Christianity, a book with which he hoped to combat the rampant atheism of his time. When he died, only some notes and stray fragments of the work were found in his room bound in disorderly bundles with other obviously unrelated compositions. Here was a heap of precious material for a structure whose framework had not been erected, for which no blueprint had been sketched. In determining an arrangement of the *Pensées* for publication, few editors have attempted to do more than follow in broad outline the plan presented by Pascal orally to a group of Port-royalists in 1658 and rather vaguely reported by Filleau de la Chaise and Étienne Périer. Another group of competent editors—including the editor of the present edition—have sought to adhere scrupulously to this so-called "plan," but the result is never entirely satisfactory. Some of the "thoughts" are like stones that fit poorly into the structure. They either must be forced in or relegated, along with the utter misfits, to a sort of scrap heap at the end of the book. This unruly material in the present edition is of considerable quantity and is placed after the *Apology* under the title *Adversaria.* The fact, however, that one of the *pensées* concerning Montaigne (No. 65 in Brunschvicg) is repeated here in both sections must surely be an oversight rather than a means of escape from the sort of dilemma such a method frequently entails.

Dr. H. F. Stewart, an eminent authority on Pascal, prepared, just before his death, this rearrangement of the *Pensées* and a fresh English translation which has been conveniently printed on the pages opposite the French text. A student of Pascal for many years and author of several scholarly essays on him (his *La Sainteté de Pascal* has been acclaimed by French critics), Dr. Stewart was perhaps better qualified for his task than any other English scholar. His notes reveal his thorough grasp of the field; and the introduction, while open to debate on certain points, such as Pascal's fideism and skepticism, is the fruit of his intimate knowledge of Pascal's thought and times. But the book's most notable virtue is the excellent translation. Generally adequate, often brilliant, the English more nearly equals the clarity, directness, and poetic beauty of the original text than do earlier translations.

Despite certain errors and misprints, which Dr. Stewart no doubt would have corrected in proofreading—Étienne Pascal for Étienne Périer (p. ix); "if I may so" for "if I may say so" (p. xix); Sainte-Beux for Sainte-Beuve (p. xx); "Dieu seroit bien manifeste" should read "Dieu *y* seroit bien manifeste" (p. 132), etc.—this edition will doubtless be the preference of the general reader.

In this new arrangement new numbers had to be assigned to the individual *pensées,* but since there is no table of concordance, comparison with the text of other editions is rendered painfully tedious. This is but another reason why it seems improbable that the present edition will be accepted as the definitive one. But for reading Pascal in the way that is perhaps most valuable, in small bits at a time, dipping here and there, "sautant de sujet en sujet," the English-speaking reader will be grateful for Dr. Stewart's matchless translation. This feeling that the individual parts of the work are more important than the order in which they are set down is strengthened by Pascal's own words when he said: "I should be doing too high honor to my subject if I treated it with order, since I wish to show that it is incapable of that."

WILLIAM J. GAINES

*Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist,* by Cyril C. Richardson, Evanston (Ill.), Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, 1949, pp. 57, 25 cents.

Still central as a mystical rite of the Christian church is the Lord's Supper. Its observance to the present among even radical Protestant bodies attests its peculiar significance as a means of grace. Stress, as the evangelical churches may, the essentiality of faith, nevertheless this rite remains fixed not alone in their liturgies but also in the hearts of their people. Nor, however defined by the theologian or in the simple feeling and response of the participants, is it easy to escape the mood of "sacrament" in partaking of the elements. There is a sacredness in this observance of the Christian centuries that defies explanation and promises its long continuance.

So Professor Richardson has accomplished more than he set out to do—or perhaps thought he did—in his lecture comparing and contrasting the views of Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist. He has in fact shown how important the Eucharist has been held by Roman Catholics and Protestants as well; but more, he has made clear how the Reformers and other leaders also, who may have found themselves in agreement on most other doctrines and practices of the Christian church, have strongly and stubbornly divided at times over questions pertaining to the administration and spiritual values to be enjoyed in partaking of the Supper.

The author concludes that the Swiss and English Reformers were at one in their doctrines of the meaning and value of the Eucharist. Both reject all thought of substance in the bread and wine—"they cannot be bearers or vehicles of spiritual power." "What has relevance," again writes Zwingli, "is the awareness of faith created by the Holy Spirit, and the historic fact that Christ was slain for the sins of the world."

What then is the value of the observance of the Supper? For both Reformers, Professor Richardson says, "It is a thanksgiving festival . . . for grace *already* received, and a means by which the Church's unity is given expression." That is, "By the Supper Christians joyfully commemorate the benefits of Calvary, and pledge to each other their willingness to be faithful soldiers of Christ." To these, says the author, Zwingli later added the teaching that "the Supper itself can be a means for increasing faith."

With all of Zwingli's views Cranmer is in harmony, says Richardson. The difference comes as to *how* faith is strengthened by partaking of the elements. Cran-

mer, we are told, "emphasized an instrumental connexion between the sacrament and the working of God's grace. . . . The difference lies in [Cranmer] giving the elements a higher value, in stressing the fact that *God,* rather than the *believer,* uses them as instruments; and that He pledges to do so when the Supper is rightly observed."

In my own mind this is not so much a difference between the two men as it is simply a further elucidation by the later writer, Cranmer. Zwingli does not say how the faith of the believer is increased by his partaking of the elements, Cranmer does.

One seeming contradiction occurs in Professor Richardson's treatment of the history of Christian doctrine concerning the meaning of "faith." On pp. 5 and 8 he warns us that we must beware of defining "faith" as used by the Reformers in the same terms as we may today. For the former faith was "being grasped by God through the action of the Holy Spirit. . . . It is, as Zwingli says, a fact of being created by the Holy Spirit. . . ." And again, "Faith, for the Reformers, is an act of God." Yet later on in his lecture we find the statement, as above, "Zwingli came to emphasize that the Supper itself can be a means for increasing faith." "After the controversy with Luther," we are told, "he, [Zwingli] was willing to admit that a wavering faith could be 'propped up' and strengthened by the Eucharist."

In accord with his thesis that Cranmer is Zwinglian in his views, Professor Richardson again maintains that for Cranmer "the gift of which the elements are seals and pledges is not participation in the substance of the body of Christ (as for Calvin), but sharing in the virtue of the Passion by faith, which is a somewhat different thing." "The bread and wine are visible pledges, confirming our faith in the fact that Christ died for us." And again, "Cranmer follows Zwingli . . . that by faith the believer enjoys an intimate union with him" . . . as he partakes of the Supper. This seems to me to be the understanding of the word against which the author warns his readers.

The real difference between these two Reformers lies in Cranmer's doctrine of the believer's "incorporation into Christ," with which Zwingli had had nothing to do. For him Christ was present, not alone in the Supper, but at all times in his divinity or spiritual power. Though Cranmer was as insistent that he was not present in the elements, he did insist that "He dwelleth in us by his incarnation." Therefore, before the Supper, and rather than the bread and wine becoming the body and blood, "Christ [is] made one with us corporally and carnally, because he took our nature of the virgin Mary."

But how is the believer to benefit by that fact? Only by partaking of the Supper. "By trust in the Passion we receive all the fruits of redemption, and these fruits do, indeed, imply a substantial union with Christ by virtue of the incarnation."

Thus, concludes the author, while Zwingli was able to escape the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence, Cranmer, even as Luther and Calvin, was not. There is a contradiction then in his theology. Though he denies the "substantial" in the Eucharist he transfers it to the Incarnation, assured, however, of its redeeming power and gift of everlasting life only by partaking in faith of the bread and wine of the Supper.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

*Christian Love,* by Paul E. Johnson, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 240, $3.

Dr. Johnson acknowledges that there may be biblical, theological, sociological, and ethical treatments of Christian love. He has taken as his own task an exposition

"within the framework of psychological analysis." His work obviously has theological, sociological, and ethical implications, but he has not let any of these determine his discussions. He has avoided pietist and edifying utterances, which have their proper place in sermons, and has given a description deserving the attention of psychologists as such. Any psychologist who asks what is meant by Christian love should be urged to read this volume. The treatment is systematic, the exposition clear and direct, and the literary style of the highest quality. It is with the general position he adopts that that of the exponents of crisis theology may best be met. From such a consideration its publication at this time may be judged singularly opportune. Dr. Johnson's *Christian Love* is a contribution of the first rank in presenting the healthy Christian attitudes to life.

It is amazing that any Christian writer should have to defend "self-love," but Dr. Johnson finds it necessary to do so against the views expressed by Nygren in *Agape and Eros.* He also performs a useful service in showing the wider implications of Freud's psychology, which cannot rightly be taken in any narrow sexual sense. He avoids discussion of the doctrine of the "total depravity" of human nature, to which he refers as "the error of Calvin" and as a "bitter heritage." In contrast with the too frequent exaggerated concern with sin, he occupies himself with the positive values of Christian love of which he considers all men by nature capable. Human beings hunger for love as obviously as they hunger for food. Great emphasis is given to the dynamic character of love. "Love is the basic energy of human life" (p. 59). "Love is not love unless it is expressed" (p. 105). All that the author says in this regard is important, and I would not challenge any of it. Yet some may get the impression that love is predominantly instrumental to something else. The psychologies of James, Freud, and McDougall may have unduly influenced him. Nowhere is there a consideration of love as a state of mind "at rest" in interpersonal relationship. What is the "rest" which Augustine (quoted by the author) suggests men may find in the love of God? To take an example from ordinary life: one may find the comforts and conveniences of a hotel better than the conditions of staying with a friend; yet the latter may give more profound satisfaction just because one is "with the friend." Friends and lovers may enjoy "being together," as for a walk, or sitting watching the ocean, without doing anything for or saying anything to one another. Such experience is often judged better than being alone, although sometimes one enjoys solitude. There is something mystical in this. It is my one serious criticism that the author has not given due recognition to Christian love as mystical. To any retort that anything such is "a mystery," it may be replied that the author himself suggests (p. 208) that to the psychologist the reality of Christian love "remains a mystery."

Dr. Johnson gives an extensive and very careful survey of those characteristics of human nature which may be summed up under the terms aggression and hatred. He does not underestimate their force. For his questionable statement: "Love is the sublimation of aggression" (p. 198) he might better say: "Aggression may be sublimated by love." In discussing the causes of war, he does not include stupidity, the incompetence to think out peaceful solutions to international problems, such as may be the immediate cause of our present situation. Chapter IV, "Education for Love," merits the consideration of all concerned with religious education. Chapters V and VI, on "The Christian Family" and "Sex and Marriage," reveal the author's mature experience and well-balanced judgments. They make the book of value to the general reader. A pastor who gave counsel along their lines might be more helpful than a psychiatrist. For Christian love as the author has so admirably described it,

for "the beloved community" to which he points in his last chapter, it would seem that differences of doctrinal belief are of no vital consequence.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

*The Greek Philosophers: from Thales To Aristotle,* by W. K. C. Guthrie, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. v, 168, $2.75.

This attractive little volume is one in a series of Home Study Books under the general editorship of B. Ifor Evans. As stated on the jacket, "The author is a lecturer in classics at Cambridge, Public Orator, and a Fellow of Peterhouse." Based upon "a short course of lectures designed for an audience of undergraduates who were reading any subject other than Classics" and who desired to learn more clearly the real significance of such allusions to Greek ideas as had come their way in whatever connection, the present work is addressed to a similar audience. The author's familiarity with his Greek sources might be taken for granted because of his academic credentials, but he deserves special praise for his skill in evaluating and elucidating those sources. Incidentally, from time to time he corrects loose and misleading statements made by men who either lack personal acquaintance with the Greek background of modern thought or else are slipshod in their handling of it. Thus on p. 2 he refutes the claim that Socrates is the ultimate source of existentialism.

Guthrie's initial chapter, "Greek Ways of Thinking," is well designed to pave the way toward a right understanding of a difficult subject. Here, as elsewhere, he shows a rare genius for anticipating the obstacles that will confront the uninitiated and an ability by clear and simple treatment to lessen their seriousness. Indeed clearness of thought and simplicity of expression constitute distinguishing features of the book. He does well to stress at the outset a fact which is sometimes overlooked, namely, that the Greeks were "in many respects a remarkably foreign people," whose terminology all too frequently stubbornly resists translation: "Even in contemporary languages, beyond a few words for material objects, it is practically impossible to translate a word so as to give exactly the same impression to a foreigner as is given by the original to those who hear it in their own country." This truth is ably illustrated by a discussion of the Greek words commonly translated *justice, virtue, god.* Attention is called also to the difficulty of reaching a true evaluation of what the Greek philosophers achieved without some appreciation of the primitive notions of man and the universe then prevalent which they sought to combat.

After this introductory chapter Guthrie proceeds to his task of exposition and interpretation under the following main heads: matter and form, the problem of motion, the reaction towards humanism, Plato (I); the doctrine of ideas, Plato (II); ethical and theological answers to the sophists, Aristotle (I); the Aristotelian universe, and Aristotle (II); human beings.

These are all topics that have been dealt with repeatedly through the years, and one need not look to find much that is novel in the facts presented. The author deserves credit, however, for his manifest sense of proportion and for good judgment in interpretation. He shows admirable skill in selecting those features in a philosopher's teaching which are of most significance, giving to them a rational and interesting explanation, and relegating to the background or entirely omitting details that might only serve to distract and perplex. This he does very consciously, as he admits quite frankly. Thus in concluding his first chapter on Plato he remarks (p. 99): "In such brief reflections on Plato's philosophy as are being given here, it was a problem to know what to put in and what to leave out. Whatever the choice, it is practically impossible to avoid a one-sided picture of the man and his mind."

His *obiter dicta* also add interest to his exposition. Thus in dealing with Anaxagoras (p. 55) he remarks: "We may notice by the way that no Greek ever spoke of creation in an absolute sense, of a god who brought something out of nothing. The creation of a world is always the imposition of order—*kosmos*—on an already existing chaos of matter." Again (p. 120), "Platonism is undoubtedly a two-world philosophy, and anyone whose thoughts are confined to this world can never hope to understand it."

Whether such observations are original or not, they serve to portray the quality of the author's mind and the spirit in which he attacks his task of introducing ancient Greek philosophy to the modern world. A sympathetic perusal of his little book can hardly fail to make the subject more real and understandable and attractive. Although modesty prompted him to state that the best justification for *The Greek Philosophers,* is that Cornford's *Before and After Socrates* is out of print, one may predict that it will prove equally valuable and stimulating.

H. LAMAR CROSBY

*A Firm Faith for Today,* by Harold A. Bosley, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 283, $3.

Liberalism in theology is not dead. Harold Bosley would be the last to maintain that this work is the profoundest and most analytical exposition of it; this cannot be done when a book develops in the limited circumference of preachers' meetings and student conferences. But what can be done is in the main done neatly and vigorously in this exposition of main articles of the Christian faith. No audience or reader could have missed the constant insistence that what the Christian believes, far from being deliverances "from above," are throughout the discovery of persons whose living and thinking express the structure of reality.

Whether Bosley is discussing "We believe in Jesus Christ," "We believe in the Forgiveness of Sins," or "We believe in the Kingdom of God," he everywhere reviews the basic alternatives offered in the past and then re-*views* the elements of human experience to which Christian beliefs are relevant, and by which, he would insist, they must be confirmed. Christian faith speaks *to* the human predicament because it is an illumination *of* it.

Such is Bosley's sense of the vital immanence of God, such is his conviction of a Holy Spirit forever at work seeking to guide and strengthen men, that one can feel in his utterances the inspiration of a religion which encourages not "finalities" but humble growth of communion between all men and God. Let this book be read by those who would understand their experience religiously, and see the meaning of religious faith for experience—and on this account let it be widely used among young people who, chilled by the vaunted "mysteries" of faith, need guidance in locating the mysteries where they really exist.

So anxious is Bosley to mediate traditional beliefs effectively, and so concerned is he to keep, if one may put it that way, the appropriate emotional atmosphere of the doctrines he discusses, that a certain vagueness enters his discussion, sometimes at essential points. Thus Bosley holds that Jesus Christ "is God's supreme effort to save the world." This means "that in and through Christ the power of God was inserting itself in history *in a special way* (italic mine), and that "of him alone can it be truly said that he is *in* history yet not *of* it." Questions are here raised, about the exact meaning of "special way," and of *in* but not *of,* which need more careful analysis than is given—or perhaps possible—here. And doubt as to Bosley's final view of Jesus is raised when such statements are compared with a summary statement like this: "Let us therefore, confront Jesus Christ ourselves, and present him to the world as a historical figure, as one of mankind's greatest teachers of ethical

religion, as our dearest revelation of the will of God for the lives of men. . ." (pp. 76, 77). The time is more than ripe in American theology for a consistent statement of the meaning of the Holy Spirit, which seems to be treated as a universalizing of the love of God, and a more restrictive doctrine of salvation through Christ.

PETER A. BERTOCCI

*Stories from Holy Writ,* by Helen Waddell, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. xi, 244, $2.75.

This is not just another book of Bible stories for children. It is an unusually fine work of its kind, possessing a rare combination of delicate artistry and a seeming artlessness which makes it both pleasing and effective.

The author, who has distinguished herself by significant scholarly contributions to the study of the Middle Ages, has here turned her gift of skillful, imaginative narration to the graphic retelling of selected biblical episodes. The choice of subjects seems almost random, but selection is apparently on the basis of dramatic qualities. From the Old Testament are taken stories from the Joseph and Jacob cycles, the life of Saul (and David), Nehemiah's building of the wall of Jerusalem, and Jonah preaching to Nineveh; from the New Testament, Matthew the Publican, Nicodemus, the Rich Young Ruler, Lazarus of Bethany, Joseph of Arimathea, and three stories about Paul.

Sufficient attention is paid to backgrounds, dramatic settings, and character depiction to make the scenes and personalities come vividly alive. Many a discerning, sympathetic touch is given to reveal the thoughts and feelings of the participants, their religious experiences, perplexities, despairs, and hopes. The style is idiomatic English rather than American, and at times seems almost quaint, recapturing the diction of the Authorized Version, but with a naturalness which adds savor to the stories. The language of the common people is often cast into the form of delightful Hibernicisms: "Maybe it's repented you have"; "they do be saying . . ."; "it is leaving we will be tomorrow." (The stories were first told to children in County Down.)

One can be critical of the contents without depreciating the appealing quality of the narration. Thus there is a tendency to treat literally some of the legendary features, and to quote biblical passages quite out of their context; *e.g.,* in the Jacob and Laban story, Jacob "wandered under the stars in those same plains where Satan had said to God, sneering, 'Skin for skin. . . .'" Curious anachronisms occur, such as, "Moses went for a walk to watch the men building the pyramids." Though the impression in the earlier stories is that they were told to very young children, some of the later stories appear often to leave the youthful audience far behind, indulging in quite adult observations and using language far above the elementary level; *e.g.,* Paul was "hungry . . . for the curial speech, the clash of dialectic." These are minor points, however, and they do not greatly detract from the prevailing charm and good taste of the stories. There are unforgettable scenes throughout the book, gems of the storytelling art in which the author excels. Readers will be glad that Miss Waddell consented to publish these stories which she had told to small nephews and nieces, now grown up, who importuned her to do so.

JOHN W. FLIGHT

*The Church and Contemporary Change,* by G. Bromley Oxnam, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. xiii, 132, $2.50.

Bishop Oxnam needs no introduction to any person likely to be reading this review. A bishop of the Methodist Church since 1936, secretary of the Methodist

Council of Bishops, one of the presidents of the World Council of Churches, a courageous and hard-hitting champion of genuinely liberal Christianity, he is one of America's best-known and most effective spokesman for the Protestant cause.

His concern for the church in its modern setting, his interest in the relation of the church to economic and political forces, and his attention to the total world situation, have given rise to a good deal of criticism, some of it virulent, most of it not well founded. The Carl MacIntyres and John Flynns scream at him as the *bête noire* of socialistic infiltration. Because he believes in brotherhood, because he points out that there are injustices in the social and economic order of our good land, they proclaim to all the faithful that he is a dangerous man.

This review is by is by no means an attempt to defend Bishop Oxnam against his critics. To make such an attempt would be ridiculous. It is not even necessary that the reviewer agree with the opinions and position of Bishop Oxnam. It is necessary that all persons who criticize him—or any other person in a similar position—should acquaint themselves with the facts and should report the truth. To any charge of communist sympathies, the best answer is his pamphlet "How the Protestants Fight Communism," and a fair reading of *The Church and Contemporary Change.*

This is a small book, 132 pages; but it is packed with the results of wide experience, accurate observation, close reasoning, and dynamic expression. The bishop has traveled widely and wisely; he has lived at the centre of the church's life at home and abroad. When he speaks, there are no wasted moments; when he writes, he has something to say, and he says it memorably.

There are five sections to the book. It would appear that these are rewritten from lectures given at the Pacific School of Religion in 1945. How much the world has changed since 1945 no one needs to be told, least of all Bishop Oxnam. On p. 1 he points out that we are living in an era of change, and the issue is no longer one of change or continuity, but rather the nature of change. We can be sure that this book represents his thought up to the moment the manuscript left his hands.

The two chief causes of modern accelerated change are the impact of technical development and the yearning of the common people the world around for the abundant life. Concerning the nature of change, the writer asks whether it is to be the change of consent or the change of coercion. And he asks the church to face the question whether the necessities of technology and the necessities of brotherhood can be reconciled. He sees power and justice as the fundamental issues. The last section deals with Amsterdam and the World Council.

"The most effective anti-toxin to dictatorship abroad is lifegiving democracy at home." "We reject Communism. We know that within the freedom of democracy we can build a society at once just and brotherly. . . ." "It is true that invading armies must be met by force and destroyed, but the danger is less that of armed invasion than of ideological infiltration. Ideologies cannot be bombed out of the heads of men; they can be dislodged only by better ideologies. Christianity is an ideology. Its ideology is incarnate in a person." "The minister must distinguish between the spent forces about to relinquish power and the dynamic forces about to assume power."

REX STOWERS CLEMENTS

*Renewing the Mind,* by Roger Hazelton, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xii, 192, $2.50.

Professor Hazelton composed this essay in Christian philosophy on the predicate that "this mind of ours is desperately sick." One sure sign of mental illness is that the victim vigorously insists upon his health. "We are caught in the grip of a new sort of Pharisaism which clings in desperation to the illusion of its own health."

What is the cause of this sickness? Essentially it is idolatry, the "putting something less than God in the place belonging to God." This radical inversion of values lies at the root of present-day frustration, confusion, and interhuman tension. Can this mental disease be cured? Yes, but only by a return to belief in God. "There is no health in the mind which wants to be its own master." Now "we do our believing, like our seeing, always within perspectives." In our case, the perspective is already provided by the Christian faith. "We shall begin to travel on the road back to health only when we can say with Luther, 'Thou art my Lord; I am Thy servant.'" This may suggest that Professor Hazelton would cure our mental disease of idolatry by giving us a mammoth pill labeled "credulity." Not at all! "Faith grants no special immunity from the needed self-control of logic or of reason." Thus those Barthians who set faith and reason in antithetical relations come in for more than one pointed indictment.

Nevertheless, in his own scheme of Christian philosophy Professor Hazelton does not place reason on a par with faith, even though he treats the two as interactive. For him, as for Augustine whom he broadly follows, faith holds a place of primacy in his religious epistemology. "We must believe before we understand, and in order to understand." But though faith is primary, it is by no means isolated from rational understanding. True Christian thinking must be controlled by four principles: "faith precedes understanding; faith needs understanding; faith pursues understanding; and faith achieves understanding." The heart of the book expounds the meaning of these four principles.

Doubtless Professor Hazelton's treatment will awaken little enthusiasm among either pure fideists or pure rationalists, but those who are not doctrinaire extremists will find it both persuasive and richly suggestive for further reflection. One marvels at the lucidity with which the author unfolds his subject. H. SHELTON SMITH

*The Christianity of Main Street,* by Theodore O. Wedel, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. x, 112, $2.

The canon of Washington Cathedral and the warden of the College of Preachers goes to battle against what he variously styles humanist Christianity, moralistic Jesus-cult, Christianity without God, the Christianity of moral ideals or Golden Rule Christianity. The four essays constituting the book were delivered in the form of lectures at the Austin Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Austin, Texas. Wedel describes them as "a preliminary apology for classical Christianity." They will be received gladly in many quarters of Christendom.

John Dewey is singled out as the prophet of this pseudo religion—"the philosopher who has shaped the secular academic faith more than any other, in America at least" (p. 34). Ideals are not enough, the author insists; for idealism can become idolatry. Ideals are impersonal, they reflect a "one storey universe." We are asked to look at communism as an example of the fact that "an ideal can become an idol" and then a demon. Communists are "idealists" who live by faith and hope but they forget charity. (Query to the canon: Have not "classical Christians" tried to do the same thing frequently? The Inquisition and its more subtle post-Reformation counterparts were not invented by communist idealists but by people who claimed to believe in God.)

The author seems to say that the major function of Christian theology is to be the guardian of the story, drama, or "theology of the Bible." It must be "a protector of the Christian faith." This comes close to saying that the theology of "authentic Christianity" must be defensive, not exploratory. This may be a sign of the times, but it is not a happy one. A good defensive is a poor substitute for a sound offensive

or (even more important) persistent efforts to reconcile divergent viewpoints. Much as churchmen may like to ignore it, "humanist Christianity" (or secular idealism) is not simply a blind departure from the "true faith." It is one symptom of a major lack in the "Christianity of the Creeds."

In his closing lecture, "Faith and Theology," Canon Wedel discusses the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed. These are "not denominational confessions . . . not systems of doctrine. They are scenarios of the drama of the Bible. They are summaries of the story which alone, through the centuries, has evoked Christian faith and which alone has produced truly Christian moral conduct." Following Maurice, the author states that the Apostles' Creed is "theology even for a child." (Nothing is said about how one translates it for the child.) He adds further that "it is certain that classical Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant, stands or falls on the issue of these creeds."

Wedel admits that both humanist Christianity and classical Christianity have the imitation of Christ as their goal. But he warns: "A gulf as wide as that between God and man can divide the two Christianities. A divine-human drama is being enacted on our earthly scene. Who is to be the chief actor—God or man? Shall we place trust in ourselves and accept the Jesus of the gospel story as merely the guiding star of our moral triumphs, or shall we enter by the strait gate of repentance into the religion of redemption and accept Christ as Savior?"

This reviewer would like to comment that this seems to be just one more example of "stacking the cards" in order to get the "right" answer. Most of these neat opposites, so important to debaters, begin to evaporate when one digs down into the profounder aspects of Christian history and theology or basic human psychology and metaphysic. Meister Eckhart, a good Christian, was asked by his parishioners how one could tell the difference between God acting through people and people acting on their own. His reply was, "Think only of God and do not worry about whether it is God acting through you or you doing it for yourself. . . . Do not worry about whether it is natural or supernatural; for both nature and grace are his" (*Talks of Instruction,* 23). Too many of us in the theological fraternity today are worrying over what vessels people shall drink their water from when (with Eckhart) we ought to be recognizing that water under any name and in diverse vessels can satisfy thirst. Humanist Christianity is having rough going in our world, but so is classical Christianity. All parties concerned need to re-examine their basic presuppositions. So-called "faith in man" and "faith in God" frequently reduce to "faith in our own beliefs." What is called for is a twentieth-century *De principiis,* not a return to ancient ghosts or a childish delight in not believing in ghosts. Why not get on with the real task?

FLOYD H. ROSS

*Service for Peace,* by Melvin Gingerich, Akron (Pa.), Mennonite Central Committee, 1949, pp. xvii, 508, $3.

*Service for Peace* was written by a Mennonite leader for members of his group. It is a report of an experiment which the Mennonite Service Committee carried on during World War II.

The book begins with a brief statement of the Mennonite attitude on participation in war. From their founding in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1525, the Mennonite group has remained true to its ideal of absolute pacifism. During the years it has faced the necessity of adapting the procedures by which it would observe its ideal to the requirements of the situation. One cannot read the story without being impressed by the price which these people have paid in order to remain loyal to the teachings of the Christian gospel as they interpret them.

In 1940 passage of the Selective Service Act compelled the American branch of the Mennonite church to face once again the question of the relationship of a member of an absolutist peace group to the program of conscription. The Mennonites, uniting with other historic peace churches (Quakers, Brethren, etc.) and with such denominations as were interested, made an agreement with the government to assume responsibility for the coöperative supervision and for the complete financial responsibility of a program of civilian public service. The Mennonites, along with the other peace churches, did a magnificent job in helping to formulate, finance, and operate the program. The book tells in some detail the story of the many types of work carried on through civilian public service. One cannot read it without becoming convinced that the service rendered by the men assigned to such service was of real value to the country.

The author is quite fair in presenting the difficulties which arose from the fact that, although the historic peace churches were presumably in charge of civilian public service, they were in every instance subject to the authority of the Selective Service. Civilian Public Service began as a compromise for the peace churches. The balancing of the books at the close of the effort showed many losses, but one gain: a more rational way had been found to deal with conscientious objectors at a time of complete mobilization. In the face of the present emergency, the experience gained from this effort during World War II offers many suggestions for handling the problems in the months ahead.

The book, although well written, will probably be of somewhat limited interest because of its nature as a report to the Mennonite group. It does provide interesting and permanent historic information on an attempt made by government and the historic peace churches to provide for freedom of conscience in the time of war.

JOHN W. THOMAS

*Positive Protestantism,* by Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr., Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1950, pp. 147, $2.50.

This is, according to the subtitle, "an interpretation of the gospel." And the lion's share of the book goes to an attempt to restate the gospel and modern evangelization, instead of to a discussion of Protestantism. But this is in accord with the author's intention. He contends that "Protestantism cannot be properly understood as a sixteenth century variety of Christianity, but that its roots are deep within the New Testament" (p. 10). The destiny of Protestantism lies, therefore, in its ability to return to the gospel, to restate it and recapture its positive affirmations. In its ability to meet this demand will lie the answer, not only to the present plight of Protestantism, with its ambiguity and uncertainty, but also to the plight of Christianity, and of our present civilization itself.

The Protestant movement, he contends, has always suffered from the restlessness created by its principle of self-criticism. This is at once its glory and its greatest liability. Unlike Catholicism and other world religions, it is self-critical, containing "an inner principle of protest which gives it, like no other religious or social movement, a self-critical frame of mind" (p. 15). From this follows its prophetic character, its creative insight, and its ability to reform itself. But it is also subject to the peril, evident in our own time, that "self-criticism is so radical as to frustrate all hopes for transformation" (p. 16). Only if Protestantism can become positive is there hope for its future. By way of illustration, the author analyzes the dilemma within the ecumenical movement, which is in one respect a serious attempt to overcome the negative and centripetal character from which Protestantism has too often suffered. Protestantism feels that it must unite if it is to exist. But the problem

is that of demonstrating a united front which does not yet exist. In fact, the ecumenical movement may be caught in the error of assuming that there can be unity before there is common conviction; and that the joining together can produce such common conviction. But history has demonstrated that unity is the fruit, not the root, of a common faith. And Protestantism is still seeking a positive position; it has only begun the pilgrimage.

The "deeper plunge into the meaning of the Gospel," which Philip Schaff had designated as the root of the Protestant movement, yields the following affirmation as the essence of the gospel: "God was in Christ for man's redemption." There was no doubt, the author holds, that Christ himself was the centre of the gospel, because God was in him, and that this is in accord with Jesus' own presentation of himself. This was the "good news," the "happiness from on high," which is the basis for the joy because "a new age has dawned," and "evil and sin have been conquered" (p. 77). The substance of the gospel may be summarized as follows: 1. that God has spoken; 2. that God is like Jesus Christ; 3. that in Christ there is a new creation, and 4. that Christ is the resurrection and the life (pp. 96-101).

When Protestantism has recovered, and identified itself with this essential gospel, the author maintains, it will also recover the true spirit of evangelism. This has become the critical need for Christianity in the modern world, and it is the prerequisite for the success of the ecumenical movement. 'The gospel is the secret to the tomorrow of Protestantism. If for Protestantism the gospel becomes once more the good news of God in Christ, the future is bright with hope and promise" (p. 131).

I found myself in warm accord with the author at the beginning of the book. But it must be confessed that this feeling ebbed somewhat as the book progressed. It is of course to be kept in mind, as the author asserts, that it is more in the nature of a manifesto, or "tract for the times." Nevertheless, one is less convinced that this is rediscovering the true genius of Protestantism, than that it is an attempt to restate the gospel message. That the Reformation was a return to the gospel, and that it caught something essential in the gospel, is not to be denied. But except for the relevance of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers to modern evangelism, one does not get the impression that the Reformation constituted a significant development in the Christian movement. Granted that the Reformation was something old, it is not clear in what sense it was also "something new."

The same disappointment comes with the restatement of what was essential in the gospel, namely, "that God was in Christ for man's redemption." This rendition would seem to fit the Fourth Gospel better than the Synoptics. And in spite of the fact that the author considers the doctrinal phase of the Reformation to be secondary to its main character, this formula certainly has a doctrinal, if not actually metaphysical, ring to it. The question occurs whether this statement can be counted on to give Protestantism the radiance it seems to have lost.

Nevertheless, something of the enthusiasm for the author's achievement remains. Certainly, if the Protestant movement is to recover its genius, it must begin where the author begins. It is an excellent statement of where Protestantism stands today.

ANDREW BANNING

*Democracy and the Quaker Method,* by Francis E. Pollard, Beatrice E. Pollard, and Robert S. W. Pollard, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 160, $3.

The thesis of this book is that the Quaker technique of executing business has a contribution to make to the democratic process among non-Friends. After presenting some of the problems resulting from attempting to reach decisions by majority rule,

and after describing the method of Friends in some detail, the authors document their thesis by a number of cases illustrating the use of the Quaker techniques, both among Friends and non-Friends.

The problem, the authors feel, is that of finding a mode of procedure in business meetings by which decisions may be reached without alienating the minority. In the Quaker method not only is unity achieved among the group members, but frequently there is realized a creative synthesis of thought which is more than the sum of the contributions of the individual group members. The steps in this process are: 1. Business sessions are essentially worship services and convene and adjourn in the manner of Friends' worship, in silence. 2. In an atmosphere of a joint search for truth all men may speak to the issue at hand, and discussion continues until unity is reached or until the matter is dropped for later consideration. 3. Usual parliamentary procedure is not followed, and no vote is taken. 4. Decisions are reached by the presiding "clerk" minuting in writing what appears to him to be the "sense of the meeting." This minute is then approved, not approved, or changed. 5. If unity is not reached, the matter is dropped for consideration at a future meeting.

Can Quaker methods be used by non-Friends? Can they be applied to the larger international issues of disarmament, the control of atomic energy, and the prevention of war? The authors feel that they can. They assert that "an understanding and acceptance of the spirit of Friends' methods by more groups outside the Society would have a profound effect upon the whole spirit of national and international debate and therefore upon the prospects of true and successful democracy."

Can Quaker methods be applied to business sessions in the local church? The authors do not speak to this question; but in this reviewer's opinion Friends' business methods can function in general church sessions and committee meetings in the everyday workings of the average church, and it is probably here, as well as in the larger international issues, that the greatest contribution to democracy is to be made. When people gather for business in a spirit of shared worship, when decisions are reached not upon the basis of majority rule or weak compromise but with the desire of the whole group to secure group unity out of diversity of belief, and when we, the average man on the street, can make democracy operative on our levels of group life, then there may be some hope that similar success may be achieved on the international plane. It is with the hope that experiments in the Quaker method will be attempted by local churches that this book is recommended to pastors.

ROBERT L. COE

*The Ethical Basis of Medical Practice,* by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 185, $2.50.

While *The Ethical Basis of Medical Practice* was written primarily for young men in the medical profession, it might well be read by anyone interested in current ethical problems. This would apply particularly to young men in the field of theology, for the author has correctly pointed out many situations in which the two professions overlap. This emphasis is particularly cogent at a time when the psychiatrist is called upon to handle so many of the problems formerly handled by the patient's theological advisor. Many of us would like to see this trend reversed, for we feel that it indicates a decrease in the effectiveness of personalized religion.

The idea of our forefathers that right and wrong may be as easily distinguished as black and white is seriously questioned. Many situations are recorded in which the physician was obviously forced to make a difficult decision without the aid of clear-cut ethical signposts to aid him in that decision. The author indicates that the medical profession has more than its share of such difficult ethical problems to face. It seems more likely that men in every field of endeavor face these difficult ethical

decisions, but that those in the field of medicine may be dramatized because human life is directly involved.

The questions of the prolongation of life, euthanasia, and the like are discussed. Although the author makes no pretense at answering all of the questions he raises, his discussion of them is highly provocative. The young physician will find much in this book to think about. As his training proceeds, he will find fortunately that these problems have been faced by those men who have gone before him, but that their teachings in this field are apt to be by precept.

The physician's goal is to prolong life and relieve suffering. The problem of whose life should be prolonged is not within his jurisdiction. It is likewise obvious that he should bring relief to the suffering whenever possible. To say that the merging of these two goals does not require judgment would be absurd, but certainly the judgment required is not beyond that with which every man of compassion is endowed.

JULIAN JOHNSON

*Religious Beliefs of Youth,* by Murray G. Ross, New York, Association Press, 1950, pp. xvii, 251, $3.

What do the young people of our day believe about morals and religion? What is their dominant view about life? These are questions which we are constantly asking. The answers are extremely important. We want to know whether we can hand the world over to these young people with any sense of confidence. To the present reviewer, these questions constitute a kind of boomerang. We mature people might well ask ourselves these questions to see whether there are any sure foundations upon which we ourselves stand. It may be that, if we were committed to the highest moral standards and had a sound religious philosophy of life, we would not be so apprehensive of the future in which we hand to younger persons the leadership which we have held.

Under the auspices of the National Council of the Young Men's Christian Association, and with the help of an advisory committee of educational and religious experts as well as a field staff of trained researchers, Dr. Murray G. Ross has produced one of the very thoroughgoing attempts to find out what a cross section of American youth believe. The study includes the reactions of 2,000 young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine. These men are largely white, Protestant, unmarried, native Americans, who have completed high school and part of college education. Slightly more than half are veterans of World War II. They are students, clerks, or professional people. All are members of Young Men's Christian Associations in eleven different American cities.

Four specific objectives of the study are given: 1. "To determine the religious position of young people in the Y.M.C.A."; 2. "To determine the 'meaningfulness' of the religious position"; 3. "To discover the relationship between 'religious position' and 'position' on characteristic social problems of our day"; and 4. "To discover if youth have 'felt needs' that impinge on the religious field and, if so, what these are and how one may deal effectively with them." These ends are sought by the use of a questionnaire study of 1,935 respondents and an interview study of 100 conferees. The findings are also compared with the results of other similar studies.

It is impossible to review here the actual findings of this study. One gets the impression from reading the book that these young men have very little vital religion. They believe certain things because they have inherited traditions from their parents. They have done little thinking of their own. Most of the respondents believe in God, but such a belief does not make a great difference to them or to the world in which they live. In the same way, most of the respondents believe that the Bible is the

supreme book of religion, but relatively few read it with any regularity. The most "formally" religious have the least vital convictions about social righteousness, while the "atheists" are keener on social issues and social justice. There is always a minority, however, who are the "saving remnant." They are concerned, studious, dynamic, and growing in insight, power, and devotion. It is upon these that hope for the future depends.

There are some questions which one is bound to raise in reviewing the book. Gordon Allport, in the foreword, commends the book as outstandingly objective. The reviewer cannot see that such a study is objective because respondents score a questionnaire or are allowed a free association response in a "guided" interview. The elements of subjectivity crowd the study at almost every point. We are apt to be deluded by an affirmed objectivity which, in practice, we do not have. Furthermore, there seems to be concern because so few of the respondents came up with religious ideas and convictions in reacting to the research techniques. But the religious nature of the study seems to have been deliberately camouflaged by both the title of the questionnaire and the placing of the questions. The "indirect approach" often gets an indirect response. It would seem both educationally and ethically sounder to be more forthright with the questions in both phases of the research, but never to be obsessed with the idea that we are achieving great objectivity, even though the results can be treated mathematically. But, then, the reviewer is not an expert in this field. The book, *Religious Beliefs of Youth,* is a serious and, on the whole, very helpful attempt to answer a phase of our persistent questions, What of the future of our religious culture?

CHARLES M. BOND

*The Pendle Hill Reader,* edited by Herrymon Maurer, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xii, 208, $2.75.

Anyone who already has learned to value the Pendle Hill pamphlets will rejoice that five of them have been reprinted and have been made available in this form to a wide public. Seven of the eight writers are associated with the Quaker movement, and all have felt its influence. Yet, while the Quaker journals and great leaders are often quoted, the unifying objective is not sectarian, but is on religion as something to be experienced and demonstrated in the lives of all.

The names of the authors are themselves high recommendations. Elton Trueblood writes the introduction. There follows an essay by Thomas R. Kelly, "The Reality of the Spiritual Life," in which, going beyond intellectual proofs, he bases assurance that God is real on the fact that men can experience the presence of God. Many have found his *Testament of Devotion* a most prized book for the quiet hour. In this essay they will find five types of prayer described as aids to that inner experience which to Thomas Kelly is the great criterion for reality in the spiritual world.

Emils Fuchs, a German Quaker who found serenity of spirit through great suffering in Nazi Germany, tells how he learned to see behind "Christ in Catastrophe" the Resurrection. This challenging fact can become a power for change in our lives. It is from this inward experience of a power living today that we gain faith.

Gilbert Kilpack raises the question: Why am I on this strange earth—what is the point in any life? Under the title, "Our Hearts are Restless," he holds that the secret is in the practice of absolute devotion to God. Only one thing is to be sought. God alone is an end in himself. Here, again, there are helpful paragraphs on prayer.

A superb chapter is written on "The Doctrine of Peace" by Howard H. Brinton, the director of Pendle Hill. He analyzes the various causes of our prevalent sense of pressure amid the host of things we think we have to do. He finds the fundamental solution in the increase of inner resources, strength, and stability. He appeals for

such an ordering of the inner life that there will be a proper balance between the inner and the outer. His suggestions for "getting atop of things" are full of spiritual insights.

Dora Wilson, with training abroad both in psychology and in teaching, discusses the problem of becoming ever more conscious of the various selves within our self, of what nature should our relation to ourselves be, how we may establish, maintain, and develop a proper relationship, and how we can come to a truly creative love of the self. The essay leads up to the saying, most pregnant and "most profound that has ever passed the lips of man," Jesus' paradox of preserving life by losing it. There must be a radical act of abdication to the unspecified good.

Douglas V. Steere, professor of philosophy at Haverford, and a well-known leader and writer in the field of inward religion, describes various experiments in fellowship under the title, "Community in Worship."

Quaker philosophy, principles, and experience are interpreted by that most widely known Friend of the twentieth century, the late Rufus Jones. He writes of a kind of life that is not speculation, is more than faith, and is characterized by a vivid experience.

The volume ends with a reprint of Arnold J. Toynbee's lecture, "Christianity and Civilization," in which the Christian idea is set forth in terms of the flow of history. Highly valuable in itself, this essay departs from the personal witness to religious experience which distinguishes the other essays.

An index would have helped anyone who might well wish to use this volume as a resource book on various aspects of the spiritual life and for the witness of many Quaker leaders. Obviously, there is desirable variety of treatment in the collection, and the reader will find a rewarding emphasis on the inward conditions which must be met if the outward stress in the world is to be released. DANIEL J. FLEMING

*The Blind Spot in American Public Education,* by Clyde Lemont Hay, New York, Macmillan, 1950. pp. xvi, 110, $2.

This little volume is a challenge to the public school people of the nation to re-examine their contention that there is no place in the public schools for religious teaching; that the closest approach is through released time to attend weekday classes in religion provided by denominational churches. The Supreme Court decision in the Champaign, Illinois, case has weakened the released time program by raising doubts as to its legality. The phenomenon of the increase in divorce, crime, liquor consumption, and broken homes in this country at the same time that church membership of the nation is increasing serves notice that some institution must reach all the children with moral and religious precepts.

In disturbed and troublesome times like the present decade, and perhaps the future decades, our people need some deep spiritual resources to guide their thinking and action. Fortunately, many American children grow up in an atmosphere of church day schools and Sunday-school influence. But not enough do so. The author presents a convincing case for his assertion that historically we are a religious nation. Not the atheists, but only religious people could respectfully take oaths in court, oaths of public office, and accept the deep devotion of our great public documents expressing an abiding faith in God.

With revealing clarity the author presents a program for religious teaching that must be acceptable to many public school people and savors in no way of denominationalism. Quite widespread at the present time is the practice of observing religious holidays with use of biblical material, as for instance at Thanksgiving, Christmas,

Good Friday, and Easter. In history the great religious leaders and events are stressed, the founding fathers of this country who in their devotion came here to worship God according to the dictates of their own hearts. In biography the great religious leaders are included, and the devotional practices of our great men, like Washington, in their prayer and faith in God are stressed. In music, singing good children's hymns; in art, studying the vast numbers of religious pictures; in literature, studying certain books of the Bible as fine literature—all these offer obvious and almost inescapable opportunities for religious study. Religion, the author pointedly contends, is the basis of a broad culture.

The case is strengthened by the author's wide reference to authoritative statements made by others, including the report of the American Council on Education on this subject, J. Edgar Hoover's statement, the writings of Dr. George Coe and others. An especially clear preface has been written by Dr. Herbert B. Mulford.

In view of the wide diversity of laws and practices in the several states regarding the reading of the Bible, Dr. Hay's book provides a program on which religious leaders and public school teachers could well agree as a vital plan of providing spiritual food for the children of our nation who are enrolled in our public schools.

FRANK R. MOREY

*Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie,* by Emanuel Hirsch, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, *Lieferung* 5, 1950, pp. 91 (321-411), DM 3.50.

This section completes the first volume of this work, the opening sections of which were reviewed in the October, 1950, issue of this journal. Here Dr. Hirsch continues his survey of the English deists with discussions of Tindal, who had sought to show that Christianity was a form of natural religion, and Thomas Morgan and Chubb, who pushed the argument further, though in different ways. Morgan, in almost Marcionite fashion, declared the God of the Old Testament to be inferior, though Moses and the prophets were treated as harbingers of a higher conception, while Chubb was one of the first to identify the real gospel with the religion *of* Jesus as distinct from the religion *about* Jesus.

The effect of this sort of writing was to separate Christianity from the church and its theology and to give religion a strongly individualistic cast; and against this tendency the church theologians rose in protest. They undertook to defend miracles, prophecy, the canon (in order to protect the Old Testament), and the messiahship of Jesus. This antideistic literature was known earlier than the deistic in Germany, and thus introduced Germans to the deists! In this chapter Hirsch limits himself to Lardner, Clarke, and Butler as church apologists, and tells us nothing of Jenyns, Paley, Law, or Dodwell. On the other hand he devotes a chapter to men who were not really church theologians, men whom he calls representative of "good English society" (*der guten englischen Gesellschaft*): Lord Shaftsbury, Mandeville, and the writers Pope, Swift, and Bolingbroke. There is among these men a different orientation: the social emphasis is evident in Shaftsbury's ethics and in Mandeville's satires on contemporary society, while Pope's *Essay on Man,* Swift's satire on the deists, and Bolingbroke's work on historiography paved the way for a new approach to the problems.

In his conclusion to the third book of this first volume Hirsch gives it as his considered judgment that never since the days of Wiclif had England exercised such an influence on European Christian thinking as it did during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was unquestionably a golden age of British theological scholarship.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

# BOOK NOTICES

*On This Rock,* by G. Bromley Oxnam, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 117, $1.50.

This little book is the third series of lectures on the William Henry Hoover Lectureship on Christian Unity, given at the Disciples Divinity House of the University of Chicago by Bishop Oxnam. The purpose of the lectureship is to provide a discussion of the problems of Christian unity by a distinguished churchman who is eminently qualified by experience, research, and knowledge; and to make a positive contribution toward closer coöperation of the Christian denominations. The body of the book is made up of four chapters, with titles that well indicate their contents: "Conserving the Values that Lie in Diversity," "Reconciling the Differences that Lie in Economic Thought and Practice," "Confronting the Divisions that Lie in the Conflict between the Free Mind and the Authoritarian Church," and "Discovering the Blessings that Lie in the United Church." Bishop Oxnam plunges into the subject in his usual forthright manner. He sees clearly the problems involved and the complexities to be resolved. Unity does not mean absolute uniformity. He points out the diversity that prevailed in the early church. His attention is fixed largely on the World Council level. The book contains a large number of lengthy quotations. His two-and-a-half page introduction is one of the best things in the book. He says that library shelves sag under the burden of weighty volumes prepared for scholars en route to ecumenical conferences. He speaks of his own impatience, and his belief that the reunion of American Protestantism is an easier task than is generally thought. He issues a challenging call for divided Christians to turn from thought to action. But how difficult it is to do this is illustrated by an article in the New York *Times* for January 24. The *Times* carries a story on the two-day Conference on Church Union held in Cincinnati, where representatives of ten denominations met and a plan of union was adopted. But, the reporter tells us, there was some opposition to the plan. One opposition statement was a letter, expressing the hope that the conference would have constructive results, but viewing the plan with disfavor as a "Congregational" document. *Time* magazine refers to the same letter, and quotes the writer as "confused and disappointed" by the plan for the new church. The authorship of the letter? It was written by Bishop Oxnam, en route to a World Council of Churches meeting in Paris.

REX STOWERS CLEMENTS

*The Man from Nazareth,* by Harry Emerson Fosdick, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 281, $3.

In the main, this book is a popular exposition of the ethical teaching of Jesus. The expressed aim of the writer is to "achieve a composite portrait" of Jesus, by trying to see him through the eyes of different contemporary groups—scribes and Pharisees, "religious and moral outcasts," women and children, his first disciples, militant nationalists, etc. Effective use is made of the rich store of materials which are now at our disposal for describing the social conditions and the different types of piety which Jesus encountered, and there are numerous well-chosen citations from the rabbinical writings which reflect the mind of authorized teachers of Judaism. But all this has little bearing upon a *portrait* of Jesus. The author's attention is bestowed almost wholly upon the aspects of Jesus' *teaching* which attract or repel the hearers, as the case may be. At the same time, Dr. Fosdick sees clearly that Jesus was more

than an ethical teacher to his followers. "Those who lived most intimately with him stood most in awe of him, felt in him the very presence of their God . . . and after Calvary they were victoriously confirmed in their adoration of him by their faith in his resurrection and their experience of his living presence" (p. 187). Dr. Fosdick, though well acquainted with the recent critical discussions of the gospel, handles his elusive materials with a degree of assurance which is a trifle disquieting to a critical scholar. There is, after all, no reason to feel that the tradition of the church concerning Jesus becomes any more detached and objective when it depicts the attitude of his opponents or of his followers than when it testifies directly of him. There is no reason to suppose that this "indirect method of approach" (p. 10) will lead to solider results than the "frustration" which has attended direct attempts "to recover the Man of Nazareth as he would appear could we moderns directly see him" (p. 9). The historical Jesus remains "a stranger and an enigma" to an extent that Dr. Fosdick's book fails at all to suggest. FRANK W. BEARE

*The English Reformation to 1558,* by T. M. Parker, New York, Oxford, 1950, pp. viii, 200, $2.

The subject of the English Reformation and Counter-Reformation has undergone considerable revision in the period since the Victorian writers and has now attained a stability recognized by the main body of competent historians. The various strands of reform needed a strong and capable hand to control them, and this was supplied by Henry VIII, who educated Parliament for its task as guardian of the nation's rights. It is an idle gibe to describe its course as determined merely by Henry's marital problems. The opening phases are rather the reverse. It was the presence of a papal legate which brought home to Henry the strength and weakness of the pope's position and his defeat, not in Rome but in England. The breakdown after the accession of Mary was by no means as complete as it appeared, for Mary used the same weapon against the Reformation as her father had used for its accomplishment. The result was first the establishment and education of Parliament in its high *rôle* in English affairs; the corresponding demonstration that "the King in Parliament" could control the excesses of ecclesiastical authority in either direction, and that, as long as Parliament remained intact, the realm could control the activity of ecclesiastical authorities as well as those of civil authorities. The "Establishment" of the Church of England was conceived in the mood and desire of the safety of the subject. This problem and others, worked out so ably and fairly by the author, have provided for students of the Reformation an introduction which has long been known to constitutional historians, and now in a form and at a cost within the reach of all. It is, in your reviewer's opinion, the best introduction to the English Reformation that has yet appeared. F. W. BUCKLER

*Eighth Baptist World Congress: Official Report,* edited by Arnold T. Ohrn, Philadelphia, Judson, 1950, pp. xii, 374, $4.

This is a carefully detailed report of the interesting Congress of the Baptist World Alliance held in Cleveland in the summer of 1950 and is profusely illustrated with photographs. It contains the minutes of the sessions with detailed accounts of the proceedings and reprints of the addresses, the resolutions passed, the constitution and by-laws of the Alliance, a list of the principal dates in the history of the Alliance and the Manifesto on Religious Liberty adopted by the Alliance. Nothing pertinent to the work of the Alliance is omitted. As a reference book it will be indispensable to all Baptist leaders everywhere. This reviewer was chairman of the Entertainment

Committee when the Second Congress of the Alliance was held in Philadelphia in 1911. It was also his privilege to attend the Eighth Congress in Cleveland. The outstanding fact resulting from a comparison of these two Congresses is found in the tremendous advance that the Baptist positions have achieved in the Protestant world—this not in America alone but in every continent. This was emphasized by the glamorous exhibition in the Municipal Stadium on the opening evening of the Congress. Here were to be seen representatives, in native costume from Europe, Asia, Africa, North and South America, and the Islands of the sea. Coming at the end of a parade through the streets of Cleveland, this event was an obvious emphasis of the fact that Baptists are everywhere. It did one good to feel the impact of the multitude of Baptists, his fellow workers. An examination of the table of contents of this volume shows that no subject common to Baptists was omitted from consideration. Here is the place to discover what Baptists are thinking on a wide range of vital questions. The list of speakers is no less striking. They come from the countries where Baptists live and include ministers, laymen, women, and youth. With this condensed encyclopædia in hand none need be ignorant of the thoughts and directions of the current Baptist leadership. Possibly, the most important action of the Alliance was the adoption of the Manifesto on Religious Liberty. Undoubtedly there are those who would rejoice to destroy this freedom. It could happen in America as well as elsewhere. Those who desire to defend this precious heritage will find ammunition in this Manifesto. Indeed it is a call for defenders of religious freedom to arise. It is more than a case of "praising the Lord and passing the resolutions." It charts the way to action. Much credit must go to those who planned and worked to make the Cleveland Congress a success, especially the chairman of the local committee, D. R. Sharpe. No less credit belongs to the general secretary of the Alliance, Arnold T. Ohrn, who edited this *Official Report.*

HOWARD WAYNE SMITH

*Classics of Religious Devotion,* edited by Willard L. Sperry, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. 117, $2.

I believe I may say that this book is unique in its class in two ways: one, that it is an anthology, the other, that it is more prevailingly Protestant. Most books of essays on the devotional classics are from a single hand, and most of them lean heavily on Catholic works. See, for example, Steere's *Doors into Life* (1948), in which three of the five essays are on Catholic books or authors. This volume before us does include Augustine's *Confessions,* but Augustine is quite as germane and congenial to Protestant thought as he is to Catholic. And the *imitation* is from a less than usually rigorous monasticism, and its message generally acceptable to Protestants. The inclusion of Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed* (B. D. Cohon's essay) was a happy one. Shall we say that this essay, and the final one by a Unitarian author (F. M. Eliot) on a quasi-Unitarian saint (Schweitzer), give the book a Unitarian slant? Surely a prevailing note is the defense of reason and its God-given function and work, in John Wild's opening essay on Augustine as in the closing essay on Schweitzer. Another notable thesis here is that God inspires us most in the normal routines of life, and not in the thin air of the mystic's ascent. H. J. Cadbury on Woolman stresses this, and Eliot on Schweitzer expressly echoes it. The Protestant bearing is plain. And refreshing! Sperry on the *Imitation* (a reprint) reminds us that the author was not an advanced mystic, and that his experiences are not irrelevant to the life we live today. Finally, Perry Miller on Bunyan has the sharpest bite. That essay needs a whole review by itself. It opens: "To characterize

'Pilgrim's Progress' as a classic of 'devotional' literature is to misunderstand it. There is nothing devotional about it; in every intention it is a program for action and not for meditation" (p. 67). I hope that makes you want to read the rest, and indeed the whole series.

JOHN W. BRUSH

*Bibelautorität und Bibelkritik,* by Erich Dinkler, Tübingen, Mohr, 1950, pp. 33, DM 1.50.

Dr. Dinkler, who is now teaching at Yale, dealt with the problem of the authority of the Bible and the criticism of the Bible, in his inaugural at the University of Mainz in November, 1949. The published lecture is a brilliant and important contribution to the solution of the problem. It is, of course, a far more serious problem for churches which make the Bible central and supremely authoritative than it is for those which emphasize tradition, fellowship, liturgy, or order—if not as of equal importance, certainly as sharing the primary importance of the Bible. That there must be biblical criticism, in the sense in which "criticism" was originally used in Protestant circles, *viz.,* as testing, judgment, evaluation, goes without saying. It is an inevitable result of the changes in interpretation introduced by the Reformation. Dr. Dinkler sketches in outline the history of biblical exegesis down to the present-day dialectical theology. It is often assumed that early Protestantism simply carried on the traditional allegorical exegesis of the Middle Ages; but this is not true. Early Protestantism, despite later relapses here and there, stood for a "literal," *i.e.,* a historical, nonallegorical interpretation of scripture. The present situation is one in which it is necessary to admit and accept biblical criticism. But this affects only the external literary history of the books of the Bible, and does not touch the revelation contained in the Bible, or destroy faith in that revelation. The revelation of God is found in the scripture only because that relevation took place before scripture was written (p. 31). The Bible is the word of God only when it is read! It is God's word in actuality, *i.e.,* as spoken, uttered, and heard, not in a descriptive sense, as characterizing a printed book (p. 32). Accordingly, it is a great mistake to assume that biblical critics are unbelievers, and that the faithful are all fundamentalists! There is no one method of biblical interpretation which can be called Orthodox. Faith is something different from a method of biblical interpretation—it is nothing less than the total response of the human heart, mind, and will to God's self-revelation.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

*Talks with Gabriel,* by Arjen Miedema, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950, pp. 253, $3.

Although the twenty-five talks which comprise this rather loosely constructed novel are more or less complete in themselves, the whole does hang together, and loses something if the parts are not read chronologically. Briefly, this is the record of a modern-day Christian on the way to Paradise. The mixture of parable and allegory is not so finely wrought as in *Pilgrim's Progress,* but there is a parallel. A Dutch burgher of the lower middle class (who goes by the extremely apt name of Jacobus Vander Stupe) has been badly shaken by the late war, and earnestly desires to do something about his resultant confusion. He is a fairly liberal Christian, but an extremely devoted one. He wants certain things, and he believes that God should do something about his wants. His guardian angel, Gabriel, appears to him one evening, as Jacobus is comparing the perfect grace and symmetry of his pear tree with the imperfect condition in the affairs of men—particularly in his own. Gabriel informs him that God is intrigued by his forthright demands, and that he, Gabriel, has been sent to help Jacobus on the road to Paradise. The rest of the

book is taken up with a series of exploits, sometimes intellectual, sometimes physical, which eventually land Jacobus in the heaven to which he has aspired. There is very little moralizing in the dry-as-dust tradition, and the book as a whole is extremely interesting and well written. It wholesomely avoids the dogmatic pitfalls of neo-orthodoxy which so often disfigure the similar performances of C. S. Lewis, and Dorothy Sayers. There are hauntingly beautiful descriptive passages of the Dutch countryside, and one or two memorable journeys into a world which seems to be the same one that Christian found beyond the Wicket Gate. Perhaps the weakness which comes most to mind is Mynheer Miedema's inability to make Jacobus the complete clodhopper which he seems to be at the beginning of the book. There is always the suspicion that Vander Stupe has received a college diploma somewhere along the line; and the translator has heightened this suspicion by a use of extremely colloquial phrases (not always happy equivalents for what may have been very effective in the original Dutch), interspersed with a type of language and abstruse reasoning which we have a right to believe would be over the head of an average small town landowner. But these are minor flaws, and the book itself is too good to be much impeded by them.

THEODORE ENSLIN

*Kahlil Gibran: a Biography,* by Mikhail Naimy, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. xviii, 267, $3.75.

To know how the other half of the world lives, loves, thinks, and speaks in these days of clashing cultures ought to be a primary responsibility on all. This small volume, written by his closest personal friend, gives us a vivid picture of the background, the life and the spirit of the Lebanese poet widely known in America through sixteen volumes of poetry in English. Of these, *The Madman, The Prophet, The Wander,* and *Jesus the Son of Man* are illustrative of his genius. Gibran sang of life in all its relations, its tensions, its fullness; and all life was one. Nature, humanity, the good and the evil, the visible and the invisible, all were his, his problem, his adventure, his joy, and his sorrow. The charm of the Lebanon hills, the glory of the Syrian sky, the deep anguish, the high exaltation of living, tragedy and triumph, life and death, all were but One Whole; and his life was a part of the broad turbulent flow of the eternal unfolding of being. His life, like his poetry, partook of the universal. He walked on the earth, but his head was held high in the heavens. He was puritan and rebel in one; a free man and a fatalist; a humble, repentant Nazarene, and a haughty, recalcitrant atheist. In himself he was Job and Don Juan, Blake and Nietzsche. Let one quotation suffice to mirror, in part, the mind of this Arabian mystic. In *The Madman,* he speaks to God as follows: "I am thy root in the earth and thou art my flower in the sky, and together we grow before the face of the sun." This far-famed Arab poet breathed his last on April 10, 1931, in a New York hospital; but Gibran and his poetry will long live in American life and thought. This revealing biography contributes much to that end.

I. G. MATTHEWS

*The Church in English Fiction,* by Andrew L. Drummond, Leicester (England), 1950, pp. xii, 324, 12/6.

Here is treasure trove for the preacher who is interested in the actual life of Christian churches as reflected in fiction. Dr. Drummond has covered the period from Jane Austen to the present time in Britain and measurably in America. He has read omniverously and he allows practically every book to which he refers to speak for itself. So he has produced a book full of vitality and energy. The novels

which he quotes are social documents of the first significance. High church, Broad church, the Reformed church, the English Free churches, the Roman Catholic church, as well as New England Puritanism, come in for comprehensive survey. Dr. Drummond, who holds a B.D. and a Ph.D. from Edinburgh shows competent familiarity with the British background. Although he holds a S.T.M. from Hartford, he does not move so easily among his American materials. He has his blind spots. His treatment of Ian Maclaren strikes one as distinctly unfriendly. His casual treatment of O. Douglas (Anna Buchan) speaks only of the Setons and ignores the rest of the series of simple and happy tales in which the Scottish manse so happily comes to life. The reference to Margaret Deland quite misses the fascinating and wise old parson who has so secure a place in the hearts of many of her readers. There is no mention of Archibald Marshall's interpretation of a London preacher whom he obviously greatly admired. The book is rather loosely constructed. There is repetition and the arrangement is not always good. But these are spots on the sun. A great mass of important materiel is assembled with sympathy and intelligence. You see the church as a part of the throbbing movement of life. And you will feel that this volume tells you things which the formal church histories have quite missed.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

*The Quiet Way: Selections from the Letters of Gerhart Tersteegen,* translated by Emily Chisholm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 64, $1.75.

Our hymnals still carry a hymn or two from Tersteegen (1696-1769), thanks to John Wesley's translations. He was a ribbon weaver by trade, but by divine call a servant of the Word. These extracts from his letters reveal a man of profound devotion and of excellent common sense. Mystic is the word for him, but he is a Protestant mystic, far nearer to George Fox than to Bernard of Clairvaux or John of the Cross, and, let us add, much more comprehensible than the German shoemaker, Boehme, who is usually named the greatest of the Protestant mystics. This is a truly beautiful little book, in both form and substance. Feather light in a man's pocket or a woman's handbag, it is yet weighty with the secrets of a happy life, a life available to everybody.

JOHN W. BRUSH

*Kierkegaard, The Melancholy Dane,* by H. V. Martin, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 119, $3.75.

The author, bachelor of divinity, doctor of philosophy, and formerly missionary in India, says in his preface to this book: "Two fundamental points of consciousness are necessary to appreciate Kierkegaard. The first is a sense of utter guilt before God, a sense of being utterly 'undone.' The second is the conviction that thereby one is completely and unreservedly at the disposal of the Divine, without 'right' of any kind. Given these (and after all, they are the basic marks of true Christian experience) Kierkegaard will be found to open up Christian truth in a strikingly unique and challenging way." Persons with these qualifications will accept this book enthusiastically. Those with more liberal religious views will not like the book so well. The author probably knows that Kierkegaard was a hunchback, since in his list of books in English on Kierkegaard (p. 13) he includes Haeker's *Kierkegaard the Cripple* (noticed in CROZER QUARTERLY, January, 1951, pp. 89 f.). Yet he does not mention this infirmity, nor otherwise explain Kierkegaard's "thorn in the flesh." Liberals will find this book singularly blind to Kierkegaard's numerous faults. He was no saint. However, the only judicious estimate of Kierkegaard I have seen

is an essay by another Dane, Harald Höffding, which I have read in a German translation. No disciple of Kierkegaard will ever translate this essay into English, and I fear that no one else will ever take the trouble to do so.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

*Deep Is the Hunger,* by Howard Thurman, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xii, 212, $2.50.

*Deep Is the Hunger* is a book of devotional readings different from the run of the mill. It is filled with practical, human, thought-provoking ideas which oftentimes challenge the reader and strike a responsive chord. One of the devotionals begins with a grandmother's remark as she gazed upon her grandson's appearance, "Nobody ever wins a fight." The lad had made the other boy "eat dirt," as the old saying goes, and naturally replied, "But I did lick him." There he stood—eye swollen, buttons ripped off his jacket, knee exposed through his torn jeans. "Nobody ever wins a fight." Many grown people have never learned this truth. The author then searchingly comments upon honor and survival and the false sense which power often gives to people. Then with a deft turn he suggests there might be another way, the way of love which he terms "God's devastating weapon." Such is typical of the human, down-to-earth approach used to introduce and convey the author's ideas and message. These devotionals grew out of the pastor's weekly devotional page in the church calendar of The Church of the Fellowship of All People and special materials which he prepared for the half-hour devotional study before the Sunday morning worship hour. The devotionals are organized around the idea of developing a sensitiveness in three fields: a sense of history, a sense of self, and a sense of praise. There is a spirit of worship, a rapierlike insight, a consciousness of the writer's spiritual awareness of the eternal which carries the reader along and here and there provides an exceptional morsel of spiritual truth for his "deep hunger."

JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

*The Date and Composition of Ezekiel,* by Carl Gordon Howie, Philadelphia, Society of Biblical Literature (Monograph Series, Vol. IV), 1950, pp. 121, $1.50.

This Ph.D. dissertation under the direction of Professor W. F. Albright at Johns Hopkins comes to the defense of the traditional date, locale, and authenticity of Ezekiel. Naturally the background is the work of critical scholarship during the last twenty-five years. The difficulties recognized by these various scholars have been admirably summarized in pp. 5-9, and treated more in detail, especially in pp. 10-46, 85-102. New material supporting orthodoxy is introduced. That from archæology (pp. 43-46), especially the general correspondence of measurements of the east gate of the temple of Ezekiel (40:5 ff) with those of the gates unearthed at Carchemish, Ugarit, Megiddo, Ezion-geber, is interesting but scarcely proves that Ezekiel saw the gates of Solomon's temple. The evidence from philology, in which it is shown that the influence of Aramaic is less marked in Ezekiel than in Chronicles and Ecclesiastes, at least suggests that the writer lived before 300 B.C. Chapter IV (pp. 69-84) is a psychological study in which the author manfully steers his bark between Scylla and Charybdis and declares that Ezekiel was neither a clairvoyant nor a schizophrenic but a sensitive mystical individual with a tendency to psychic abnormality. Much careful, rewarding labor has gone into this thesis; hence it is Q.E.D. But problems in Ezekiel are sure to rise again.

I. G. MATTHEWS

*How Love Grows in Marriage,* by Leland Foster Wood, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. vi, 183, $2.50.

This little volume of eight chapters, and no index, belongs with the hortatory and sermonic writing on marriage. The author is well known in religious circles for his use of tongue and pen to persuade couples to continue in marriage "until God, by death, shall separate" them. By citing some twenty-eight marriages Dr. Wood illustrates, rather than analyzes, how love may grow out of marital problems. The place of the church and the rôle of the minister loom prominent. The idealism of the book is so pronounced that the would-be marriage counselor must look again at the records of a divorce court, or read some case histories of a family service agency, or, perhaps, talk with the man next door, in order that he might also know how love does *not* grow in nearly half the marriages in the United States. Nevertheless, this effort to inspire affection in an institution where, unfortunately, it cannot be taken for granted, is a deserving tribute.

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

*The Brethren of the Common Life,* by Albert Hyma, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950, pp. 222, $3.50.

This is a severely streamlined revision of Hyma's work of 1924, which was entitled *The Christian Renaissance: a History of the Devotio Moderna.* The older work had 150 pages of notes and appendices and bibliography, with thirty-five of these pages in very fine print in Latin. It also gave us chapters on Wessel Gansfort and on the "Christian Renaissance in France," chapters omitted from the new. The present volume, however, expands the final chapter, on "The Imitation of Christ." As one compares the two versions of this chapter, one comes upon an important clue to the revision. Whereas the older version reads: "About four hundred manuscripts are still in existence containing one or more books of the 'Imitation' . . ." (p. 177), the newer reads at the same point: "About seven hundred manuscripts, etc." (p. 158). Hyma is now convinced that Gerard Zerbolt wrote the important core of the immortal classic. Listen to the last sentence, but two, in the text: ". . . the facile pen of Gerard Zerbolt gave to the Imitation such power that his assistant now known as Thomas à Kempis could not reduce it to the level of mediocrity" (p. 194). Hyma's scholarship must be judged by the Dutch scholars who have the language and access to the documents. The American reader can say at the very least that the new volume is greatly more attractive to view and to handle and to read.

JOHN W. BRUSH

*The Best of Dick Sheppard,* edited by Halford E. Luccock, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xx, 162, $2.50.

"Any idea that a round collar is a slipped halo must be once and for all abandoned" (p. 162). That is the last statement you will read in the book, but you will have known it after the five pages that comprise the first selection. I should like to have had the assignment of editing this volume so that I could have the privilege of bringing his "best" to a new generation of readers. The "impatient parson," the vicar of St. Martins in the Fields—who really thinks of him as the Dean of Canterbury or Canon of St. Paul's?—is like the poet whom Louis Untermeyer compared to "a salt breeze blowing through a perfumed, heavily-screened studio." One might envy those who encounter Dick Sheppard for the first time, were it not for the way in which he bears rereading by old friends. Are you looking for a man who was properly called both "a series of explosions" and "a lighthouse"? Meet

Dick Sheppard. Do you want something that is easy to read and hard to forget? Read his "best." ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Charles Freer Andrews: a Narrative,* by Benarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjorie Sykes, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xiv, 334, $3.75.

Charles Freer Andrews was a world Christian and a saint, whose career as friend led him among the poor in Britain, South Africa, the Near East, and India. He helped to interpret East and West to each other, writing books with equal facility on the *Sermon On the Mount, What I Owe to Christ,* and on Mahatma Gandhi and the movement for Indian independence. Wherever he went, he left enduring impression for good. In this volume an Indian and a British author collaborate to furnish a factual narrative based on Andrews' letters and writings, as well as on files of newspaper cuttings, correspondence, and memoranda collected in both England and India. This is the first time a rounded biography of the man has been attempted. While it is impossible to examine all documents scattered in the many parts of the world visited by Andrews, the material presented does give a true and satisfying cross section of his unique life and influence. Several excellent photographs add to the interest of the book. CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

*The Word in Season,* by Hughes Wagner, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 176, $2.

An excellent description of this book is its own preface, which is one of the best statements of the character and value of preaching the great themes of the Christian year—"the word in season." More and more the churches of the evangelical heritage are finding and using the effectiveness of the great seasons of Christian experience. Here this use is well exemplified by an author whose sermons have clarity, conciseness, human interest, and charm. Particular attention should be called to his use of illustrations; they satisfy. (In subsequent editions the author will certainly wish to correct the assigned dates on page 84.) ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*Assignment: Near East,* by James Batal, New York, Friendship Press, ©1950, pp. 119, $1.75.

James Batal, a journalist by profession, has presented in this little book a simple, straight-forward account of the work of Christian missions in the Near East. The story is told out of sincere interest and with a refreshing lack of sentimentality. As far as I am able to judge from my own experience in the Near East, the report is accurate. The influence of Christian missions on life in the Near East certainly cannot be determined by the number of converts that have been reported. *Assignment: Near East* will give those who read it a good idea of what the real influence has been.

WALTER M. MORRIS

*A Book of Pastoral Prayers,* by Ernest Fremont Tittle, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 108, $1.50.

Is there a better discussion of the pastoral prayer than the earlier article of the author reprinted as a preface to this collection? It is to be doubted. In less than twenty pages Tittle has said almost all that can or need be said. In addition to this definitive essay there are seventy prayers of a general nature, for certain days of the Christian year, intercessions for various subjects and occasions, and litanies. Here is an intelligent and inspired addition to the devotional library of the pastor.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*A Coptic Bibliography,* compiled by Winifred Kammerer and others, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1950, pp. xv, 205, $2 (paper), $3 (cloth).

It is a truism that part of erudition is knowing where to find information. In the jingling couplet of Pope,

> ". . . Index-learning turns no student pale,
> Yet holds the eel of science by the tail."—*Dunciard,* B.2.

This Coptic bibliography, inspired and promoted by the veteran Orientalist, W. H. Worrell, is an altogether admirable and indispensable tool for research dealing with texts as well as books and articles on Coptic philology, literature, history, religion, and art published up to 1948. It contains about 3,200 classified items, most of which are annotated. Cross references and an index of authors and places enhance the usefulness of the book. Bibliographic work, according to all experience, is never perfect. It was inevitable that a few items should have escaped the vigilance of the compilers. When the bibliography is published in a revised edition (for which material is now being collected at the University of Michigan), the following should be incorporated. P. A. A. Boeser edits a Dutch translation of "Een briefwisseling van Abgar en Christus" according to a Coptic version in a Leiden manuscript, in *Oudheidkundige Mededeelingen uit het Rijksmuseum van Oudheiden te Leiden,* X, 2 (1929), pp. 71-73 (=*Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie,* XXXI, pp. 71-73); J. van den Gheyne, "Note sur le mot *hermētarion,*" *Mélanges Charles de Harlez* (Leyde, 1896), pp. 321-324; N. J. Hone, "Early Coptic Manuscripts of the Holy Scriptures," *The Tablet* (London), August 19, 1916, p. 236; M. Jugie, "Un apophthegme des pères inédit sur le Purgatoire," *Mémorial Louis Pitit* (Bucarest, 1948), pp. 245-253; and Wadī' Hannā Šenūda's statistical survey (in Arabic) of 3,556 Coptic manuscripts which are in the Nitrian Monasteries, published in *al-Karma,* XVII (1931), pp. 106-110.

BRUCE M. METZGER

*The Church of the Pilgrim Fathers,* edited by George N. Marshall, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. xx, 143, $2.

This little book is a collection of passages from various sources covering the history of the First Church in Plymouth, Mass.—"The Church of the Pilgrim Fathers"—from the time of its gathering in Scrooby Manor in England, through the period of exile in Leyden and the perils of settlement in Plymouth, to the present day. The nine writers who have been drawn upon are ministers or laymen now or formerly connected with the church, and they give a loving account of the various phases through which it has passed, and find in the principles which guided its founders the seeds of modern democracy and of liberal religion. The reader seeking information about the Pilgrims and their church will find it here in readable form, with illustrations, and with references to longer and more authoritative works, but the book throws no new light on a story very familiar to students of American history. None of the contributors has more than a local reputation as an historian, and the method of compilation results in a good deal of repetition of well-known facts. The tourist to New England from other parts of the country, however, who wishes to inform himself about the shrines at Plymouth, will find this book a handy, accurate, and inspiring guide.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

*Communion Meditations,* edited by Gaston Foote, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 176, $2.

The communion meditation is often merely an amorphous expedient. The twenty-five presented here are far from being that. They are excellent expositions in their

own right and, in addition, are challenging examples of restraint. A word of gratitude is due the editor for his choice of authors; they are a goodly company of serious men who know how to write. It would be good if one could promise as well as predict a wide reading of the book. At least one can urge it.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

*The Word Accomplished,* by A. B. Christopher, New York, Philosophical Library, n.d., pp. ix, 176, $3.75.

It is difficult to assess this uncommon book because it fits into no usual category. Adjectives occur to one in reading it such as *rhapsodic, aphoristic, oracular, hortatory,* but they are not conclusively descriptive. The work is also *dogmatic, humorless,* and wholly *sincere.* All of which could be said of considerable stretches of the Bible. Not that the book under consideration is on a par with Holy Writ. It is singularly lacking in experiential concepts, and its literary merit is not high. Yet the mood it evokes is now and then reminiscent of Revelation or preachy portions of the prophets. Most of it moves in a hazy dreamland, occasionally lighted by a fitful figurative speech such as might have occurred to John of Patmos. Without qualification whatsoever the pseudonymous stenographer who has put the book together announces that the Lord speaks therein. Through short parables, accounts of visions, sibylline comments, the "truth" is channeled down to poor mortals. Perhaps it is his blind inadequacy that makes this reviewer prefer knowledge of God in a way that Walt Whitman announced:

> I find letters from God dropped in the street, and every one is
> signed with God's name;
> And I leave them where they are, for I know that wheresoe'er I go
> Others will punctually come for ever and ever.

HARMON M. GEHR

*The Physician Examines the Bible,* by C. Raimer Smith, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. vii, 394, $4.25.

The author, whose hobby is the Bible, is familiar with modern science, in general, and with medical science, in particular. His avowed purpose is to prove that the Bible is "a text book in which evolution is plainly expounded." Two facts rise in protest against this thesis. One, the method of selecting verses, often ripped from their context (*e.g.,* Psalm 129:3, which refers to national disaster, is "a verse which applied to my case" when suffering severely from sciatica) can be used, and too often is by the preacher, to prove any pet theory. This is quite invalid. The other fact is that a vast array of material, at times obscured by translation, proving that all writers of Scripture believed that creation was by fiat, finished, static, has been omitted, no doubt unconsciously, by the author. These ancient writers had no glimmer of the modern theory of cosmic evolution. To them it would have been ridiculous, blasphemous, and atheistic. When Dr. Smith pleads for an understanding of the spirit and not the letter of the law, he is on solid ground; but when to that is added the defense of scientific accuracy in modern terms—even a predictive foregleam of such discoveries as the weight of air, electricity, radio, and the atomic bomb—the author has strayed from the highway of science and religion into the back alleys of mythology. The hobby of the good doctor, though misguided by an untenable presupposition, no doubt has yielded valuable by-products; yet a more rigorous method of interpretation would have provided an indisputable foundation for even greater religious values. Religious insights that are valid survive even when

the thought pattern in which they were first expressed becomes obsolete. The scientific concepts of ancient days have been outmoded by Copernicus, Galileo, Darwin, and Einstein; but the essential message of the ancient prophets has never lost its splendor.

I. G. MATTHEWS

*Moses,* by A. A. Williamson, New York, Philosophical Library, 1950, pp. viii, 231. $4.75.

The full title runs: "Moses, WHO FIRST SAW OUR PYRAMID OF LIFE: A Grand Philosophy of Evolution." A strange title this to a strange book, in which a modicum of sense is mingled with much nonsense. Sense: the acceptance of evolution, emergent evolution preferred; the recognition that life did not come from outside; the probability of spontaneous generation; survival of the fittest, the law in every area of life; the higher forms, characterized by personality, with man at the top, living on and dominating the lower; the whole a "pyramid of life," an organism culminating in the apex, the Cosmic One, the Ultimate Unity. No less significant is the author's rejection of crude interpretations of Scripture, and, though by the strangest exegesis, his conclusion that Moses rejected the idea of Israelitish nationalism in favor of an interracial, international concept of religion. But there is also much nonsense. Not that Moses at the burning bush (and later, by profound reflection, without supernatural aid) could have concluded that the bush (the vegetable kingdom) lived off the creative trinity (soil, air, and moisture); that the sheep (herbivorous) lived off the vegetal; that the carnivora lived off the herbivorous; and that this pyramid of life culminated in the Ultimate Unity; but the suggestion that Moses recorded all this in the Torah, in terms acceptable to twentieth-century evolutionary theory does violence to all Scripture, early and late. To attempt to make the Bible agree, even in a general way, with modern theories of any of the sciences, or with any system of theology, is vicious, beclouds its religious insights, and undermines the sure foundations of revelation.

I. G. MATTHEWS

*Design for Living—From Jewish Life and Lore,* by Esther Rudy, New York, Bloch, 1950, pp. viii, 224, $3.

This volume was conceived as a therapeutic exercise to enable a sorrowing wife to find surcease from grief over the death of her physician husband. Taking the great Jewish words, *Torah* and *Talmud,* and adding thereto the words *Judaism* and *labor,* the author devises a mnemonic scheme by which she aims to summarize Jewish ideals and Jewish concepts so that the lazy reader can progress from zero to mastery of all Judaism. At p. 19 this reviewer surrendered the battle. Gentle Morpheus took command and the roseate Dawn found said reviewer refreshed and zealous for the new day's activities. In Gilbert & Sullivan's *The Mikado* the eloquent Ko-Ko lists many things which, if they were not, "never would be missed; never would be missed." I offer *Design for Living* as a worthy addition to the Ko-Koan inventory.

MORTIMER J. COHEN

*The Unity of Isaiah,* by Oswald T. Allis, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1950, pp. 136, $2.25.

The thesis of the author is that the main value of the Bible rests on prediction, that is, on precise and definite foretelling, and that the superscriptions to the individual books must be equally trustworthy. He holds that if prediction is not sure the Christian has no heavenly guidance. The validity of Christianity thus would seem to be dependent on a type of clairvoyance.

I. G. MATTHEWS

# BOOKS RECEIVED

*Books scheduled for review are not included in this list.*

*The Wit and Wisdom of Roosevelt,* edited by Maxwell Meyersohn, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. 154, $2.

*The Jewish Holidays,* by Isaac Unterman, rev. ed., New York, Bloch, 1950, pp. 300, $3.

*The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1951,* by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. xvii, 478, $2.50.

*The Story of Jesus,* by Blanche Hoke, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1950, pp. 200, $2.

*The Moffatt Bible Concordance,* New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 550, $6.

This concordance is based on the revised and final edition (1934) of Moffatt's famous translation of the Old and New Testaments. It contains between 60,000 and 70,000 entries, "each verse in the 'New Translation' being therefore listed under from two to three separate words." Sturdily bound and well printed, it should prove a most useful tool.

*The Sword with the Golden Hilt,* by Margery Evernden, Caldwell (Ida.), Caxton Printers, 1950, pp. 132, $3.

A well-told story of legend and adventure from days of old in Norway, attractively illustrated.

*The Jesus of History,* by T. R. Glover, New York, Harper, n.d., pp. 190, $2.

This is a reprint of a volume which appeared in 1916. Dr. Glover was an eminent classical scholar whose field of interest embraced the early Christian movement.

*The Idea of the Development of the Soul in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,* by Philip David Bookstaber, Philadelphia, Maurice Jacobs, 1950, pp. 104, $2.

*The Bible and the World* and *Triluminal Science,* by Apostolos Makrakis, Chicago, Orthodox Christian Educational Society, 1950, pp. 483, $5.

A translation into English from the Greek of the author who died in 1905. "In Greece this book aroused so great interest that there can be no doubt that an English translation will be welcomed by believers and skeptics alike." However low an estimate one has of American intelligence, it would still be disillusioning to believe this statement could be true.

*Whitehead and This Modern World,* by Victor Love, Charles Hartshorne, and A. H. Johnson, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. viii, 56, $1.50.

Three essays on a philosopher whose real and lasting significance the future must decide.

*When Minds Go Wrong,* by John Maurice Grimes, Chicago, published by the author (5209 S. Harper Ave.), ©1949, pp. 237, $5.

This is a sizzling indictment with few holds barred of the treatment of the mentally ill by a psychiatrist of twenty years' experience who was for "four years a staff member of the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical Association."

*The Story of Harriet,* by Mary S. Paxson, New York, Exposition Press, ©1950, pp. 48, $2.

No comment.

*The Education of Man: Aphorisms,* by Heinrich Pestalozzi, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xii, 93, $2.75.

If you wish a brief collection of "pithy sayings and aphorisms" at just under three cents a page, here it is.

*The Theology of Albert Schweitzer,* by E. N. Mozley, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. vii, 117, $2.

This time it is a series of quotations from Schweitzer's well-known four volumes on New Testament subjects, compiled by (and frequently prefaced by) one who has "given much thought to theological questions" and who signs his introduction: E. N. Mozley, D.S.O., Lt. Col., R.E. (ret.). He is also "a great-nephew of a Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford and (on another side of my family) of Cardinal Newman." To the volume Dr. Schweitzer dutifully appends an epilogue.

*From the Life of a Researcher,* by William Weber Coblentz, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 238, $4.75.

An informal and pleasant autobiography of an eminent (see *Who's Who in America*) scientist now in his seventy-eighth year.